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ARTICLE
THE RELEVANCE OF FATF’S
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MUTUAL EVALUATIONS TO THE LEGAL
PROFESSION *
Laurel S. Terry** & José Carlos Llerena Robles***
ABSTRACT
More than two hundred countries in the world have agreed to
abide by the anti-money laundering (“AML”) recommendations
developed by the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”), which is an
intergovernmental organization. This Article focuses on the potential
impact on the legal profession of FATF’s fourth round of mutual
evaluations. During these mutual evaluations, which currently are
underway, FATF-affiliated countries examine each other’s compliance
with the FATF Recommendations and recommend follow-up action.
This Article first presents the legal profession-related results from the
completed Mutual Evaluation Reports. A number of these FATF
Reports recommend changes that include requiring lawyers to report
suspicious client transactions, greater enforcement of existing lawyer
AML rules, and changing the entities that supervise lawyer AML

* This Article includes information that was current through July 25, 2018, which is shortly
before the Article’s editorial process began, although much of it was written before December
2017 because it was circulated to the attendees at the Fordham University School of Law
Regulation of Legal and Judicial Services Conference. Because FATF regularly updates its
documents and the FATF Mutual Evaluation process is ongoing, the Authors recommend that
readers check for updates. All URLs were accurate as of July 2018.
**H. Laddie Montague, Jr. Chair and Professor of Law at Penn State’s Dickinson Law,
which is located in the United States. The Author would like to thank Ellen McCleneghan and
Michael Kwon for research assistance, the student editors at the Fordham International Law
Journal, and the many people who helped with this Article. All of Laurel Terry’s articles can be
found at https://works.bepress.com/laurel_terry/ [https://perma.cc/9AFW-PKZN]. Comments
and correspondence about this topic welcome at LTerry@psu.edu.
***Legal Ethics Lecturer at Universidad del Pacífico, Perú.
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efforts. The next Part of this Article examines the legal profession AML
situation in the Authors’ home countries of the United States and Peru,
noting the current or potential impact in these countries of the FATF
Recommendations, the FATF Mutual Evaluation process, and lawyerrelated money laundering scandals. The final Part of this Article
suggests an alternative, education-focused, peer-review approach to
the legal profession portions of the FATF Mutual Evaluations that
arguably would decrease lawyer facilitation of criminal money
laundering activities while better protecting traditional lawyer values
that are globally recognized as important components of
administration of justice and rule of law systems. Because the
regulatory impact of FATF’s mutual evaluations may be much broader
than anti-money laundering issues, everyone interested in the topic of
lawyer regulation should be aware of the FATF Recommendations and
the ongoing mutual evaluation process.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article focuses on international anti-money laundering
(“AML”) standards and the “mutual evaluation” assessments that
currently are underway to measure compliance with these standards.
Viewed from one perspective, this Article focuses on a narrow topic
that might seem of interest to a limited audience. The Authors submit,
however, that this topic should be of interest to everyone interested in
legal services regulation because AML regulations raise issues that
address the core of what it means to be a lawyer. Moreover, the
developments discussed in this Article have the potential to shape not
only lawyers’ AML obligations, but lawyer regulation more broadly,
including the nature of the lawyer-client relationship.
This Article proceeds in the following manner. After a brief
introduction in Part I, Part II continues by explaining why governments
care about money laundering issues and the ways in which lawyers
previously have been involved in illegal money laundering. Part III
provides an introduction to an international intergovernmental body
called the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) and its AML
recommendations. Part IV focuses on the mutual evaluation process
that countries use to evaluate each other’s compliance with the FATF
Recommendations. Section IV.A provides information about the FATF
mutual evaluation process and Section IV.B analyzes the treatment of
the legal profession in the completed reports. Section IV.C explains
how the legal professions in three countries prepared for their mutual
evaluations. Sections V.A and V.B examine the AML lawyer
regulation situation in the United States and Peru, including scandals
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that already have affected or that may in the future affect lawyer AML
regulation. Section V.C highlights the polarized nature of discussions
about lawyer AML issues and identifies two competing narratives that
are used to discuss lawyer AML issues and regulation. Part VI sets
forth a potential new approach towards FATF Mutual Evaluations of
the legal profession that arguably would be more effective than the
current approach in reducing lawyer facilitation of money laundering
and would be more consistent with lawyers’ traditional values.
II. BACKGROUND: GLOBAL MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE
LEGAL PROFESSION
A. The Global Money Laundering Problem
Money laundering is a significant societal problem. 1 The United
Nations has estimated that the amount of money laundered globally in
one year is two to five percent of global gross domestic product, which
is equivalent to US$800 billion to US$2 trillion. 2 Other global bodies
concur in the significance of the problem. 3 Legal profession

1. The FATF Recommendations and the mutual evaluation reports cited throughout this
Article address money laundering and terrorist financing. This Article, however, focuses
exclusively on the problem of money laundering. Because of FATF’s multi-pronged mission,
some of the quotes in this Article also refer to countering the financing of terrorism (“CFT”) or
terrorist financing (“TF”). For additional information about CFT issues, see Shima Baradaran et
al., Funding Terror, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2014).
2. While the UN recognizes that the margin between these two numbers is huge, it has
explained that “even the lower estimate underlines the seriousness of the problem governments
have pledged to address.” UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIMES, MoneyLaundering
and
Globalization,
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/
globalization.html [https://perma.cc/9RKN-FMQJ].
3. See, e.g., EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, Report on the inquiry into money laundering, tax
avoidance and tax evasion (2017/2013(INI)) 1, 10, ¶ AI (A8-9999/2017, Nov. 8, 2017)
[hereinafter EU PANA Committee Final Report]; The IMF and the Fight against Money
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Apr. 2017),
https://www.imf.org/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/31/Fight-Against-MoneyLaundering-the-Financing-of-Terrorism?pdf=1 [https://perma.cc/9U8H-PYSF] [hereinafter
IMF Factsheet]; The World Bank Group’s Response to Illicit Financial Flows: A Stocktaking,
WORLD BANK GROUP (Mar. 22, 2016), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/
502341468179035132/pdf/104568-BR-SecM2016-0112-IDASecM2016-0071-IFCSecM2016-00423-MIGA-SecM2016-0044-Box394878B-PUBLIC-disclosed-4-5-16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WQA7-SEG5].
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organizations have described the scope of the problem as
“staggering.” 4
It is common for countries to provide estimates of the money
laundering occurring in their jurisdiction. 5 For example, in a 2015
report, the US government estimated that approximately US$300
billion is laundered annually in the United States. 6 In 2008, the
Peruvian government estimated that Peru had laundered US$2.1 billion
in illicit funds annually, although it had no data about whether that
money was laundered inside or outside of Peru. 7 The European Union

4. A Lawyer’s Guide to Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering: A collaborative
publication of the International Bar Association, the American Bar Association and the Council
of Bars and Law Societies of Europe 1, 6 (Oct. 2014), https://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2014oct_abaguide_preventingmoneylaundering.authche
ckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/982V-4JMH] [hereinafter IBA/ABA/CCBE Lawyer’s Guide]; see
Jack P. Sahl, Lawyer Ethics and the Financial Action Task Force: A Call to Action, 59 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 457, 463-65 (2015).
5 . See Money laundering and terrorist financing risks, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE,
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/methodsandtrends/documents/ml-tf-risks.html
[https://perma.cc/PW3M-9QKE] (FATF webpage that includes links to multiple risk
assessments). Countries may refer to this type of report as either a risk assessment or a threat
assessment. Compare infra note 6 (citing the 2015 US risk assessment report), with infra note
12 (citing the 2005 US threat assessment report).
6. See National Money Laundering Risk Assessment 2015, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF THE TREASURY 1, 2 (2015), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicitfinance/Documents/National Money Laundering Risk Assessment – 2006-12-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WP32-2XLL] (“It is difficult to estimate with any accuracy how much money
is laundered in the United States. However, while recognizing the limitations of the data sets
utilized, this assessment estimates that about $300 billion is generated annually in illicit
proceeds.”).
7. This estimate is found in Peru’s 2008 Third Round Mutual Evaluation Report. See
Informe de Evaluación Mutua Anti Lavado de Activos y contra el Financiamiento del
Terrorismo (3ra Ronda), Peru [Peru Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti Money Laundering and
against Terrorism Financing (3rd Round)], GRUPO DE ACCIÓN FINANCIERA DE SUDAMÉRICA
[FINANCIAL ACTION GROUP OF SOUTH AMERICA] 1, 4 (July 31, 2008),
https://www.sbs.gob.pe/Portals/5/jer/gafi/files/IEM
Perú
Tercera
Ronda
2008.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2XUL-BLFP] [hereinafter 2008 Peru Mutual Evaluation Report].

FATF’s link to this report takes one to a FATF on Latin America (“GAFILAT”) link which
is broken, but Peru’s report is available on the webpage of the La Superintendencia de
Banca, Seguros, which is the Peruvian Banking Regulator webpage cited above. At the time

this Article was submitted, Peru had completed its risk assessment for the current round of
mutual evaluations, but its Mutual Evaluation Report was not yet publicly available. See infra
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has reported that “annual revenue losses from tax evasion and tax
avoidance amounts to at least EU€1 trillion within the EU alone.” 8 The
United Kingdom recently issued its risk assessment report and included
a separate chapter devoted to AML risks in legal services. 9 The World
Bank encourages money laundering risk assessments and has prepared
a threat assessment template. 10 Risk assessment reports are now
required by FATF Recommendation 1. 11 These reports can help
note 354 and accompanying text (citing an IMF report that referred to the more recent risk
assessment).
8. EU PANA Committee Final Report, supra note 3, at 9 ¶ AC (noting that this figure
includes losses that arguably go beyond more than money laundering). See EU PANA Committee
Final Report, supra note 3, at 8 ¶¶ Q, 10 ¶ AI (November 2017 Parliament PANA Report notes
that “Europol estimates that the Panama Papers account for only 0.6% of the total number of
money laundering cases recorded annually” and that “money laundering cases are increasing,
according to Eurojust statistics.”); REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the assessment of the risks of money laundering and
terrorist financing affecting the internal market and relating to cross-border activities, COM
(2017) 340 final (June 26, 2017).
9. National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 2018, HER
MAJESTY
TREASURY
&
HOME
OFFICE
1,
49-55
(Oct.
2017),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/f
ile/655198/National_risk_assessment_of_money_laundering_and_terrorist_financing_2017_p
df_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/7G6A-WDJQ]. Citing an earlier report, this Report stated that “the
social and economic costs of the most serious and organised crimes total £24 billion per year,
with most of this related to drugs supply at £10.7 billion and fraud at £8.9 billion,” Id. at 20.
10 . See WORLD BANK, Risk Assessment Support for Money Laundering/Terrorist
Financing, (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialsector/brief/
antimoney-laundering-and-combating-the-financing-of-terrorism-risk-assessment-support
[https://perma.cc/E43E-P65Y]:
Why does a country need a national risk assessment for money laundering and
terrorist financing? A framework designed to prevent money laundering and combat
terrorist financing is most effective when it targets resources there where they will
have most effect. This can be done only through a good analysis and understanding
of the money laundering/terrorist financing (ML/TF) risks in the country. This
approach is in line with the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF). FATF recommends that countries identify, assess, and understand the
ML/TF risks within their jurisdiction and then take action and apply resources to
mitigate such risks, based on a risk-based approach . . . . The World Bank has
developed an advisory package to guide countries in conducting their ML/TF risk
assessment.
11. Since 2012, FATF Recommendation 1 has stated that “[c]ountries should identify,
assess, and understand the money laundering and terrorist financing risks for the country, and
should take action, including designating an authority or mechanism to coordinate actions to
assess risks, and apply resources, aimed at ensuring the risks are mitigated effectively.” THE
FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE 4, 9 (2018), http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.p
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“policy makers, regulators, and the law enforcement community better
understand the landscape of money laundering” and “support strategic
planning efforts to combat money laundering.” 12
The United Nations has identified negative consequences that
flow from money laundering. 13 It notes that money laundering fuels
corruption and organized crime. 14 Corrupt public officials need to
launder their bribes, kick-backs, and theft of public funds; organized
crime needs to launder the proceeds of illegal activity such as drug
trafficking and commodity smuggling. 15 The United Nations has also
stated that money laundering can erode a nation’s economy by
changing the demand for cash, making interest and exchange rates
more volatile, and by causing high inflation in countries where
criminals are doing business. 16 It observed that developing countries
that attract “dirty money” as a short-term engine of growth can find it
difficult “to attract the long-term foreign direct investment that is based

dfhttp://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF
Recommendations
2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5RKG-ZQHK]
[hereinafter
FATF
RECOMMENDATIONS]. For information about the FATF Recommendations, see infra notes 7491 and accompanying text.
12. 2007 National Money Laundering Strategy, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY 1, 16, Appendix A (2007), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicitfinance/Documents/nmls.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8PK-5EUN] (citing this as the purpose behind
the 2005 Money Laundering Threat Assessment, which was the first government-wide analysis
of money laundering in the United States). See also World Bank Risk Assessment, supra note
10 (describing the reasons to conduct a risk assessment).
13 . See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, Introduction to Money
Laundering,
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/introduction.html?ref=
menuside [https://perma.cc/S8GT-39B9].
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. For US perspectives regarding the dangers of money laundering, see John
McDowell & Gary Novis, The Consequences of Money Laundering and Financial Crime, 6(2)
ECON. PERSP. 1, 6-8 (May 2001), https://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/
State_Dept_journal_2001.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WF6-6QV8] (listing as negative consequences
of money laundering: 1) undermining the legitimate private sector; 2) undermining the integrity
of financial markets; 3) loss of control of economic policy; 4) economic distortion and
instability; 5) loss of revenue; 6) risks to privatization efforts; 7) reputation risk; and 8) social
costs that can include driving up the cost of government due to the need for increased law
enforcement and health care expenditures, transferring economic power from the market,
government, and citizens to criminals, and corrupting effect on all elements of society).
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on stable conditions and good governance and that can help them
sustain development and promote long-term growth.” 17
For additional proof that countries consider money laundering and
terrorist financing to be significant societal problems, one can consult
the list of countries that are members of the Financial Action Task
Force (“FATF”) or one of its affiliate organizations. 18 Most countries
in the world belong to either FATF or a FATF-affiliate. 19 Because
these countries have agreed to abide by FATF’s Recommendations,
their membership demonstrates a global consensus that money
laundering and terrorism financing are serious societal problems that
need to be addressed. 20 The global consensus to fight money
laundering is also reflected in United Nations General Assembly and
Security Council resolutions that have stressed the importance of
implementing FATF’s Recommendations. 21
B. Lawyer Involvement in Money Laundering
Money laundering typically involves three different stages. 22 The
first step involves “placement” in which illegal proceeds are deposited
into the financial system; the second step involves “layering,” which
conceals the criminal origin of the proceeds; and the third step involves
“integration,” which creates an apparent legal origin for criminal
proceeds and allows the criminal to use the criminal proceeds for his or
her personal benefit. 23 In light of this three-step process, criminals who

17. UN Introduction to Money Laundering, supra note 13.
18. See, e.g., FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, Countries, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/
[https://perma.cc/YLG5-X6V3] (webpage containing a list of countries and indicates whether it
is a member of FATF or a FATF-Style Regional Body). Id. This webpage also contains a “map”
view. Id.
19. See UN Introduction to Money Laundering, supra note 13.
20. See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that countries that
are members of FATF or a FAT-Style Regional Body have agreed to abide by the FATF
Recommendations).
21. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 60/288 at 6 (Sept. 20, 2006), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/60/288 [https://perma.cc/LPH2-ZEXN]; S.C. Res. 1617 (July
29, 2005), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1617%20%282005%29
[https://perma.cc/3J9Q-T527].
22 . See, e.g., U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIMES, The Money-Laundering Cycle,
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/laundrycycle.html
[https://perma.cc/3AV3-UY83], accord IBA/ABA/CCBE Guide, supra note 4, at 4.
23. See UN Introduction to Money Laundering, supra note 13.
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want to launder their illicit proceeds typically require the assistance of
others to do so. 24 Because Step Two involves creating an apparent legal
origin for criminal proceeds, lawyers are among those whose assistance
might be sought. 25
Lawyers who assist clients in money laundering activities might
do so either intentionally or unwittingly. There clearly have been
lawyers who have intentionally engaged in criminal money laundering
activities. 26 For example, in 2013, FATF published a report entitled
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal
Professionals (“FATF Legal Profession Typologies Report”). This
Report cited a number of criminal prosecutions against lawyers who
had knowingly engaged in criminal money laundering activities. 27
Some of the lawyers cited in this Report had masterminded the money
laundering schemes, whereas other lawyers appear to have been
brought into these criminal schemes by their clients or other

24. Id. (noting that the layering stage involves “disguising the trail to foil pursuit”). See
also infra note 25.
25. See IBA/ABA/CCBE Guidance, supra note 4, at 24:
There are three main reasons why lawyers are exposed to misuse by criminals
involved in money laundering activities. First, engaging a lawyer adds respectability
and an appearance of legitimacy to any activities being undertaken – criminals
concerned about their activities appearing illegitimate will seek the involvement of a
lawyer as a stamp of approval” for certain activities. Second, the services that lawyers
provide, e.g., setting up companies and trusts, or carrying out conveyancing
procedures, are methods that criminals can use to facilitate money laundering. Third,
lawyers handle client money in many jurisdictions – this means that they are capable,
even unwittingly, of “cleansing” money by simply putting it into their client account.
26. See Laurel S. Terry, U.S. Legal Profession Efforts to Combat Money Laundering &
Terrorist Financing, 59 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 487, 499 (2015).
27. FATF Report: Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal
Professionals, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE 30, 30 (2013), http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML%20and%20TF%20vulnerabilities%20legal%20prof
essionals.pdf [https://perma.cc/2624-9BNF] [hereinafter FATF Typologies Report] (“Criminal
prosecutions were started in sixteen countries, with Austria, Spain, Italy, and Poland joining the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States reaching double figures of prosecutions
in the last five years.”).
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associates. 28 The United States is among the countries that have
prosecuted lawyers for money laundering. 29
Although there have been a number of cases that involve
intentional wrongdoing by lawyers, it is certainly possible that a lawyer
might unwittingly assist a criminal money launderer, rather than doing
so intentionally. 30 Recognizing this possibility, the International Bar
Association (“IBA”), the American Bar Association (“ABA”), and the
Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (“CCBE”) worked
together to produce a document designed to help lawyers avoid such
unwitting involvement. 31 The IBA/ABA/CCBE Guidance document
identifies a number of “red flags” that could signal a money laundering
situation. 32 The expectation is that if a lawyer recognizes money
laundering “red flags,” that lawyer can investigate further. 33 If a US
lawyer concludes that a client is seeking the lawyer’s assistance in
money laundering activities, the lawyer must refrain from assisting that
client. 34
Although it is clear that some lawyers have intentionally or
unwittingly assisted clients in illegal money laundering activity, there
is a paucity of empirical data about the extent of lawyer involvement

28. Terry, supra note 26, at 499; see generally David J. Middleton & Michael Levi, Let
Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Organized Crime, Lawyers and the Regulation of Legal Services, 55
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 647 (2015).
29 . See Terry, supra note 26, at 499-500 n.57 (listing the twenty-nine US criminal
prosecutions or discipline cases against lawyers cited in the FATF Legal Profession Typologies
Report at 39-146). Peru is not listed in the FATF Typologies Report. See generally FATF
Typologies Report, supra note 21.
30. See, e.g., Paula Frederick, Money for Nothing, 18 GA. B.J. 50 (2012) (describing a
lawyer that inadvertently assisted a money laundering scheme); IBA/ABA/CCBE Lawyer’s
Guide, supra note 4 (written to help lawyers from inadvertently assisting money launderers).
31. See IBA/ABA/CCBE Guidance, supra note 4.
32 . Id. A number of voluntary bar associations and lawyer regulatory bodies have
produced their own documents. Links to these documents are available on the webpages of
organizations such as the AML-related webpages of the ABA, CCBE, Federation of Law
Societies of Canada, Law Council of Australia, and Law Society of England and Wales, among
others. See Laurel Terry, FATF Resources 2017, https://works.bepress.com/laurel_terry/69/
[https://perma.cc/VV64-XUNL] (including links to AML webpages and other resources).
33. See IBA/ABA/CCBE Guidance, supra note 4, at 32
34. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). These rules
are discussed infra in Section V.A.
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in money laundering. 35 Consider, for example, a 2011 report the
consulting firm Deloitte prepared for the European Commission. 36 The
Commission asked Deloitte the following:
f) Role of lawyers in the AML system. Specifically regarding
lawyers, which is the impact of the rules on the client’s access to
law/legal advice? What is the perception of lawyers about their
role in the AML/CFT system? What is the perception from other
professions and from credit and financial institutions about the role
of lawyers? 37

The Deloitte Report concluded that there was a lack of empirical
data about gatekeeper involvement in money laundering. 38 It observed
that there were differing views about the degree to which lawyers are
involved in illegal money laundering activities and the considerations
that that should be paramount when designing AML regulations for
lawyers. 39 The concluding sentences in this section stated: “This
35 . See European Commission: Final Study on the Application of the Anti-Money
Laundering Directive, Service Contract ETD/2009/IM/F2/90, DELOITTE ENTERPRISE RISK
SERVICES
(2009),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/financial-crime/
20110124_study_amld_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/4447-8E88] [hereinafter Deloitte Study];
Middleton & Levi, supra note 28, at 663 (“The extent of intentional lawyer involvement in
money laundering schemes remains only a little better understood now than a decade ago, and
then, it is well evidenced mostly in a few Grand Corruption cases.”). See also Baradaran, supra
note 1 (describing a small-scale empirical study to test how service providers responded to email
solicitations that were designed to raise terrorist financing red flags).
36. See Deloitte Study, supra note 35.
37. Id. at 310.
38. Id. at 294 (“Given the lack of quantitative information it is not possible to draw
conclusions on the frequency with which gatekeepers are misused.”).
39. Id. at 7, 269-73. To illustrate the differing views, see IBA/ABA/CCBE Guidance, supra
note 4, at 6-7:
[W]e do not believe [the FATF Typologies] Report is as helpful as FATF
intended, principally because it focuses heavily on situations in which
lawyers are knowingly involved in money laundering and/or terrorist
financing activities. As a result, the FATF report is in danger of creating a
misleading impression of the legal profession. The profession generally
believes that, contrary to what the FATF typologies report may suggest,
circumstances in which lawyers are knowingly involved in criminal
activities are quite rare.
Compare, id. with Emily M. Halter et al., The Puppet Masters: How The Corrupt Use Legal
Structures To Hide Stolen Assets And What To Do About It, WORLD BANK STOLEN ASSET
RECOVERY (STAR) INITIATIVE 1, 61 (2001), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/
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section of the study sets out the opinions of lawyers on their role in the
AML/CFT system and the opinions of others on the lawyers’ role. It is
clear that opinions differ.” 40
The ongoing conversations about lawyer involvement in money
laundering and the proper scope of lawyer AML regulation are not
taking place in a vacuum, but instead are taking place against the
backdrop of several high-profile events. One prominent event is the
“Panama Papers” leak, which involved the release of millions of
documents taken from the Panama law firm of Mossack Fonseca. 41 The
Panama Papers leak has given rise to discussions about money
laundering in general and lawyers’ roles in illegal money laundering in
particular. 42 For example, the Panama Papers leak led the European

784961468152973030/The-puppet-masters-how-the-corrupt-use-legal-structures-to-hidestolen-assets-and-what-to-do-about-it [https://perma.cc/8CUC-6GFG] [hereinafter The “Puppet
Masters”]. World Bank report highlighted the resistance by the ABA to AML regulations for
lawyers. Id. at 65; See also id. at 22 (noting thirty-two “Grand Corruption” cases in which a
“[p]rofessional legal advisor, solicitor, or attorney who either established a corporate vehicle or
held positions of ownership or management” and suggesting widespread lawyer wrongdoing).
40. Id. at 296. See also Middleton & Levi, supra note 28, at 663 (“At this stage, despite
international differences in both rules and practices of the regulation of the legal profession, the
extent of cross-border arbitrage by those looking for lawyers to help commit or conceal crimes
and their proceeds remains more alleged than proven.”).
41. See Brian Baxter, Dozens of Big Firms to Appear in New ‘Panama Papers’ Database,
AM. LAW. DAILY (May 8, 2016), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/d7f4476c-61804589-bf41-a40529df4e00/?context=1000516
[https://perma.cc/T2XY-LBA4]
(“The
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists is poised to unveil a searchable online
database on Monday drawn from some of the 11.5 million documents that were leaked last
month from the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca.”).
42. See, e.g., id. (listing by name AmLaw 100 firms named in the documents and the office
involved. AmLaw 100 firms is a term used to refer to law firms that the American Lawyer
magazine has included in their annual ranking as among the top 100 law firms according to
variables such as size and profits per partner. The cited Baxter article also includes this
statement: “The Am Law Daily identified dozens of major US and international firms listed in
the database already posted by the ICIJ online, one whose universe figures to grow with its
inclusion of data from Mossack Fonseca. . . . [The ICIJ] also stressed that being included in the
database does not signal participation in illegal activities.”); see also Has the Legal Profession
Lost its Moral Compass? The Panama Papers, Lawyers’ Professional Ethics and Due Diligence
Obligations, ABA SEC. OF INT’L L., Spring Meeting Apr. 28, 2017); see generally Heather M.
Field, Offshoring Tax Ethics: The Panama Papers, Seeking Refuge from Tax, And Tax Lawyer
Referrals, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 35 (2017); Michael D. Goldhaber, Americans in Panama: Did
the Panama Papers scandal net few U.S. citizens because of good policy, or bad? AM. LAW.
(Aug. 1, 2016); Peter J. Henning, Panama Papers Show How Lawyers Can Turn a Blind Eye,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/12/business/dealbook/panamapapers-show-how-lawyers-can-turn-a-blind-eye.html [https://perma.cc/T57L-TJCD].
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Parliament to create its “PANA” Committee, which prepared a report
and resolution, both of which were adopted and included a discussion
about the role of lawyers. 43 The European Union is not alone in
instituting action as a result of the Panama Papers leak. By December
2016, there reportedly had been announcements of more than 150
inquiries, audits, or investigations in seventy-nine countries, and
business executives and attorneys were behind bars awaiting criminal
trials in the Middle East, Europe, and Latin America. 44 News articles
and scholarly articles, as well as government reports, have discussed
whether and how lawyers are involved in money laundering
activities. 45
In addition to global scandals such as the Panama Papers leak,
and the subsequent “Paradise Papers” leak, 46 there have been scandals

43. See EU PANA Committee Final Report, supra note 3, at ¶¶ 131-38; Eur. Parliament,
Recommendation following the inquiry on money laundering, tax avoidance
and tax evasion, P8_TA-PROV (2017)0491 (adopted Dec. 13, 2017), at ¶¶ 138-40,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/135340/P8_TA-PROV(2017)0491_EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RG27-9J9C] [hereinafter EU Parliament Pana Final Recommendations]. For
additional PANA committee documents and a link to the subsequent committee, see
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/pana/home.html [https://perma.cc/8C36-FFFQ].
44. See, e.g., Will Fitzgibbon & Emilia Díaz-Struck, Panama Papers Have Had Historic
Global Effects — and the Impacts Keep Coming, INT’L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE
JOURNALISTS: PANAMA PAPERS (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.icij.org/investigations/panamapapers/20161201-global-impact/ [https://perma.cc/L3CJ-CRMW]. As of July 2018, the Panama
Papers homepage on the ICIJ website posts news items that show continued activity. See
generally
Int’l
Consortium
of
Investigative
Journalists:
Panama
Papers,
https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/
[https://perma.cc/E6WC-W672]
[hereinafter ICIJ Webpage and Database]. The ICIJ webpage includes, inter alia, a database
where one can search by name or country. Id.
45 . Scholarly articles include, inter alia, Field, supra note 42, at nn.11-33 and
accompanying text (citing numerous sources); Arthur J. Cockfield, Big Data and Tax Haven
Secrecy, 18 FL. TAX REV. 483 (2016); Karin Svedberg Helgesson & Ulrika Mörth, Client
Privilege, Compliance and the Rule of Law: Swedish Lawyers and Money Laundering
Prevention, 69 CRIME, LAW & SOC. CHANGE 227 (2018); Middleton & Levi, supra note 28.
News articles include those cited supra in note 42; Susan Beck, Are US Lawyers a Weak Link
in the Fight Against Money Laundering? AM. LAW. DAILY (Dec. 22, 2016). See infra note 48
(citing a US government report). See also EU PANA Report, supra note 3.
46. See Int’l Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Investigations: Paradise Papers,
https://www.icij.org/investigations/paradise-papers/ [https://perma.cc/ULV3-7B8A]; Paradise
Papers: Who are Appleby, the lawyers at the centre of the leak?, BBC (Nov. 5, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-41878881 [https://perma.cc/PQ4B-AND6]; Max Walters,
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in individual countries that have prompted discussions about lawyers’
involvement in money laundering. High-profile events in the United
States include a series of newspaper articles about luxury real estate
transactions, 47 a Congressional hearing about lawyer involvement with
the President of Equatorial Guinea, 48 and a 60 Minutes TV episode that
featured a Global Witness undercover investigation in which an actor
sought legal assistance from a number of US lawyers for a simulated
transaction that was intended to represent a money laundering
scheme. 49 High profile events in Peru include arrests related to the
Panama Papers leak, 50 as well as corruption scandals that involve

Paradise Papers: Legal Firms ‘Ignore The Law With Impunity’, Margaret Hodge Tells
Parliament,
THE
[UK]
LAW
SOCIETY
GAZETTE
(Nov.
14,
2017),
https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/paradise-papers-legal-firms-ignore-the-law-with-impunitymargaret-hodge-tellsparliament/5063696.article?utm_source=dispatch&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=%20
GAZ141016 [https://perma.cc/3P22-T974].
47. See, e.g., Louise Story & Stephanie Saul, Towers of Secrecy: Piercing the Shell
Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2015, (a five-part series), http://nyti.ms/2iPeztb
[https://perma.cc/AUM7-5Y5C]. For an article analyzing the impact of these kinds of
regulations, see Nicholas Nehamas & Rene Rodriguez, How Dirty Is Miami Real Estate? Secret
Home Deals Dried Up When Feds Started Watching, MIAMI HERALD, July 18, 2018,
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/real-estate-news/article213797269.html
[https://perma.cc/F6LE-HMD3] [hereinafter How Dirty is Miami Real Estate].
48. S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, REPORT ON THE
ACTIVITIES
OF
THE
COMMITTEE
COMM.
1,
129-32(2012)
https://www.congress.gov/112/crpt/srpt193/CRPT-112srpt193.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5GVS3DZ2]; see also U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, Second Vice President of Equatorial Guinea Agrees to
Relinquish More Than $30 Million of Assets Purchased with Corruption Proceeds (Oct. 10,
2014),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/second-vice-president-equatorial-guinea-agreesrelinquish-more-30-million-assets-purchased [https://perma.cc/9VGU-BFTT].
49 . See, e.g., Steve Kroft, 60 Minutes: Anonymous Inc., CBS, (Jan. 31, 2016),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/anonymous-inc-60-minutes-steve-kroft-investigation/
[https://perma.cc/4NEZ-UW6H] [https://perma.cc/4NEZ-UW6H] (includes a transcript);
Global Witness, Undercover in New York, https://www.globalwitness.org/shadyinc/
[https://perma.cc/5ZBR-X69A] (includes video clips); Louise Story, Report Describes Lawyers’
Advice on Moving Suspect Funds Into U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2016, at A12; Debra Cassens
Weiss, Group goes undercover at 13 law firms to show how US laws facilitate anonymous
investment,
ABA
J.
(Feb.
1,
2016),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/group_goes_undercover_at_13_law_firms_to_show_
how_us_laws_facilitate [https://perma.cc/Y4R9-EYLJ]; AM. B. ASS’N, News: ABA President
Paulette
Brown
responds
to
“60
Minutes”
segment
(Feb.
1,
2016),
https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-newsarchives/2016/01/statement_of_abapre0.html [https://perma.cc/2BWF-HU6P].
50. See infra notes 337-43 and accompanying text.
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public figures, most of whom are lawyers. 51 One could point to
additional examples, but this discussion should be sufficient to
demonstrate that money laundering is viewed as a serious societal
problem, that criminals might want lawyers’ assistance in illegally
laundering the proceeds of their crimes, that some lawyers have helped
their clients with illegal money laundering, and that there are differing
views about the scope of lawyer involvement.
III. THE ROLE OF THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE IN
SETTING ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING (“AML”) STANDARDS
A. FATF and the FATF-Style Regional Bodies
The Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) is an international
intergovernmental standard-setting body that has provided global
leadership and momentum on anti-money laundering issues. 52 FATF
was established in 1989 during the G-7 Summit in Paris. 53 Its
objectives are to “set standards and promote effective implementation
of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money
laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity
of the international financial system.” 54 FATF has issued anti-money

51. See, e.g., Head of Peru’s Judiciary Resigns As Crisis Grips Justice System, REUTERS
(July 19, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-peru-corruption-resignation/head-of-perusjudiciary-resigns-as-crisis-grips-justice-system-idUSKBN1K92OH [https://perma.cc/NB833FW9]; Peru ex-governor, lawyer arrested over ties to Odebrecht bribes, REUTERS (May 17,
2017).
52. See generally Who We Are, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/
about/whoweare/ [https://perma.cc/NWZ3-S62X].
53. History of the FATF, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/
about/historyofthefatf/ [https://perma.cc/JW3Y-76D7]. Unlike some other international bodies,
such as the World Trade Organization, FATF was not established by a Treaty and does not have
any direct power over the countries that are FATF members. It has great indirect or “soft law”
influence, however, because FATF members and FSRBs have agreed to implement FATF’s
Forty Recommendations. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text; Terry, supra note 26, at
490 n.9 (quoting a 2008 membership policy). The United States is a founding member of FATF.
Id. at 488.
54. See FATF Who We Are, supra note 52. See also the asterisk (*) footnote, supra, which
explains that this Article addresses only money laundering, even though FATF’s mandate also
includes countering terrorist financing.
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laundering recommendations that are extremely influential. These
recommendations are described infra in Section III.B.
FATF’s reach is global, even though its members only include
thirty-five jurisdictions and two regional associations. 55 This is because
FATF has nine “associate members” that are regional organizations
that fight money laundering. 56 All of FATF’s associate members have
been approved as a FATF-Style Regional Body or FSRB, which means
that they have satisfied certain criteria, have endorsed the FATF
Recommendations, and have established processes to monitor
implementation of the FATF Recommendations by their respective
members. 57 More than 200 countries belong to either FATF itself or
one of the FATF-Style Regional Bodies that are FATF associate
members. 58 For the remainder of this Article, the term “FATF” will be
used to encompass both FATF and the FATF-Style Regional Bodies.
FATF also has as organizational “Observers,” a number of influential
organizations, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary

55 . FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF Members and Observers, http://www.fatfgafi.org/about/membersandobservers/ [https://perma.cc/WRM3-DSPX] (“The FATF currently
comprises 35 member jurisdictions and 2 regional organisations, representing most major
financial centres in all parts of the globe.”). The regional organizations are the European
Commission and the Gulf Co-operation Council. Id.
56. FATF Members, supra note 55. FATF’s nine “Associate Members” include 1) the
Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (“APG”); 2) the Caribbean Financial Action Task
Force (“CFATF”); 3) the Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of AntiMoney Laundering Measure and the Financing of Terrorism (“MONEYVAL”); 4) the Eurasian
Group (“EAG”); 5) the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group
(“ESAAMLG”); 6) the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America (“GAFILAT”) (formerly
known as the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America
(“GAFISUD”)); 7) the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West
Africa (“GIABA”); 8) the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force
(“MENAFATF”); and 9) the Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa (“GABAC”).
Id.
57 . Financial Action Task Force Mandate (2012-2020), FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE
(2012), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/FINAL%20FATF%20MANDATE%20
2012-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AGX-2QV9] ¶ 12, Annex B; Twenty-Five Years and Beyond
20-21, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE (2014), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/
brochuresannualreports/FATF%2025%20years.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SS4-32TN] (describing
the history of Associate Members).
58 . See, e.g., Annual Report 2016-17, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE 1, 53 (2018),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF-annual-report-2016-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H6TN-7BSH] (“The FATF and FSRBs bring together over 200 countries that
have each committed to implement the FATF’s Recommendations.”).
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Fund, the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development,
the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the
European Central Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank.59
FATF’s organizational Observers include among their functions a
specific anti-money laundering mission or function. 60 Individual
countries can also request Observer status if they have endorsed the
FATF standards. 61 At the time this Article was written, Indonesia,
Israel, and Saudi Arabia were FATF Observers. 62
FATF members typically meet in a Plenary session three times
per year. 63 The Plenary meetings often take place in Paris, which is the
location of FATF’s Secretariat or headquarters. 64 FATF’s “Outcomes
of Meetings” webpage includes summaries of these Plenary
meetings. 65 In addition to its Plenary meetings, FATF hosts meetings
on particular topics66 and has a number of committee meetings. 67

59. See FATF Members, supra note 55.
60. Id. See also FATF Policy on Observers, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatfgafi.org/about/membersandobservers/fatfpolicyonobservers.html
[https://perma.cc/462EFK85].
61. See FATF Members, supra note 55. FATF Observer countries have endorsed the
FATF standards. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, Process and criteria for becoming a FATF
member, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/membersandobservers/membershipprocessandcriteria.
html [https://perma.cc/RF4M-D79M].
62. See FATF Members, supra note 55.
63 See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, Calendars, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/calendar/
eventscalendar/?hf=10&b=0&s=asc(fatf_date1) [https://perma.cc/4MQL-PRT3 ] (“During a
plenary year, the FATF holds three plenary meetings, a meeting of experts on typologies, and,
depending on the focus of current work, intersessional meetings and meetings of various ad hoc
groups. The plenary meetings usually take place in October, February and June of each year.”).
64 . See id.; FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF Secretariat, http://www.fatfgafi.org/about/fatfsecretariat/ [https://perma.cc/Y7ST-3P8R] (noting the location of the
Secretariat); About Us: Outcomes of meetings, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatfgafi.org/about/outcomesofmeetings/#d.en.198108 [https://perma.cc/X5BW-USMV] (listing the
location of the plenary sessions).
65. See FATF Outcomes of Meetings, supra note 64.
66. See FATF Calendars, supra note 63 (describing meetings typically held during the
year).
67. See FATF Secretariat, supra note 64 (identifies five teams that operate under the
Executive Secretary and includes links to FATF’s annual reports and to the FATF Mandate
2012-2020).
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FATF’s activities go far beyond simply adopting AML
recommendations. One of its most important activities is the mutual
evaluation process and resulting reports that are described infra in
Section IV.A. FATF also issues a number of advisory papers, reports,
and other documents designed to help countries effectively implement
the FATF Recommendations. 68
Two FATF documents that are specific to the legal profession are
FATF’s 2008 “RBA [Risk Based Assessment] Guidance for Legal
Professionals” 69 and the 2013 FATF Legal Profession Typologies
report cited earlier. 70 Legal profession organizations originally had
hoped that when FATF produced its legal profession typologies
document, that document would provide guidance about “red flags”
that lawyers should look for in order to help them recognize money
laundering and thus avoid inadvertently assisting criminals. 71 When the
2013 FATF Legal Profession Typologies Report was issued, however,
its examples and case studies focused primarily on lawyers who had
acted intentionally and were criminals, rather than lawyers who
unintentionally or inadvertently helped their clients engage in money
laundering activities. 72 FATF’s focus on intentional wrongdoing led to

68. See Terry, supra note 64, at 490-92. As of August 2, 2018, FATF’s “All Publications”
webpage listed more than 700 publications. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, All Publications,
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/?hf=10&b=0&s=desc(fatf_releasedate)
[https://perma.cc/H3EQ-FCWK]. Although there are many ways that one can perform a search
on this webpage, including by country or topic, a drop down menu listed the following as the
categories or types of publications that FATF has produced: Report (357); News (92); Meeting
(59); Speech (58); Other (28); Guidance (21); Risk Based Approach (13); Recommendations
(6); and Public Consultation (5). Id.
69. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, RBA GUIDANCE FOR LEGAL PROFESSIONALS (Oct.
23,
2008),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/RBA%20Legal%20
professions.pdf [https://perma.cc/AL6Z-9UYV] [hereinafter FATF RBA FOR LAWYERS].
For additional information about the background and context of this document, see Terry, supra
note 26, at 491-93; Kevin L. Shepherd, The Gatekeeper Initiative and the Risk-Based Approach
to Client Due Diligence: The Imperative for Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for U.S.
Lawyers, 2010 J. PROF. L. 83.
70. FATF Typologies Report, supra note 27.
71. See, e.g., IBA/ABA/CCBE Lawyer’s Guide, supra note 4, at 6 (“Unfortunately, we do
not believe this Report is as helpful as FATF intended, principally because it focuses heavily on
situations in which lawyers are knowingly involved in money laundering and/or terrorist
financing activities.”).
72 . See generally FATF Typologies Report, supra note 27 (most examples involve
intentional wrongdoing by lawyers); see also IBA/ABA/CCBE Lawyer’s Guide, supra note 4,
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the IBA/ABA/CCBE Guidance document cited earlier, which is
directed towards lawyers who might inadvertently assist criminals,
rather than lawyers who are criminal money launderers. 73
B. FATF’s Forty Recommendations and Related Documents
FATF’s Recommendations have evolved over the years. They
originally were adopted in 1990 to fight drug-money laundering. They
were revised in 1996 to expand their scope beyond drug-money
laundering, and were amended in October 2001 to include terrorist
financing activities. 74 Significantly for lawyers, in 2003, FATF
amended the Recommendations so that they applied to “designated
non-financial businesses and professions” (“DNFBP”) who sometimes
are called “gatekeepers.” DNFBPs include lawyers engaged in
designated activities. 75
The FATF Recommendations took their current form in 2012,
when they were significantly restructured and renumbered, and
amended to add some new obligations. 76 Subsequent to 2012, there

at 6; Terry, supra note 26, at n.115 (quoting an Am. Bar Ass’n letter to FATF and a CCBE letter
to FATF).
73 . See generally IBA/ABA/CCBE Lawyer’s Guide, supra note 4 (providing risk
assessment and due diligence guidance and identifying potential red flags).
74. See FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 11, at 7.
75. Compare FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS (Oct. 1996)
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20
Recommendations%201996.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6H3-PMQB] (no reference to DNFBPs),
with FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS (June 2003),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20
Recommendations%202003.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9NT-8TN9] (includes Recommendation
12, which applies Recommendations 5, 6, and 8-11 to “designated non-financial businesses and
professions” which include lawyers involved in certain activities). See generally Review of the
FATF Standards and Historical Versions, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatfgafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/review-and-history-of-fatfstandards.html [https://perma.cc/RM4K-8ASN] (webpage includes links to prior versions). For
a list of the covered activities, see infra note 85.
76 . See, e.g., FATF Recommendations Media Narrative, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE
(2012),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/Press%20handout%20FATF%20
Recommendations%202012.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MVK-46AG] (FATF press release
describing the changes). For an excellent discussion of the 2012 changes, see Gary W. Sutton,
The New FATF Standards, 4 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L. 68, 68-136 (2012). Gary W. Sutton
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have been minor changes. 77 At the time this Article was written, the
FATF Recommendations had most recently been updated in 2018.78
The FATF Recommendations include interpretive notes and additional
material such as a glossary, a list of acronyms, useful links, and a
revisions summary. 79
FATF-related documents and articles that are older than 2012
often refer to the “40+9 FATF Recommendations.” 80 This is because,
in their pre-2012 format, the first forty recommendations addressed
money laundering and the last nine recommendations addressed
terrorist financing. 81 Although the Recommendations were
restructured in 2012 and reduced to forty, no major concepts were
deleted. 82 Since the 2012 restructuring, the Recommendations are
called either the “FATF Forty Recommendations” or the “FATF
Recommendations.” 83
Not all of the forty FATF Recommendations apply to DNFBPs. 84
The key FATF Recommendations that apply to DNFBP lawyers are
Recommendations 22 and 23. Moreover, lawyers are only covered by
the DNFBP FATF Recommendations if they are engaged in one or
more of five specified activities. 85

was “Senior Legal Advisor for Financial Crime in the Office of the General Counsel at the U.S.
Treasury Department, where he served as a member of the U.S. Delegation to the FATF and
participated in the FATF’s review of the standards.” Id. at 68.
77. FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 11, at 129-30 (summarizing the changes since
2012, including the February 2018 and October 2018 changes).
78. Id. at 3 (showing the 2018 adoption date).
79. See FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 11, at 29-107 (Interpretive Notes) and id.
at 108-28 (other items).
80. See, e.g., Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the Financial Action Task
Force and Its 2008 Lawyer Guidance, J. PROF. L. 3 (2010) (referring to the 40+9
Recommendations).
81. Id. at 9.
82. See generally Sutton, supra note 76, at 74-75.
83. Compare Twenty-Five Years, supra note 57 (referring to FATF Forty
Recommendations), with Media Narrative, supra note 76 (referring to the FATF
Recommendations); Terry, supra note 26, at 489.
84 . See FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 11, at 4 (the heading before
Recommendations 22 and 23 is “Designated non-financial Businesses and Professions
(DNFBPs)”).
85. See FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 11, at R. 22(d):
22. DNFBPs: customer due diligence

2018]

RELEVANCE OF FATF’S RECOMMENDATIONS

647

Recommendation 22 is entitled “DNFBPs: customer due
diligence.” It specifies that the “due diligence” and record keeping
requirements found elsewhere in the FATF Recommendations also
apply to covered DNFBPs, including lawyers. 86 Recommendation 23
is entitled “DNFBPs: Other measures” and it too incorporates by
reference other FATF recommendations. 87 Recommendation 23
incorporates by reference the following FATF Recommendations:
Internal controls and foreign branches and subsidiaries (Rec. 18);
Higher-risk countries (Rec. 19); Reporting of suspicious transactions
(Rec. 20); and [No] Tipping-off and confidentiality (Rec. 21). 88
Recommendation 23, which requires suspicious transaction reporting
(“STR”) and prohibits disclosure of an STR (no “tipping off” or

The customer due diligence and record-keeping requirements set out in
Recommendations 10, 11, 12, 15, and 17 apply to designated non-financial businesses
and professions (“DNFBPs”) in the following situations:
...
(d) Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants – when
they prepare for or carry out transactions for their client concerning the following
activities:
 buying and selling of real estate;
 managing of client money, securities or other assets;
 management of bank, savings or securities accounts;
 organisation of contributions for the creation, operation or management of
companies;
 creation, operation or management of legal persons or arrangements, and buying
and selling of business entities.
86. Id. at 17-18 (DNFBPs include lawyers engaged in one of the five activities described
supra, are subject to the customer due diligence and record keeping requirements in
Recommendations 10, 11, 12, 15, and 17). Recommendation 10 is entitled “Customer due
diligence”; Recommendation 12 is entitled “Politically exposed persons;” Recommendation 15
is entitled “New technologies”; and Recommendation 17 is entitled “Reliance on third parties.”
Id. at 12, 14-16.
87. Recommendation 23 states in pertinent part:
The requirements set out in Recommendations 18 to 21 apply to all designated nonfinancial businesses and professions, subject to the following qualifications:
(a) Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants should
be required to report suspicious transactions when, on behalf of or for a client, they
engage in a financial transaction in relation to the activities described in paragraph
(d) of Recommendation 22.
Id. at 18-19 (Recommendation 23).
88. Id. at 18-19.
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“NTO”), has proven more controversial for lawyers than
Recommendation 22. 89
The Interpretive Note to Recommendation 23 adds an important
qualification. Because of the importance of this Interpretive Note and
the frequency with which reference to this Note is omitted, 90 it is
reprinted below in its entirety:
INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION
(DNFBPS – OTHER MEASURES)

23

1. Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals, and
accountants acting as independent legal professionals, are not
required to report suspicious transactions if the relevant
information was obtained in circumstances where they are subject
to professional secrecy or legal professional privilege.
2. It is for each country to determine the matters that would fall
under legal professional privilege or professional secrecy. This
would normally cover information lawyers, notaries or other
independent legal professionals receive from or obtain through one
of their clients: (a) in the course of ascertaining the legal position
of their client, or (b) in performing their task of defending or
representing that client in, or concerning judicial, administrative,
arbitration or mediation proceedings.
3. Countries may allow lawyers, notaries, other independent legal
professionals and accountants to send their STR to their
appropriate self-regulatory organisations, provided that there are
appropriate forms of cooperation between these organisations and
the FIU [Financial Intelligence Unit].
4. Where lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals
and accountants acting as independent legal professionals seek to
dissuade a client from engaging in illegal activity, this does not
amount to tipping-off. 91

89. See, e.g., CCBE, Anti-Money Laundering Committee, Other Documents,
https://www.ccbe.eu/actions/committees-working-groups/?idC=791&Committee=AntiMoney-Laundering [https://perma.cc/LGE4-CGKP] (tab entitled “Other” including links to
legal challenges brought in Belgium, France, and EU Courts); Fed’n of Law Soc’ys of Can. v.
Canada, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 401 (Can.); see also Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the Financial
Action Task Force and its 2008 Lawyer Guidance, J. PROF. L. 3, 39-45 (2010) (discussing “How
Has the Legal Profession Responded to the FATF 40+9 Recommendations?”).
90. See infra notes 125-71 and accompanying text (describing the treatment of the legal
profession in FATF’s 4th Round Mutual Evaluation Reports).
91. FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 11, at 83.
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Parts IV and V, infra, provide additional information about the
ways in which this Interpretive Note to Recommendation 23 has—or
has not—been cited by FATF or FATF-Style Regional Bodies in their
mutual evaluations of their members.
IV. THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND FATF’S FOURTH ROUND OF
MUTUAL EVALUATIONS
This Part focuses on the legal profession’s experience during the
current round of FATF mutual evaluations. Section IV.A provides
background information about the current evaluation round and
identifies the documents that are most relevant to this process. Section
IV.B analyzes how the legal profession has fared in the most recent
round of FATF mutual evaluations. Section IV.C offers case studies
from three countries that show different levels of engagement among
legal profession and government representatives.
A. FATF’s Ongoing Fourth Round of Mutual Evaluations
FATF’s Mutual Evaluations are peer reviews that “assess levels
of implementation of the FATF Recommendations” and provide “an
in-depth description and analysis of each country’s system for
preventing criminal abuse of the financial system.” 92 FATF currently
is engaged in its fourth round of mutual evaluations. 93 Although some
countries have received fewer than four mutual evaluation reports and
others have received more than four, this Article will refer to all of the
current reports as FATF 4th Round Mutual Evaluation Reports. 94
92. Mutual
Evaluations,
FIN.
ACTION
TASK
FORCE,
http://www.fatfgafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/?hf=10&b=0&s=desc(fatf_releasedate)
[https://perma.cc/4AZP-MBTS] [hereinafter FATF Mutual Evaluations Webpage].
93. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, Procedures for the FATF Fourth Round of AML/CFT
Mutual evaluations (updated June 2018), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/
methodology/FATF-4th-Round-Procedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/E44T-T7LJ] [hereinafter
FATF 4th Round Procedures].
94. Countries that belong to a FATF-Style Regional Body rather than FATF may have
received fewer than four reports. Some countries have had more than four evaluations because
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FATF’s fourth round of Mutual Evaluations differs from the third
round because FATF members are attempting to measure both the
effectiveness of a country’s AML measures, as well as that country’s
technical compliance with the FATF Recommendations. 95
FATF’s Mutual Evaluations webpage contains a wealth of
information about what countries can expect during the current mutual
evaluation process. 96 For example, the Mutual Evaluations webpage
contains links to the most recent versions of a Mutual Evaluation
Methodology document 97 and a Mutual Evaluation Procedures
document. 98 FATF has also prepared a much shorter document entitled
“Consolidated Processes and Procedures for Mutual Evaluations and
Follow-Up: ‘Universal Procedures,’” that states the procedures that
should be followed by all assessment bodies, including the FATF-Style
Regional Bodies and international financial bodies such as the World
Bank. 99 Among other things, the longer Mutual Evaluation Procedures
document includes a sample timetable and explains the procedure for
follow-up after a Mutual Evaluation Report is approved by the FATF

there have been follow-up reports. See generally FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, Countries,
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/ [https://perma.cc/PYU5-M5F7]. Clicking on an individual
country will lead to a webpage that usually includes links to prior mutual evaluation reports. But
see supra note 7 (noting the broken links on FATF’s Peru page).
95 . See generally Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance with the FATF
Recommendation and The Effectiveness of AML/CFT Systems FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE (Feb.
2018),
http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/methodology/FATF%20Methodology%2022%20Feb%202013.
pdf [https://perma.cc/8SBA-9VG4] [hereinafter FATF 4th Round Methodology].
96. See Mutual Evaluations Webpage, supra note 92.
97. See FATF 4th Round Methodology, supra note 95. This methodology document has
been updated several times.
98. See FATF 4th Round Procedures, supra note 93. Similar to the FATF 4th Round
Methodology document, supra note 95, the FATF 4th Round Procedures document has been
updated several times. See, e.g., Procedures for the FAFT Fourth Round of AML/CFT Mutual
Evaluations, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/methodology/FATF-4th-RoundProcedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZHW-3DJX].
99. See Consolidated Processes and Procedures for Mutual evaluations and Follow-Up
“Universal Procedures,” FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE ¶ 2 (June 2018), http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/FATF-Universal-Procedures.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TY7G-HTSS]
[hereinafter June 2018 FATF Universal Procedures]. This document has also been updated
regularly. See, e.g., Consolidatd Processes and Procedures for Mutual Evaluations and FollowUp: “Universal Procedures,” http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/Universal-Procedures2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7YN-Y42X].
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Plenary. 100 Because a FATF mutual evaluation requires extensive
preparation, legal profession representatives who want to provide input
to their governments will need to prepare months before the country’s
scheduled on-site assessment visit. 101
The FATF webpage includes a “calendar” link on the main menu;
if one clicks on this link, one can then select either the “events
calendar” or the “assessment calendar.” 102 Table 1 on the assessment
calendar provides information about which countries have an
upcoming mutual evaluation, which entity will conduct the evaluation,
the date of the country’s last evaluation, the proposed date for the onsite visit, and the tentative date during which that country’s Mutual
Evaluation Report will be discussed by the FATF Plenary. 103 The
assessment calendar webpage also contains two search windows that
allow one to search by country or by examining body (e.g., FATF or a
particular FATF-Style Regional Body). 104 Table 2 on the Assessment
100. See FATF 4th Round Procedures, supra note 93, at 27-31 (timeline) and 16-17 (post
Plenary procedures).
101. See id. at 27-31. Appendix 1 – Timelines For the 4th Round Mutual evaluation
Process provides that at least six months before the on-site visit, the FATF assessment team will:
1) commence research and desk-based review on technical compliance;
2) confirm (or find) assessors drawn from countries which had volunteered and have the
FATF President formally advise the country of the assessors once confirmed; and
3) invite delegations to provide information about (a) assessed country’s risk situation and
any specific issues which should be given additional attention by assessors and (b) their
international cooperation experiences with the assessed country.
Id. at 26. During this same time period, the country that is being assessed is expected to: a)
designate contact point(s) or person(s) and set up an internal coordination mechanisms (as
necessary); and b) respond to technical compliance update by providing updated information on
new laws and regulations, guidance, institutional framework, risk and context. Id. Four months
before a country’s Mutual Evaluation on-site visit, the country will have the opportunity to
comment on the eleven Immediate Outcomes that are set forth in the FATF Methodology
document and that will be the basis for a country’s “effectiveness” rating. Id. Two months before
the on-site visit, the country has the opportunity to comment on the technical compliance
assessment prepared by the assessment team. Id.
102 . See Global Assessment Calendar, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatfgafi.org/calendar/assessmentcalendar/?hf=10&b=0&s=asc(document_lastmodifieddate)&table
=1 [https://perma.cc/N5MQ-KR7X] [hereinafter FATF Global Assessment Calendar]. This is
the Calendar page that one sees if one clicks on the “Assessment Calendar” tab from the FATF
Calendar webpage, supra note 63.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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Calendar contains a list of countries to be assessed whose mutual
evaluation dates have not yet been scheduled. 105 These pages show that
the legal professions in most countries either have had or soon will have
their AML regulatory system evaluated by FATF members.
FATF’s Mutual Evaluation Methodology document sets forth
“immediate outcomes” that will be used to determine a country’s
effectiveness rating during the FATF 4th Round of Mutual
Evaluations. 106 Appendix II of this Methodology document is a
template for the Mutual Evaluation Report that is prepared after the
assessors’ mutual evaluation on-site visit. 107 This template
recommends an executive summary of five pages or less, a report that
is 100 or fewer pages, and annexes that are sixty pages or fewer.108
Many reports, however, exceed this length. 109 Legal profession
105. See FATF Global Assessment Calendar, supra note 102.
106. See FATF 4th Round Methodology, supra note 95, at 93-122 (these pages specify the
“Immediate Outcomes” that will be used to measure the effectiveness of a country’s
implementation of the FATF Recommendations). See infra note 132 for information about the
Immediate Outcomes most relevant to the legal profession.
107. See FATF 4th Round Methodology, supra note 95, at 124-45.
108. Id. at 124.
109. The completed reports are available on the FATF Mutual Evaluations webpage, supra
note 92. The fifty completed FATF 4th Round Mutual Evaluation Reports are listed below. For
ease of use, these citations have included the abbreviations of the FATF-Style Regional Body,
if any, issuing the report. See supra note 56 and the accompanying text for these abbreviations
and information about the FATF-Style Regional Bodies. Separate URLs are not included since
all of these are available on the FATF Mutual Evaluations webpage. These are listed in
alphabetical rather than chronological order. MONEYVAL, Anti-Money laundering and
Counter-Terrorist Financing counter-terrorist financing measures, Andorra, Fifth Round
Mutual Evaluation Report (Sept. 2017); MONEYVAL, Anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing measures, Armenia, Fifth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (Dec. 2015);
FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Australia, Mutual
Evaluation Report (Apr. 2015); FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing
measures, Austria, Mutual Evaluation Report (Sept. 2016); CFATF GAFIC, Anti-money
laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, The Bahamas, Mutual Evaluation Report
(July 2017); APG, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures,
Bangladesh, Mutual Evaluation Report, (Oct. 2016); CFTAF GAFIC, Anti-money laundering
and counter-terrorist financing measures, Barbados, Mutual Evaluation Report (Feb. 2018);
FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Belgium, Mutual
Evaluation Report (Apr. 2015); APG, Anti‐money laundering and counter‐terrorist financing
measures, Bhutan, Mutual Evaluation Report (Oct. 2016); ESAAM, Anti-money laundering and
counter-terrorist financing measures, Botswana, Mutual Evaluation Report (May 2017); APG,
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Cambodia, Mutual
Evaluation Report (Sept. 2017); FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing
measures, Canada, Mutual Evaluation Report (Sept. 2016); GIFLAT, Mutual Evaluation Report
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of the Republic of Costa Rica (Dec. 2015); GIFLAT, Mutual Evaluation Report of the Republic
of Cuba (Dec. 2015); FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures,
Denmark, Mutual Evaluation Report (Aug. 2017); ESAAM, Mutual Evaluation Report, AntiMoney Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, The Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia (May 2015); APG, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing
measures, Fiji, Mutual Evaluation Report (Oct. 2016); GIABA, Anti-money laundering and
counter-terrorist financing measures, Ghana, Mutual Evaluation Report (May 2017); CFATF
GAFIC, Mutual Evaluation Report of the Republic of Guatemala (Nov. 2016); GAFILAT,
Mutual Evaluation Report of the Republic of Honduras (Oct. 2016); MONEYVAL, Anti-money
laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Hungary, Fifth Round Mutual Evaluation
Report (Sept. 2016); FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures,
Iceland, Mutual Evaluation Report (Apr. 2018); FATF, Anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing measures, Ireland, Mutual Evaluation Report (Sept. 2017); MONEYVAL,
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Isle of Man, Fifth Round
Mutual Evaluation Report (Dec. 2016); FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist
financing measures, Italy, Mutual Evaluation Report (Feb. 2016); CFATF GAFIC, Anti-money
laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Jamaica, Mutual Evaluation Report (Jan.
2017); APG, Anti‐money laundering and counter‐terrorist financing measures, Macao, China,
Mutual Evaluation Report (Dec. 2017); FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist
financing measures, Malaysia, Mutual Evaluation Report (Sept. 2015); FATF, Anti-money
laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Mexico, Mutual Evaluation Report (Jan.
2018); APG, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Mongolia,
Mutual Evaluation Report (Sept. 2017); GAFILAT, MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA (Oct. 2017); FATF, Anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing measures, Norway, Mutual Evaluation Report (Dec. 2014); GAFILAT,
Mutual Evaluation Report of the Republic of Panama (Jan. 2018); FATF, Anti-money
laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Portugal, Mutual Evaluation Report (Dec.
2017); APG, Anti‐money laundering and counter‐terrorist financing measures, Samoa, Mutual
Evaluation Report (Sept. 2015); MONEYVAL, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist
financing measures, Serbia, Fifth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (Apr. 2016); FATF, Antimoney laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Singapore, Mutual Evaluation
Report (Sept. 2016); MONEYVAL, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing
measures, Slovenia, Fifth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (June 2017); FATF, Anti-money
laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Spain, Mutual Evaluation Report (Dec.
2014); APG, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Sri Lanka,
Mutual Evaluation Report (Sept. 2015); FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist
financing measures, Switzerland, Mutual Evaluation Report (Dec. 2016); FATF, Anti-money
laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Sweden, Mutual Evaluation Report (April.
2017); FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Switzerland,
Mutual Evaluation Report (Dec. 2016); APG, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist
financing measures, Thailand, Mutual Evaluation Report (Dec. 2017); CFATF GAFIC, Antimoney laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Trinidad and Tobago, Mutual
Evaluation Report (June 2016); MENA FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist
financing measures, Tunisia, Mutual Evaluation Report (May 2016); ESAAM, Anti-money
laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Uganda, Mutual Evaluation Report (Apr.
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representatives can use this template when considering what
information their governments and FATF will want to know about the
country’s legal profession.
FATF’s Mutual Evaluations webpage includes useful information
about completed mutual evaluations. 110 For example, one of the
subheadings on this page is entitled “Consolidated Assessment
Ratings.” 111 Underneath this heading one can find links to both PDF
and Excel versions of a document entitled Consolidated Table of
Assessment Ratings. 112 These PDF and Excel documents summarize
the results of the completed 4th Round FATF Mutual Evaluations.113
The Consolidated Table of Assessment Ratings is regularly updated.114
This Article relies on the July 25, 2018 version of this document.

2016); MONEYVAL, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures,
Ukraine, Fifth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (Dec. 2017); FATF, Anti-money laundering
and counter-terrorist financing measures, United States, Mutual Evaluation Report (Dec. 2016);
APG, Anti‐money laundering and counter‐terrorist financing measures, Vanuatu, Mutual
Evaluation Report (Sept. 2015); ESAAM, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist
financing measures, Zimbabwe, Mutual Evaluation Report (Sept. 2016).
110. See generally FATF Mutual Evaluations Webpage, supra note 92.
111. See FATF Mutual Evaluations Webpage, supra note 92.
112. Id.
113. Id. (including links to both PDF and Excel versions of the Consolidated Table of
Assessment Ratings). See infra note 114 for links to the July 25, 2018 versions of the PDF and
Excel documents, which are the versions that this Article relies on. Because FATF updates these
ratings table after each Plenary session, it is inevitable that this Article will not be fully up-todate when published. The current versions of the Consolidated Table of Assessment Ratings
appear as links on the FATF Mutual Evaluations page, supra note 92. The July 25, 2018 version
on which this Article is based will continue to be available at a permalink cite, which is
https://perma.cc/FSK6-57AZ] (It is perhaps worth noting that the title that appears on the FATF
Mutual Evaluations Webpage, supra note 92, is slightly different than the title that appears on
the PDF document when one selects the link and opens the document. The document itself
begins with the word “Table” rather than the words “Consolidated Table.”).
114 . Compare Table of ratings for assessment conducted against the 2012 FATF
Recommendations, using the 2013 FATF Methodology, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE (updated
July 25, 2018), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/4th-Round-Ratings.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FSK6-57AZ] [hereinafter July 25, 2018 Consolidated Table of Assessment
Ratings], with FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, Table of ratings for assessment conducted against the
2012 FATF Recommendations, using the 2013 FATF Methodology (updated Oct. 12, 2017),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/4th-Round-Ratings.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Y6PRMJN]. As explained supra note 94, some countries are listed more than once because the Table
of Consolidated Assessment Ratings includes follow-up reports. Id. (showing follow-up reports
for Austria).

2018]

RELEVANCE OF FATF’S RECOMMENDATIONS

655

The July 2018 Consolidated Table of Assessment Ratings lists the
name of each country whose 4th Round Mutual Evaluation Report has
been published and presents information about that country’s technical
compliance ratings and its effectiveness ratings. 115 As noted earlier, the
FATF Mutual Evaluation Methodology document specifies that fourth
round evaluations focus on both technical compliance and
effectiveness, the latter of which is measured by examining eleven
immediate outcomes. 116 For each of the forty FATF
Recommendations, a country will receive one of the following
technical compliance ratings:
C

Compliant

LC Largely
compliant—There
shortcomings.
PC Partially
compliant—There
shortcomings.

are

only
are

minor
moderate

NC Non-compliant—There are major shortcomings.
NA Not applicable—A requirement does not apply, due to
the structural, legal or institutional features of the
country. 117

For each of the eleven “Immediate Outcomes” that are specified
in the FATF Mutual Evaluation Methodology document and that are
used to measure the “effectiveness” of a country’s implementation of
the FATF Recommendations, 118 a country will receive one of the
following “effectiveness” ratings:
HE High level of effectiveness—The Immediate Outcome is
achieved to a very large extent. Minor improvements needed.
SE Substantial level of effectiveness—The Immediate Outcome
is achieved to a large extent. Moderate improvements needed.

115. See July 25, 2018 Consolidated Table of Assessment Ratings, supra note 114.
116. See supra notes 106, 118-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Immediate
Outcomes.
117. Id.
118. See FATF 4th Round Methodology, supra note 95, at 93-122. For a discussion of the
Immediate Outcomes most relevant to the legal profession, see infra note 132 and accompanying
text.
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ME Moderate level of effectiveness—The Immediate Outcome is
achieved to some extent. Major improvements needed.
LE Low level of effectiveness—The Immediate Outcome is not
achieved or achieved to a negligible extent. Fundamental
improvements needed. 119

Before a country’s data is included in a Consolidated Table of
Assessment Ratings, the FATF Plenary will discuss the report and
approve its publication. 120 After the Plenary approves the publication
of a Mutual Evaluation Report, there will be a follow-up process
designed to ensure quality and consistency. 121 Once the required
follow-up occurs, links to that country’s final Mutual Evaluation
Report will be available on the FATF Mutual Evaluations webpage.122
B. Findings About the Legal Profession in the Completed FATF
Fourth Round Mutual Evaluations
Fifty jurisdictions were listed in FATF’s July 25, 2018
Consolidated Table of Assessment Ratings. 123 All of these jurisdictions
have received reports that evaluate both their technical compliance

119. Id.
120. See, e.g., June 2018 Universal Procedures, supra note 99, at 7-8 (including the
sections on “Plenary discussion” and “Publication and other procedures following the Plenary”);
FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, Outcomes of the Plenary meeting of the FATF, Paris, 22-24
February 2017 http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/outcomes-plenaryfebruary-2017.html [https://perma.cc/7JLB-5L5E] (“Discussion of the mutual evaluation report
of Sweden”).
121. See, e.g., supra note 99 (citing FATF’s 4th Round Universal Procedures document).
See supra note 120 (citing the February 2017 Plenary discussion of Sweden’s Mutual Evaluation
Report).
122 . See FATF Mutual Evaluations Webpage, supra note 92 (the reports are listed
chronologically, but one can also search by country or region). A few countries have requested
and received a rerating. See, e.g., Technical Analysis of FATF Recommendations – Rerating of
Cuba, GAFILAT (Oct. 2017), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/merfsrb/FUR-Cuba-Oct-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/YER7-GQ83]. Some countries have follow-up
reports, as well as the initial mutual evaluation report. See, e.g., 1st Follow-Up Report
Mutual Evaluation of Fiji, APG (Oct. 2017), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/
reports/mer-fsrb/FUR-Fiji-Oct-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/WT9A-XC25] (follow-up from Fiji’s
2016 FATF 4th Round Mutual Evaluation Report, supra note 109).
123. See FATF Consolidated Table of Assessments Ratings, supra note 114. During the
editing process for this Article, FATF posted November 2, 2018 versions of the Consolidated
Tables of Assessment Ratings. This Article is based on the July 2018 ratings. As noted in the
asterisk footnote to this Article, the FATF process is ongoing.
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with the FATF Recommendations and the effectiveness of their actions
with respect to eleven Immediate Outcomes. 124 As the discussion that
follows demonstrates, the legal profession has not fared particularly
well in these Mutual Evaluation Reports.
FATF Recommendation 22 is the “due diligence” provision that
applies to DNFBPs, including lawyers who are engaged in one of five
activities. 125 The July 25, 2018 Consolidated Table of Assessment
Ratings lists the evaluated countries’ technical compliance ratings for
Recommendation 22.126 These ratings are as follows:
• Nine Non-Compliant Jurisdictions: Australia, Botswana,
Canada, Fiji, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Thailand,
and the United States.
• Twenty-Three Partially Compliant Jurisdictions:
Andorra, Austria, Bahamas, Cambodia, Costa Rica,
Denmark, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Jamaica, Macao China, Mexico, Norway, Portugal,
Samoa, Serbia, Singapore, Switzerland, Tunisia, Uganda,
Vanuatu, and Zimbabwe.
• Seventeen Largely Compliant Jurisdictions: Armenia,
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Cuba, Ethiopia, Ghana,
Honduras, Isle of Man, Italy, Malaysia, Panama, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Trinidad & Tobago, and Ukraine.
• One Fully Compliant Jurisdiction: Bhutan. 127
The July 25, 2018 Consolidated Table of Assessment Ratings also
lists the technical compliance ratings for Recommendation 23, which
is entitled “DNFBPs – Other Measures.” 128 Recommendation 23
includes the suspicious transaction reporting (“STR”) obligation and
124. For a discussion of the Immediate Outcomes, see supra notes 95, 118-19 (discussing
the effectiveness ratings and the content of the eleven Immediate Outcomes). See also supra
note 94 (explaining why the reports from some jurisdictions may not be called their 4th Report);
supra note 114 (explaining why some jurisdictions are listed more than once on the Consolidated
Table of Assessment Ratings).
125. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the content of
Recommendation 22.
126. See July 2018 Consolidated Table of Assessments Ratings, supra note 114.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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the “no tipping off” (“NTO”) prohibition on notifying the person that
a suspicious transaction report has been made. 129 Both of these
obligations apply to DNFBPs, which includes lawyers who are
involved in one of the five designated activities. 130 The FATF 4th
Round Mutual Evaluation Report ratings for Recommendation 23 are
as follows:
• Six Non-Compliant Jurisdictions: Australia, Canada,
Mexico, Mongolia, Nicaragua, and the United States.
• Twenty-Four Partially Compliant Jurisdictions: Andorra,
Bahamas, Barbados, Bhutan, Botswana, Costa Rica, Fiji,
Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Isle of Man,
Jamaica, Macao China, Samoa, Serbia, Singapore, Sri
Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, Vanuatu,
and Zimbabwe.
• Eighteen Largely Compliant Jurisdictions: Austria,
Bangladesh, Belgium, Cambodia, Cuba, Denmark,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, Norway,
Panama, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, Trinidad & Tobago,
and Ukraine.
• Two Fully Compliant Jurisdictions: Armenia and
Spain. 131
Immediate Outcomes 3 and 4 are the “effectiveness” ratings that
are most relevant to the legal profession. 132 None of the fifty countries

23.

129. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of Recommendation

130. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of Recommendation
23, including the requirements that DNFBPs report suspicious transaction and the prohibition
on DNFBPs notifying or “tipping off” the individual in question that a report has been made.
131. See Consolidated Table of Assessments Ratings, supra note 114.
132. See FATF Methodology, supra note 95, at 93-102. See supra notes 95, 118-19 and
accompanying text for additional information about the inclusion in the fourth round of mutual
evaluations “effectiveness” ratings which are measured by the “immediate outcomes.” The
content of Immediate Outcomes 3 and 4 is set forth in the FATF 4th Round Methodology
document, supra note 95, at 99-104. Some of the issues included in Immediate Outcome 3s
effectiveness rating include “how well do supervisors, on a risk-sensitive basis, supervise or
monitor the extent to which . . . DNFBPs are complying with their AML/CFT requirements?”
and “to what extent are supervisors to demonstrate that their actions have an effect on
compliance by . . . DNFBPs?” Id. at 100. Some of the core issues included in in Immediate
Outcome 4’s effectiveness rating include “how well do . . . DNFBPs understand their ML/TF
risks and AML/CT obligations?”; “How well do . . . DNFBPs apply the enhanced or specific
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whose Mutual Evaluation Reports were published as of July 2018
received a “high level of effectiveness” rating for either Immediate
Outcome 3 or Immediate Outcome 4. 133 Only six of fifty countries
received a “substantial level of effectiveness” rating on Immediate
Outcome 3 and only one country received a “substantial level of
effectiveness” rating on Immediate Outcome 4. 134 The majority of
countries evaluated received a rating of “moderate level of
effectiveness,” although more than twenty-five percent received the
lowest possible rating on Intermediate Outcome 3 and almost thirtyfive percent received the lowest possible rating on Intermediate
Outcome 4. 135 As noted earlier, the FATF effectiveness ratings are for
all categories of DNFBPs; the legal profession is not rated
separately. 136 Interestingly, Australia and the United States received
“noncompliant” ratings for their technical compliance with
Recommendations 22 and 23, but received “moderate” effectiveness
ratings for both Intermediate Outcomes 3 and 4. 137 Canada received a
noncompliant rating on both Recommendations 22 and 23, but it
received one of the very few “substantial” effectiveness ratings on

measures for [risk]?”; “to what extent do . . . DNFBPs meet their reporting obligations on
suspect proceeds of crime . . . ?”; “How well do . . . DNFBPs apply internal controls and
procedures . . . to ensure compliance with AML/CFT requirements?” Id. at 102-03. To show that
these are the most relevant to the legal profession, see infra notes 215-19 and accompanying text
(Immediate Outcomes 3 and 4 were the outcomes for which US legal profession representatives
were asked to provide information).
133. See July 25, 2018 Consolidated Table of Assessment Ratings, supra note 114.
134. Id. (showing that Canada, Cuba, Ireland, Macao China, Malaysia, and Spain received
a “substantial” effectiveness rating on Intermediate Outcome 3 and Armenia received a
substantial effectiveness rating on Intermediate Outcome 4).
135. Id. (showing that thirty countries received the “moderate” effectiveness rating on
Immediate Outcome 3 and thirty-two countries received the “moderate” effectiveness rating on
Immediate Outcome 4. Fourteen countries received the “low” effectiveness rating on Immediate
Outcome 3 and seventeen countries received the low effectiveness rating on Immediate Outcome
4). Id.
136. See supra notes 95, 118-19, 132 and accompanying text regarding the effectiveness
ratings.
137. See July 25, 2018 Consolidated Table of Assessment Ratings, supra note 114.
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Intermediate Outcome 3 and received a “moderate” effectiveness rating
on Intermediate Outcome 4. 138
Despite the range of scores for DNFBPs, when lawyer AML
efforts are discussed in the FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports, the tone
is quite harsh. It is true that there are a few Mutual Evaluation Reports
that are largely silent about the legal profession. 139 It is also true that
there are some Reports that note that most or all of the jurisdiction’s
lawyers are not engaged in the kinds of activities to which the FATF
Recommendations apply. 140 There are also a very few Reports that
contain neutral or mostly positive reviews of the legal profession.141
Overall, however, it is striking how many of the FATF Mutual
Evaluation Reports contain negative comments about that legal
profession’s AML regulations or implementation. This is true even for
countries that received “largely compliant” technical compliance
ratings for Recommendations 22 and 23. 142

138. Id. The Consolidated Table of Assessment Ratings shows that some of the countries
that performed the best on the DNFBP technical compliance ratings performed poorly on the
effectiveness ratings and vice-versa. Id.
139. See, e.g., Bangladesh MER, supra note 109.
140. See, e.g., Andorra MER, supra note 109, ¶ 130; Cuba MER, supra note 109, at 124
(“Under Decree-Law 317, the above professions are reporting entities when they prepare for, or
carry out, transactions for customers concerning the management of client money, securities or
other assets. However, at present this criterion does not apply as lawyers, notaries and other legal
professionals and natural or legal persons working as accountants independent or under other
forms of non-state management are not allowed to conduct this activity in accordance with the
rules governing the power and activities of each sector (Decree-Law 81 for lawyers and Law 50
for state notaries).”); Bahamas MER, supra note 109, at 51, ¶ 133 (“Although a majority of
attorneys do not comply with AML/CFT measures since they do not perform the designated
activities and have concerns regarding legal professional privilege, they are aware of their
obligations . . . .”).
141. See, e.g., Vanuatu MER, supra note 109, ¶ 256 (“Some lawyers do not regularly
handle client funds, e.g. where litigation is the main business focus, but may from time to time
receive funds through bank accounts (not cash) on behalf of customers as part of a property
settlement transaction. AML/CFT procedures appear to be adequate in the major firms at least.
Not all firms appear to have updated their AML/CFT policies and procedures to encompass the
2014 legislative changes. The nature of their non-TCSP business has not warranted STRs to
date.”); see generally Austria MER, supra note 109 (the tone seems more positive than most,
citing information such as the lawyer discipline system and education efforts); Macao, China
MER, supra note 109, ¶ 269 (“For other DNFBPs, the level of awareness of risk and AML/CFT
requirements varies, with a good awareness of risks and obligations among notaries, lawyers
and accountants, and a lower awareness among real estate agents and high value goods
dealers.”).
142. See, e.g., Italy MER, supra note 109.
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The types of criticisms that appear in the FATF Mutual Evaluation
Reports vary. For example, some of the Reports assert that the
evaluated country has an inadequate AML regime for lawyers. 143 This
was the finding in the US Mutual Evaluation Report, which gave the
United States a non-compliant ratings for its technical compliance with
Recommendations 22 and 23. 144 The concluding sentence in the “Key
Findings” section of the US Mutual Evaluation Report was that the
“most significant supervisory gap is lack of comprehensive [AML]
supervisory processes for the DNFBPs, other than casinos.” 145
Another criticism of the legal profession that appears in the
Mutual Evaluation Reports is that even when an AML regime for
lawyers exists, lawyers do not understand that they are subject to those
AML regulations. 146 Armenia, for example, received a rare

143. See, e.g., Nicaragua MER, supra note 109, ¶¶ 353, 358; Thailand MER, supra note
109, ¶ 24 (“A significant scope gap remains with the lack of inclusion of lawyers or accountants
in the AML/CFT framework in Thailand”), ¶ 373 (“include lawyers . . . in the AML/CFT
framework. The particulars of obligations should reflect risk assessment findings”); Turkey
MER, supra note 109, at r. 16 (Deficiency 1) (“Accountants, lawyers and other legal
professionals are not required to submit STRs and are not subject to other measures covered by
Recommendations 14, 15 and 21.”); Uganda MER, supra note 109, ¶ 37 (“The institutional
framework providing for lawyers’ compliance with their AML/CFT CDD obligations is weak
and for foreign corporate clients, lawyers heavily rely on verification information they request
from their foreign counterparts without necessarily verifying it themselves.”); Guatemala MER,
supra note 109, at 3 (“Activities carried out by lawyers and notaries referred to by the FATF
Standards are not all subject to AML/CFT regulations and they are not supervised for such
purpose.”); Austria MER, supra note 109, ¶¶ 28, 33 (“Some DNFBP sectors, such as lawyers
and notaries, showed a good understanding of TFS obligations . . . Notaries, lawyers, and
accountants play a key role within the economic system as they are often involved in high risk
business like company formations and real estate transfers. There are concerns whether they
fulfil their gatekeeper role effectively.”).
144. Id. at 257.
145. United States MER, supra note 109, at 5.
146. See, e.g., Bhutan MER, supra note 109, ¶ 27 (describing lack of awareness by
DNFBPs, which is a category that includes lawyers); Botswana MER, supra note 109, ¶ 276
(“The real estate agents and lawyers are not aware of their CDD requirements such as due
diligence measures to verify customer and conduct customer profiling.”); Fiji MER, supra note
109, at 72-73, ¶¶ 263, 273 (noting the general understanding of ML risks was low with outreach
to DNFBPs, including lawyers, low); Uganda MER, supra note 109, ¶ 215 (“Lawyers and
Accountants have implemented basic Know Your Client and Due Diligence procedures. Due to
the fact that no AML/CFT specific supervision activities have taken place in the DNFBP sector,
very limited awareness of the AML/CFT obligations exist within the sector.”); Mexico MER,

662

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:2

“compliant” rating on Recommendation 23, but its Mutual Evaluation
Report stated that “the legal community has a poor understanding of
the AML/CFT law.” 147 A third type of criticism is that the jurisdiction’s
lawyers may understand as a theoretical matter that they are subject to
their country’s AML regulations, but the lawyers do not understand the
risks they face or they are not properly following or implementing the
existing AML regulations. 148 Some FATF Reports have also implicitly
or explicitly criticized the entities that regulate lawyers. 149

supra note 109, at 87 (“Key Findings . . . Discussions suggested that lawyers and accountants
generally have a lower level of awareness of their AML/CFT obligations.”).
147. Armenia MER, supra note 109, ¶ 259. This Report stated that the “evaluation team
was advised that the legal community has a poor understanding of the AML/CFT law, which
suggests that risk and appropriate mitigating measures are not in place. The further provision of
information to the legal sector was suggested as being necessary.” Id.
148. See, e.g., Ghana MER, supra note 109, ¶ 201 (“Most of the lawyers interviewed by
the assessment team demonstrated low level of understanding of ML/TF risks associated with
the services they provide and their profession as a whole”); Mexico MER, supra note 109, at ¶
27 (“Reporting by DNFBPs is generally poor in both quantitative and qualitative terms, a
particular concern being that professionals (lawyers and accountants) have not filed a single STR
in the past three years”); Portugal MER, supra note 109, ¶ 267 (“Some other sectors (e.g. lawyers
and notaries) do not consider that their services can be used for ML/TF purposes, even
unwittingly, and therefore do not even consider the possibility that a transaction or service for a
client could be suspicious. This reinforces the concerns expressed about the lack of
understanding of ML risks by these professions . . .”), ¶ 115 (“However, actors like dealers in
high-value goods, real estate agents and lawyers - some of which are considered at specific risk
of ML/TF abuse - need to increase their AML/CFT involvement, which may require more
awareness raising since their STR reporting is significantly lower than that of other entities.”);
Trinidad and Tobago MER, supra note 109, ¶ 15 (“There is no evidence that the legal profession
complies with AML/CFT measures. This is a serious deficiency having regard for the significant
role played by these professionals as financial intermediaries (gatekeepers) in introducing and
facilitating such a large percentage of financial transactions.”); Uganda MER, supra note 109, ¶
86 (“All lawyers practicing in Uganda are subject to AML/CFT obligations. However in terms
of implementation, the lawyers in general have not been doing much to comply with their
AML/CFT obligations.”); Zimbabwe MER, supra note 109, ¶ 86 (“Although at law the DNFBPs
are subject to AML/CFT requirements, there is no implementation nor supervision for
compliance with requirements.”); Hungary MER, supra note 109, at 88 (“The level of SARreporting by the DNFBP sector - especially by lawyers, notaries and casinos - is not considered
adequate by the assessment team considering their involvement in transactions with high-risk
customers and products.”); Panama MER, supra note 109, ¶ 382; see also Barbados MER, supra
note 109, ¶ 196 (not all lawyers involved in real estate dealings understand the risks they face);
Ukraine MER, supra note 109, ¶ 400(c)-(d) (noting that lawyers did not recognize risks posed
by the use of fictitious companies or by clients seeking work beyond the lawyer’s expertise).
149. See, e.g., Portugal MER, supra note 109, at 95 (“For some DNFBPs (lawyers),
AML/CFT supervision is not exercised at all.”); Ghana MER, supra note 109, ¶ 201 (although
the IBA has AML/CFT guidelines for its members, the Ghana Bar Association, which is an IBA
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There have also been criticisms of lawyers related to the Mutual
Evaluation Process itself. In some countries, the legal profession has
been criticized because its representatives did not participate in the
country’s preparation of its national risk assessment report. 150 In other
countries, the legal profession contributed to the preparation of the
national risk assessment report, but that country’s FATF Mutual
Evaluation Report was critical of the conclusions about the legal
profession found in the risk assessment report. 151 A related criticism is
member, has “yet to appreciate and adapt or develop similar guidance for its members”);
Barbados MER, supra note 109, ¶ 233 (“Lawyers are obligated to become members of the
Barbados Bar Association and are required to register with the supreme court, however no
evidence was provided to the Assessors to demonstrate the integrity of the registration
process.”); Iceland MER, supra note 109, ¶ 292 (“There is no designated supervisor in law for
lawyers, and the [Iceland Bar Association, which is the mandatory professional body] did not
demonstrate an understanding or consideration of the potential ML/TF risks within the legal
sector.”); Macao, China MER, supra note 109, at 86 (“AAM [the Macao Lawyers Association,
which is the chief supervisory body,] has undertaken no AML/CFT on-site inspections (off-site
monitoring only) of lawyers since 2011 and the DSF on-site inspection visits have been
irregular.”); Malaysia MER, supra note 109, ¶ 28 (“The DNFBP sectors, with the exception of
the casino are under-supervised for AML/CFT compliance due mainly to a shortage of AML/
CFT supervisory staff in FIED, although risk-based approaches and cooperation with SRBs is
allowing for steps to mitigate risks in the high-risk DNFBP sectors.” Elsewhere, however, the
MER stated that “The Bar Council has a well-established track record of applying the fit and
proper controls under the Legal Professions Act 1976.” Id. at 107); Thailand MER, supra note
109, ¶ 416 (“Comprehensive fit and proper checks do not extend to DNFBPs. [The Lawyer
Council includes] licensing criteria that cover some fit and proper elements, however these are
not broad enough.”); see also Mexico MER, supra note 109, at 101, ¶¶ 270, 309 (noting that less
than 3% of lawyers belong to one of seven bar associations and that lawyers who were not bar
members were less aware of their AML/CFT obligations and recommending passage of the
delayed legislation that would require that lawyers belong to professional bodies).
150. See, e.g., Serbia MER, supra note 109, ¶ 448:
The Bar Association does not undertake supervision and lawyers did not respond to
the questionnaires issued with the intention of informing the ML NRA. The NRA
designates the sector as low risk, which does not appear to be adequate in light of the
systematic refusal of the sector to meet its AML/CFT obligations and the significant
role played by lawyers in relation to legal persons and real estate transactions.
Bhutan MER, supra note 109, at 29, ¶ 67 (noting the participation of all key stakeholders in the
National Risk Assessment Working Group, except for various kinds of DNFBPs, including
lawyers, who lack a professional association); see also Austria MER, supra note 109, ¶ 247
(“There seems to be no sufficient overall approach within the profession of lawyers to analyse
risks and develop AML/CFT systems to reduce these risks for the whole sector.”).
151. See, e.g., Sri Lanka MER, supra note 109, at 75–76 (“The NRA considers notaries to
have low exposure to foreign and high-risk customers, but does not elaborate on the basis for
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that the legal profession has not properly acknowledged the risks
lawyers present in facilitating money laundering activities. 152 Some
countries have been criticized because the lawyers who met with the
on-site assessment team were unfamiliar with the national risk
assessment. 153 Finally, some Reports seemed to criticize the legal
profession because the FATF team did not meet with any lawyers
during the mutual evaluation team’s on-site visit. 154
this assessment beyond professional judgment. There have been cases of ML investigations
reported in relation to the legal profession and notaries in the last five years.”); Mexico MER,
supra note 109, ¶ 321 (“The upgrading of the professional service providers (especially lawyers)
to medium-risk in the SAT model appears to be more appropriate than the categorization in the
NRA.”); Panama MER, supra note 109, ¶ 347 (“Although the National Strategy affirms that the
impact of the [lawyers] sector’s vulnerabilities is low, recent events, particularly the “[Panama]
Papers” case, indicate the opposite.”).
152. See, e.g., Belgium MER, supra note 109, ¶ a5 101:
The reservations expressed by the accountancy and legal professions, lawyers in
particular, about the national risk assessments are problematic. The supervisory
bodies for these professions did not provide a contribution to the national ML risk
assessment, and although they say that they started to consider risk once they became
aware of these analyses, they do not share the assessment’s conclusions, which
present their professions as particularly risky in terms of ML. They consider that they
have adequate controls in place to counter the main threats and that misconduct is
largely the preserve of those outside the regulated professions.
Honduras MER, supra note 109, ¶ 104 (“It is important to mention that lawyers and notaries do
not agree with being obliged subjects and expressed that they should not be subject to any
requirements established by the law. This represents a lack of awareness related to their role
regarding AML/CFT.”); Italy MER, supra note 109, ¶ 250 (“There is no common appreciation
of lawyers’ vulnerability to being used by ML facilitators, although most agreed that risks are
highest in real estate transactions, advising on project capital, and/or providing tax advice.”);
Spain MER, supra note 109, ¶ 5.4141041:
Lawyers have a low level of awareness of ML/TF risks, do not recognise the level of
risk in their profession, and feel that their AML/CFT obligations pose an unnecessary
burden. . . . Lawyers have played a central role in establishing and operating the
organised ML networks which have been at the centre of a number of high-profile
ML prosecutions. . . . However, the involvement of lawyers in these cases is not seen
as representative of the risks: the lawyers involved are considered as complicit
criminals (Malaya) or as acting recklessly (White Whale).
Mexico MER, supra note 109, ¶ 270 (“Representatives of these professions [including lawyers]
who were met with do not seem to appreciate that the misuse of legal persons is a major ML risk
facing their professions.”).
153. See, e.g., Andorra MER, supra note 109, ¶ 197 (“The evaluation team met a lawyer
that had not participated in the NRA process, and had not seen its output . . . .”).
154. See, e.g., Samoa MER, supra note 109, at 74–75, ¶ 251:
While the evaluation team did not meet with the Law Society, the AGO asserts that
lawyers should be aware of their obligations under the MLP Act 2007, however this
could not be verified by the evaluation team; nor was it possible to determine whether
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Although there are many criticisms of lawyers in the FATF
Mutual Evaluation Reports, only a few Reports cite or discuss the
Interpretive Note to Recommendation 23 or the administration of
justice and rule of law concerns that underlie the Interpretive Note to
Recommendation 23. 155 One of the rare exceptions is Austria’s Mutual
Evaluation Report, which talked about the need to balance AML goals
and lawyer privilege. 156 The Report observes, however, that the
“evaluation team is not convinced that Austria has succeeded to find
the right balance.” 157
Although a number of FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports urged the
examined country to adopt AML regulations for lawyers, 158 these
Reports arguably use a “one size fits all” solution. For example, none
of the Reports cited the Interpretive Note to Recommendation 23 or
examined the degree to which the country in question had weighed the
competing arguments in order to determine for itself “the matters that

lawyers accept their AML/CFT obligations . . . . However, no supervision of the legal
profession has been undertaken by the SFIU and the understanding of risks, by both
the profession and the regulator is uncertain. Authorities believe that lawyers are
aware of the risks associated with onboarding clients or when offering financial
advice to clients or when they are involved in handling accounts or opening/operating
trust accounts on behalf of their clients, but it is not known whether lawyers are
meeting their AML/CFT obligations.
155. See, e.g., Andorra MER, supra note 109, ¶ 290 (citing the FATF MER footnote that
referred to the interpretive note privilege issue); Ukraine MER, supra note 109, ¶ 210 (noting
that the legal privilege-based exemption to lawyers’ and others’ reporting obligations do not
appear to unduly or unreasonably obstruct the requirement of a legal professional to submit an
STR and so is in line with the FATF standards).
156. See Austria MER, supra note 109, ¶ 150.
157. Id. It also stated:
The strict conditions for obtaining/compelling information and the scope of
professional privilege were mentioned as deficiencies already in the third mutual
evaluation of Austria. The problems faced by prosecutors when pursuing ML
investigations due to the factors mentioned above seems to prolong investigations and
most probably also contribute to the high rate of dismissed investigations.
Id. The Austria Mutual Evaluation Report cited with approval, however, a 2012 Austrian
Supreme Court case. The case “stated in its decision that legal privilege does not cover
instruments used for criminal acts, having facilitated criminal acts or having been produced by
criminal acts . . . nor other pieces of evidence, in particular written documents which are not a
communication between the professional and his client.” Id. ¶ 155.
158. See, e.g., supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
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would fall under legal professional privilege or professional
secrecy.” 159 Although FATF’s RBA [Risk Based Assessment]
Guidance for Legal Professions discusses the “unique position of
lawyers in society” and the importance of lawyers to the rule of law,160
none of the FATF 4th Round Mutual Evaluation Reports cited this
FATF document. 161 FATF’s RBA Guidance for Legal Professions
includes the following language which echoes Recommendation 23’s
Interpretive Note and emphasizes the important role that lawyers play
in preserving the rule of law and administering a country’s system of
justice:
Lawyers are members of a regulated profession and are bound by
their specific professional rules and regulations. Their work is
fundamental to promoting adherence to the rule of law in the
countries in which they practice. Lawyers hold a unique position
in society by providing access to law and justice for individuals
and entities, assisting members of society to understand their
increasingly complex legal rights and obligations, and assisting
clients to comply with the law. 162
None of the Reports contains an extended discussion of the potential
tension between anti-money laundering goals, on the one hand, and the
rule of law goals identified in the RBA and the Interpretative Note to
Recommendation 23, on the other hand. 163 None of the fifty Mutual
Evaluation Reports issued by July 2018 discussed whether the country
had done the type of balancing and evaluation that the Interpretive Note
to Recommendation 23 contemplates. 164 In those Mutual Evaluation
Reports in which privilege is cited at all, the Reports rather cavalierly
dismiss the privilege and do not address the implications for the

159. Compare supra note 91 (Recommendation 23’s Interpretive Note language), with
the Mutual Evaluation Reports, supra note 109.
160. See FATF RBA Guidance for Legal Professionals, supra note 69, at 5-6.
161. See generally FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports, supra note 109 (word search for
“RBA” revealing no results).
162. FATF RBA Guidance, supra note 69, at 5-6, ¶ 11.
163. See generally Mutual Evaluation Reports, supra note 109.
164. Id.
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administration of justice or the rule of law if one fundamentally
changes the nature of the lawyer-client relationship. 165
Consider, for example, Serbia’s Mutual Evaluation Report. 166
This Report referred to the legal profession’s interest in client
confidentiality as a “negative cultural approach.” 167 This section of the
Report did not include any discussion of whether client confidentiality
might be warranted or whether lawyers in Serbia were invoking
confidentiality inappropriately. Instead, it said:
In particular, [the Serbian Bar Association] is aware that lawyers
consider that AML/CFT obligations conflict with those emanating
from legal privilege and as a result consider their priority to be
their duty to their customer, leading to a lack of compliance by the
legal sector with its AML/CFT obligations. The views expressed
by the Bar Association, however, mirrored the negative cultural
approach of the legal profession to AML/CFT obligations and it
did not accept the existence of other risks connected with the legal
sector or the gatekeeper role lawyers should hold. 168

165. See, e.g., Botswana MER, supra note 109, ¶ 30:
[L]egal practitioners have been identified by both the private and public sectors as
being high risk for ML yet these sectors have a very limited awareness of the ML/TF
risks and the AML/CFT requirements that apply to them. Whilst, this is mostly
attributed to the lack of supervision and monitoring of these sectors by their
supervisors due to lack of internal capacity, the Law Society of Botswana is also of
the view that application of the AML/CFT requirements will be in conflict with the
client lawyer privilege.
Id. ¶ 74; Ghana MER, supra note 109, ¶ 201 (noting that lawyers “feel that their AML/CFT
obligations pose an unnecessary burden” without addressing the issue further other than to say
that “[a]lmost all of the Lawyers do not fully understand the essence of their gatekeeper role
within the AML/CFT regime and the responsibility and integrity that it requires.”).
166. See Serbia MER, supra note 109, ¶ 448.
167. Id.
168. Id. The reference to “AML/CFT” refers to anti-money laundering (“AML”) and
countering the financing of terrorism (“CFT”), both of which are topics addressed by the FATF
Recommendations. See supra notes 1 (citing the CFT acronym), 11 (citing the FATF
Recommendations), 81 and accompanying text (explaining the expansion of the FATF
Recommendations after the 9/11 attack to include a focus on terrorist financing).
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Costa Rica’s Mutual Evaluation Report provides another
example. It observes that the “reluctance showed by some
professionals, such as lawyers, to provide information on their
customers by virtue of professional secrecy significantly affects the
transparency of legal persons domiciled in Costa Rica.” 169 Despite this
reference to privilege, Costa Rica’s Mutual Evaluation Report did not
refer to Costa Rica’s privilege law, the Interpretative Note to
Recommendation 23, the FATF RBA Guidance for Legal Professions,
or the underlying rule of law concerns that might lie behind lawyers’
attitudes. 170
There are additional examples that one could cite. 171 These
examples, however, illustrate a tone that is commonly found in the
FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports. Thus, the overall impression from
reading these Reports is that few of the FATF Mutual Evaluation
Reports, if any, are balancing AML obligations and rule of lawprivilege concerns, or evaluating whether privilege is warranted or how
it has been applied. The bottom line is that the Reports show that few,
if any, of the legal professions around the world are doing what FATF
wants or expects of them.
C. Three Case Studies of Legal Profession Engagement in the FATF
Mutual Evaluation Process
This Section provides information about how the legal professions
in three countries prepared for their FATF mutual evaluations. Legal
profession representatives in Australia, Canada, and the United States
appear to have had quite different levels of engagement with their
governments. It appears that the US legal profession representatives
likely had the most interaction with their government, followed by
Australia, and then Canada. Although this sample size is small and the
results may not be representative of other countries’ experiences, the
range of experiences incurred by these countries may prove useful to

169. Costa Rica MER, supra note 109, ¶ 450. But see Nicaragua MER, supra note 109, ¶
TC 345 (noting that Mutual Legal Assistance cannot be refused MLA for reasons of secrecy or
confidentiality except that it is obtained in circumstances in which it applies the legal
professional privilege or legal professional secrecy).
170. See generally Costa Rica MER, supra note 109.
171. See, e.g., Honduras MER, supra note 109.
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legal profession representatives in countries that have not yet
undergone their FATF 4th Round Mutual Evaluation.
Australia not only was the first of these three countries to undergo
its evaluation, but it was one of the first countries overall to complete
its FATF 4th Round Mutual Evaluation. 172 The Law Council of
Australia interacted with FATF on behalf of Australia’s legal
profession. 173 Law Council representatives shared with this Article’s
Authors a description of their involvement and preparation efforts. 174
The Law Council reports that Australian government authorities
did not seek any input from the Law Council when the government
prepared Australia’s risk assessment or when preparing documents for
the FATF on-site visit. 175 It was, however, invited to participate in the
on-site visit. 176
Before meeting with the FATF representatives, the Law Council
representatives prepared for the on-site interview by:
• Analyzing the ML risk assessment and the TF threat
assessment (prepared by Australian government
authorities) to ascertain the risks as they apply to the legal
services sector;

172. See Australia MER, supra note 109. Australia’s report is dated April 2015. Id. Only
Norway and Spain have reports dated earlier—both of their reports are dated December 2014.
See July 2018 Consolidated Table of Assessment Ratings, supra note 114, at 1 (includes the date
of the final report).
173. See About Us, LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, https://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/aboutus [https://perma.cc/3CGE-77JZ]:
The Law Council of Australia (Law Council) is the peak national representative body
of the Australian legal profession. The Law Council represents the Australian legal
profession on national and international issues, on federal law and the operation of
federal courts and tribunals. It works for the improvement of the law and of the
administration of justice. The Law Council is a federal organisation representing
65,000 Australian lawyers through their bar associations and law societies and Law
Firms Australia (the Constituent Bodies).
174. See Email and attachments from Margery Nicoll, Deputy Chief Executive Officer &
Director, International, Law Council of Australia, to Laurel S. Terry (Oct. 29, 2017) (on file
with Author) [hereinafter Nicoll Email].
175. See Nicoll Email, supra note 174.
176. Id.
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Undertaking research to understand how and to what
extent the risks are mitigated; and
• Attempting to understand the assessment mechanism of
the 2013 Methodology particularly in reference to
effectiveness in the particular sense intended by the
Methodology. 177
The Law Council proactively pursued regular engagement with
Australian government authorities (both policy and regulatory
authorities) and developed, where possible, areas of shared
understanding. 178 This process highlighted areas of concern for matters
where little information seemed to be available, such as a cost/benefit
analysis of AML/CTF regulation and evidence of whether the regime
was impacting/reducing the incidence of serious crime. 179
When the FATF representatives made their on-site mutual
evaluation visit, Law Council of Australia representatives had the
opportunity to meet with them. 180 The Australian Attorney General’s
department, which is responsible for AML policy development,
coordinated these meetings. 181 The practitioners who met with FATF
representatives had volunteered in response to a memo sent by the Law
Council to its members and the profession. 182 The Law Council
representatives were chosen based on their expertise and knowledge of
AML/CTF regulation, legal profession regulation, ethics, and the
international picture. 183 The Law Council sought the opportunity to
provide documents directly to the mutual evaluation team without
consultation with government. 184
Australia’s Mutual Evaluation Report rated it as “non-compliant”
for Recommendations 22 and 23. 185 Australia was rated as having a
“moderate level of effectiveness” on Intermediate Outcomes 3 and 4,
although the language regarding the legal profession was more critical
•

177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Australia MER, supra note 109, at 23 (showing noncompliant ratings for
Recommendations 22 and 23).
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than these effectiveness ratings might suggest. 186 In essence, the Report
placed some of the “burden of proof” on the legal profession and found
that it had failed to carry that burden. 187 For example, Australia’s
Report stated that:
[S]ector [legal profession] representatives were unable to
demonstrate to or convince the assessors how existing professional
standards were sufficient to mitigate ML/TF risks over and above
their personal business interests, or had enabled them to be an
effective contributor in combating system-wide ML/TF risks. . . .
[T]here is no conclusive evidence that these non-regulated
DNFBPs are rejecting customers due to suspected ML/TF
activities. They also do not have obligations to report suspicious
matters to AUSTRAC, and do not do so in practice. 188

Canada provides this Article’s second case study regarding legal
profession-government interaction. Canada had its on-site FATF
mutual evaluation visit in November 2015, several months after
Australia’s Mutual Evaluation Report was approved. 189 The Federation
of Law Societies of Canada [the Federation] is a coordinating body for
Canada’s legal profession regulatory bodies. 190 The Federation’s
preparation was, in many respects, similar to the experience of the Law
Council of Australia. The Federation was not involved in the
preparation of the Canadian government’s risk assessment document,
nor was it asked to provide information that would help the Canadian

186. Australia MER, supra note 109, at 94, 102-03, ¶¶ 6.1, 6.31-6.32 (Immediate Outcome
3); 87-88, 91, ¶¶ 5.27-5.30, 5.51 (Immediate Outcome 4); 168, ¶ a5.105 (technical compliance
with Recommendation 22); and 168, ¶ a5.108 (technical compliance with Recommendation 23).
187. See infra note 188.
188. Australia MER, supra note at 109, ¶¶ 5.28-5.30.
189. See Canada MER, supra note 109, at 3.
190. See About Us, FED. L. SOC’YS OF CANADA, https://flsc.ca/about-us/
[https://perma.cc/FN42-M6PJ] (“The Federation of Law Societies of Canada is the national
coordinating body of Canada’s 14 provincial and territorial law societies, which regulate more
than 120,000 lawyers and 3,800 Quebec notaries and Ontario’s nearly 9,000 licensed paralegals
in the public interest.”).
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government prepare the legal profession portion of the documents
required before Canada’s mutual evaluation on-site assessment. 191
Two representatives from the Federation met with FATF’s on-site
assessment team. 192 The Canadian Department of Finance initially had
proposed that the FATF team meet with representatives of the Law
Society of British Columbia. 193 Following internal discussions, the
Federation proposed that the meeting be with Federation
representatives in order to ensure that the assessors received a more
complete picture of the anti-money laundering and terrorist financing
activities of Canadian law societies. 194 Departmental officials made
those arrangements with the FATF team. 195
Before the FATF on-site visit, the Federation reviewed the risk
assessment the Canadian government had prepared and made it
publicly available. 196 The Canadian government’s risk assessment had
placed legal professionals in the “high vulnerability” category,
indicating that lawyers presented the same level of anti-money
laundering risk as bricks and mortar casinos, virtual currencies, and
dealers in precious metals and stones, among others, and a greater risk
than Provincial online casinos, accountants, and money services
businesses. 197

191. See Email and attachment from Frederica Wilson, Senior Director, Regulatory and
Public Affairs, FLSC, to Laurel S. Terry (Oct. 31, 2017) (on file with Author) [hereinafter
Wilson Email]. For information about the Mutual Evaluation process and required documents,
see supra notes 92-110 and accompanying text.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196 . Id. See also Assessment of Inherent Risks of Money Laundering and Terrorist
Financing in Canada, CANADA DEPT. OF FINANCE, (2015), https://www.fin.gc.ca/pub/mltfrpcfat/mltf-rpcfat-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZF5N-DJSX] [hereinafter Canada Risk
Assessment].
197. Canada Risk Assessment, supra note 196, at 32 (listing in the “High Vulnerability”
category Brick and Mortar Casinos; Life Insurance Companies; Company Services Providers;
Registered Charities; Credit Unions and Caisses Populaires; Open-Loop Prepaid Access;
Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones; Real Estate Agents and Developers; Foreign Bank
Branches Securities Dealers; Foreign Bank Subsidiaries Smaller Retail MSBs; Internet-Based
MSBs Trust and Loan Companies; Legal Professionals; and Virtual Currencies. The Canadian
report gave a “very high vulnerability” rating to five types of entities: Corporations; National
Full-Service MSBs; Domestic Banks; and Small Independent MSBs; Express Trusts. Id. Life
Insurance Intermediary Entities and Agencies were the only kind of entity that received a “low
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During FATF’s on-site visit, Federation representatives described
the Canadian legal profession regulators’ commitment to fighting
money laundering and terrorist financing, including the relevant rules
and regulations and their enforcement. 198 Federation representatives
were also prepared to discuss their successful constitutional challenge
to the government’s attempts to extend its regulatory scheme to
members of the legal profession. 199
Canada’s Mutual Evaluation Report treats the legal profession
rather harshly and does not appear to reflect the information that the
on-site inspectors heard from the representatives of the Federation of
Law Societies of Canada during the on-site visit. 200 For example,
Canada’s Mutual Evaluation Report does not cite or refer to any of the
mandatory AML rules that apply to Canadian lawyers. 201 Indeed, for
those who are unfamiliar with the AML rules in Canada’s lawyer
regulatory system, the broad statements in Canada’s Mutual Evaluation
Report might give the misleading impression that Canadian lawyers are
not subject to any AML regulation at all. 202 In addition to the broad

vulnerability” rating. The five types of entities that received a “Medium Vulnerability” rating
were Accountants; Provincial Online Casinos; British Columbia Notaries; Wholesale and
Corporate MSBs; and Independent Life Insurance Agents and Brokers). Id.
198. Wilson Email, supra note 191.
199. Id.
200. Canada MER, supra note 109, at 207 (explaining that Canada received a rating of
“noncompliant” for Recommendations 22 and 23. With respect to the effectiveness evaluation,
it was one of the few countries so far that was rated as having a substantial level of effectiveness
for Immediate Outcome 3; it was rated as having a moderate level of effectiveness with respect
to Immediate Outcome 4).
201. All Canadian lawyer regulators have implemented the FLSC’s Model Rule on Client
Identification and Verification Requirements. See FED. L. SOC’YS OF CANADA, Model Rule on
Client Identification and Verification Requirements, FED. L. SOC’YS OF CANADA (Dec. 12,
2008), https://flsc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/terror2.pdf [https://perma.cc/DC9J-7WQ9];
FED. L. SOC’YS OF CANADA, Model Rule on Cash Transactions, FED. L. SOC’YS OF CANADA
(July 2004), https://flsc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/terror1.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3WNGTY3]; see generally FED. L. SOC’YS OF CANADA, Model Rules to Fight Money Laundering
and Terrorist Financing, FED. L. SOC’YS OF CANADA, http://flsc.ca/national-initiatives/modelrules-to-fight-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing/ [https://perma.cc/877Q-LFCH].
202. See, e.g., Canada MER, supra note 109, at 205 (“1. Assessing risks & applying a
risk-based approach: Lawyers, legal firms and Quebec notaries are not legally required to take
enhanced measures to manage and mitigate risks identified in the NRA”); id. at 207 (“22.
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statements that suggest that Canadian lawyers are not subject to AML
regulation, the FATF Report on several occasions cited the “high
vulnerability” characterization of lawyers found in Canada’s 2015 Risk
Assessment. 203 Moreover, when the Report referred to the recent
Canadian Supreme Court case as an “impediment” to Canada’s AML
scheme, 204 it did not explain that the Supreme Court case was a lengthy
one that had carefully weighed the competing interests and Canada’s
constitution. 205
The United States provides the third case study of legal profession
mutual evaluation preparations. The US legal profession was aware of
the US government’s June 2015 National Risk Assessment, but it did

DNFBPs: Customer due diligence: AML/CFT obligations are inoperative for legal counsels,
legal firms and Quebec notaries.”).
203. See, e.g., Canada MER, supra note 109, at 15 nn.7, 16, 78.
204. See, e.g., Canada MER, supra note 109, at 7:
AML/CFT requirements are inoperative towards legal counsels, legal firms and
Quebec notaries. These requirements were found to breach the constitutional right to
attorney-client privilege by the Supreme Court of Canada on 13 February 2015. In
light of these professionals’ key gatekeeper role, in particular in high-risk sectors and
activities such as real-estate transactions and the formation of corporations and trusts,
this constitutes a serious impediment to Canada’s efforts to fight ML.
The case that was an “impediment” was Canada (Attorney General) v. Fed’n of Law Soc’ys of
Can, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 401 (Can.) (striking portions of Canada’s Proceeds of Crime (Money
Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act as inconsistent with Canada’s Charter).
205. See supra note 204 and accompanying text (explaining one of the ways in which
Canada’s Mutual Evaluation Report discussed this case). Compare FATF RECOMMENDATION
Interpretive Note to Recommendation 23, supra note 91, at 83, with Canada MER, supra note
109, ¶ 266:
The legal profession is not currently subject to AML/CFT supervision due to a
successful constitutional challenge that makes the PCMLTFA inoperative in respect
of legal counsels, legal firms, and Quebec notaries. There is therefore no incentive for
the profession to apply AML/CFT measures and participate in the detection of
potential ML/TF activities. The exclusion of the legal profession from AML/CFT
supervision is a significant concern considering the high-risk rating of the sector and
its involvement in other high-risk areas such as the real estate transactions as well as
company and trust formation. This exclusion also has a negative impact on the
effectiveness of the supervisory regime as a whole because it creates an imbalance
amongst the various sectors, especially for REs that perform similar functions to
lawyers.
This discussion failed to acknowledge the fact that Canada’s Supreme Court case seems to
be the country-specific approach recognized by Recommendation 23’s Interpretive Note.
Compare Interpretive Note to Recommendation 23, supra note 91 and accompanying text, with
Canada MER, supra note 109.
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not contribute to this document. 206 However, in contrast to the situation
in Australia and Canada, the US legal profession was able to submit
information to government officials as they prepared the United States’
required mutual evaluation paperwork. 207 In contrast to the situation in
Canada and Australia, in the United States, it was primarily lawyers
from the private sector and voluntary bar associations, rather than the
professional staff from regulatory bodies or coordinating groups, who
took the lead in preparing for the United States’ mutual evaluation.
Most of the efforts were coordinated by Kevin Shepherd who is a
lawyer in private practice who previously had served as Chair of the
ABA Task Force on Gatekeeper Regulation and the Legal
Profession. 208 The members of this ad hoc FATF mutual evaluation
working group included lawyers who were in private practice and
active in the FATF-related ABA and ACTEC groups, legal academics,
and staff lawyers from the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility.
The working group consulted with, and drew upon, the resources of
others, including malpractice insurers and officers in the National
Organization of Bar Counsel (“NOBC”), which is a national
organization that brings together state government officials who
206 . See Nat’l Money Laundering Risk Assessment, supra note 6. This document
contained a discussion of some DNFBP sectors, such as the casino sector and money service
businesses, but it did not contain a section dedicated to DNFBPs or the legal profession. Id. at
Table of Contents. Nor does a word search reveal a discussion of lawyers or the legal profession.
Id.
207. Compare supra notes 175 (Australia) & 191 (Canada) and accompanying text, with
infra notes 218-19 and accompanying text (United States).
208 . Id. For additional information about the ABA Task Force, see Task Force on
Gatekeeper
Reg.
and
the
Profession,
AM.
BAR.
ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/gatekeeper.html [https://perma.cc/PJK8SLVR] [hereinafter ABA Gatekeeper Task Force Webpage]. Organizations whose
representatives have participated in these efforts include The American College of Trust and
Estate Counsel (“ACTEC”); the American College of Real Estate Lawyers; the American
College of Mortgage Attorneys; and the American College of Commercial Finance Lawyers and
staff lawyers from the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility. See, e.g., Terry, supra note
26, at 501 n.61 (noting the cosponsors of ABA resolutions regarding AML issues). In addition
to the ABA Gatekeeper Task Force Webpage, there is information on a webpage maintained by
the ABA Governmental Affairs office. See Gatekeeper Regulations on Lawyers, AM. BAR.
ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/
priorities_policy/independence_of_the_legal_profession/bank_secrecy_act/
[https://perma.cc/QR9K-4K2S] [hereinafter ABA Gatekeeper Advocacy Webpage].
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regulate lawyers. For example, after being requested to do so by Kevin
Shepherd, NOBC representatives sent out a listserv message asking
their members for relevant information, such as lawyer discipline
cases. 209 The ad hoc working group was also able to draw upon
information that the ABA Gatekeeper Task Force had prepared for an
internal ABA review called the “Scope” review and information in a
document previously submitted to FATF. 210
Because of the timing of the US mutual evaluation, US legal
profession representatives had the advantage of being able to speak to
legal profession representatives from other countries about their
experiences with the FATF mutual evaluation process. US legal
profession representatives were aware that the US FATF mutual
evaluation was on the horizon and regularly sought input from US
government officials about the likely timetable and how the US legal
profession could most effectively provide information and be of service
as the United States completed its mutual evaluation paperwork. One
of the reasons why lines of communication existed between US
government officials and legal profession representatives was because
of groundwork that had been laid in the preceding years. 211 For
example, representatives from the US Department of the Treasury had

209. See Email from author to Kevin Shepherd (July 10, 2015) (on file with Author). The
NOBC is the organization that brings together those who discipline and regulate lawyers (on file
with Author).
210. See, e.g., Kevin L. Shepherd, Self Regulatory Bodies Call for Information and Cases,
AM. BAR
ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/
2012nov26_gatekeeperreg.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6G2W-MHQC]
(undated
document prepared by the ABA in 2012 for FATF; it is available as a link from the ABA
Gatekeeper webpage, supra note 208); see also Email from Kevin Shepherd to the Members of
the ABA Gatekeeper Task Force (Jan. 9, 2015) (on file with Author).
211. See, e.g., Duncan E. Osborne, The Financial Action Task Force and the Legal
Profession, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 421 (2014), which states:
For the past ten years, I along with others—as representatives of The American
College of Trust and Estate Counsel (ACTEC) and of the American Bar Association
(ABA)—have engaged with both the FATF and the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
. . . I would interject here that the interactions with officials from the Treasury
Department have differed markedly from those with the FATF bureaucrats. Treasury
personnel have certainly not always agreed with representatives of the US legal
profession, but their communications have been open, rational, and reasoned. These
substantive and meaningful dialogues have helped all parties find common ground
and avenues for progress in the areas of AML and CFT.
Id. at 423, 430.
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met periodically with various legal profession representatives in order
to discuss topics of mutual interest. 212
In March 2015, before the United States was required to provide
its paperwork to FATF, 213 Kevin Shepherd had reached out by email to
officials at the US Department of the Treasury and offered to gather
AML information related to the legal profession. 214 Although
government officials did not immediately respond, they ultimately
accepted the offer and asked for assistance in gathering information
relevant to the legal profession and the mutual evaluation’s
“effectiveness” prong. 215 US legal profession representatives provided
information about each of the six “core issues” listed under Immediate
Outcome 3 and the six “core issues” listed under Immediate Outcome
4. 216
The US legal profession’s informal working group exchanged a
number of internal drafts during July 2015 before transmitting its
responsive document to US Department of the Treasury officials.217
The final version of this document was lengthy—in excess of fifty
pages. 218 This document addressed the core issues in Immediate
Outcomes 3 and 4 and covered a range of topics. 219 This document
provided information regarding licensing requirements, discipline
requirements, continuing education requirements, the role of
malpractice insurance, and financial auditing mechanisms, among
other things. In addition to providing narrative responses to the core
issues, the ad hoc group’s document included seven Appendices. 220
The titles of these Appendices, which are listed below, illustrate the
type of information provided:

212. See Osborne, supra note 211.
213. Author Laurel Terry has personal knowledge of these facts. See also FATF
Procedures, supra note 93 (including a timetable of preparatory work).
214. Author Laurel Terry has personal knowledge of these facts.
215. Id.
216. Id. See supra note 118 and accompanying text for a list of the Intermediate Outcomes
3 and 4 core issues.
217. Author Laurel Terry has personal knowledge of these facts.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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Appendix 1: Rules and Regulations Relevant to a
Lawyer’s Entry into the Profession; 221
Appendix 2: Ongoing Governmental Supervision of
Lawyers’ Conduct; 222
Appendix 3: Governmental and Nongovernmental
Sources That Educate State Regulators, Educators,
Supervisors, Insurers, and US Lawyers about AML/CFT
Issues and Lawyers’ Legal and Ethical Obligations; 223
Appendix 4: Articles Used in the “Cradle to Grave”
AML/CFT Education Approach (targeting regulators,
legal educators, insurers, individual lawyers, law firms,
and others involved in private ordering);
Appendix 5: Selected Presentations Since 2008 Used in
the “Cradle to Grave” AML/CFT Education Approach
(targeting regulators, legal educators, insurers, individual
lawyers, law firms, and others involved in private
ordering);
Appendix 6: Tools Used in US Legal Profession
Stakeholder Education Efforts; 224 and
Appendix 7: Representative Sample of MoneyLaundering Related Disciplinary Proceedings. 225

221. Id. This Appendix included links and other information related to legal education
accreditation requirements and bar admission requirements.
222. Id. This Appendix included a wide range of items such as a summary of the criminal
laws that would apply to money laundering activities by lawyers; as well as rules of professional
conduct that would subject a lawyer to discipline; government supervision programs such as
random audit programs; required ongoing education requirements; and financial recordkeeping
requirements. This Appendix also referenced the National Lawyer Regulatory Data Bank,
surveys on lawyer discipline, and resources of the National Organization of Bar Counsel, which
is an umbrella organization for those who regulate lawyers.
223. Id. Among other things, this Appendix identified state and local bar association and
specialty bar association websites that educated their members about AML issues.
224. Id. This Appendix referenced the FATF-related items that US lawyers have used in
their education efforts, including the FATF Recommendations, the FATF RBA for Legal
Professionals, the FATF “Typologies” report for the legal profession, as well as a number of
US-based education items such as the ABA/IBA/CCBE Lawyer’s Guide cited supra note 4. It
also cited items discussed in Terry, supra note 26, such as ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 463,
infra note 235, and the ABA’s Voluntary Good Practices Guide, infra note 233.
225. Id. This Appendix was in the form of a table that showed disciplinary action taken by
the supervising authority, typically a state’s highest court, against lawyers who were charged
with, or convicted of, money laundering offenses. The Appendix included a caveat that the list
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When the FATF on-site assessment team came to the United
States in February 2016, it met with Kevin Shepherd and William
Clark, who were the past and future chairs of the ABA Gatekeeper Task
Force. 226 The US Department of the Treasury had requested that these
two individuals meet with the evaluation team. 227 US officials did not
participate in that meeting. 228 After the meeting concluded, Kevin
Shepherd reported to the ad hoc working group that the meeting had
lasted approximately two hours and that the FATF team was familiar
with the materials about the legal profession the US government had
submitted. 229 The FATF team asked the US legal profession
representatives to provide follow-up information on two topics: 1)
disciplinary actions taken by state disciplinary authorities, especially
disbarment and suspension statistics; and 2) the circumstances under
which US lawyers might consider advising the creation of non-US
trusts for their clients and the implications of that advice. 230 The
working group provided follow-up information to the US Department
of the Treasury which presumably transmitted the information to the
FATF team. 231
One reason why the US working group was able to prepare its
lengthy submission to the US government over the course of only a few
weeks was that most of its members had been heavily involved in AML
efforts for a number of years. 232 Members of the working group
it provided should not be construed as containing an exhaustive catalog of disciplinary action
taken against these lawyers. This Appendix noted that criminal cases against US lawyers had
been included in the FATF Typologies report described supra note 27.
226. See Email from Kevin Shepherd to author (July 6, 2016) (on file with Author)
(reporting on the individuals who were asked to meet with the FATF on-site evaluation team).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See Email from Kevin Shepherd to various US Treasury Officials (July 29, 2015) (on
file with Author).
232. See, e.g., Kevin L. Shepherd, Guardians at the Gate: The Gatekeeper Initiative and
the Risk-Based Approach for Transactional Lawyers, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 607
(2009); John A. Terrill II & Michael A. Breslow, The Role of Lawyers in Combating Money
Laundering and Terrorist Financing: Lessons from the English Approach, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 433, 435-36 (2014) (describing some of these efforts); Terry, supra note 26, at 501-10.
Some, but not all, of the group’s efforts appear on the webpage of the ABA Gatekeeper Task
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included lawyers who had led ABA AML initiatives that included the
ABA’s Voluntary Good Practices Guide, 233 the ABA-IBA-CCBE
Guide mentioned earlier, 234 ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 463 that
focused on lawyers’ AML efforts, 235 as well as efforts that contributed
to the Conference of Chief Justices’ adoption of a resolution regarding
AML and follow-up education efforts. 236 The working group’s
members, which also included lawyers from ACTEC and other groups,
had also been heavily involved in additional AML education efforts,
many of which have been documented in a law review article entitled
U.S. Legal Profession Efforts to Combat Money Laundering and
Terrorist Financing. 237
Despite the existence of, and enforcement of, criminal and
regulatory lawyer AML provisions, and education efforts, the United
Force, such as the letters sent by various ABA Presidents to state and local bar leaders notifying
them of new AML resources for their lawyers. See ABA Gatekeeper Task Force Webpage, supra
note 208 (includes links to a July 31, 2013 letter from ABA President Laurel Bellows and an
April 8, 2011 letter from ABA President Stephen Zack to state and local bars leaders regarding
AML issues). But not all of the efforts described here appear on this webpage.
233. Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money
Laundering and Terrorist Financing, AM. BAR ASS’N (Apr. 23, 2010),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminaljustice/voluntary_good_pr
actices_guidance.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NCA-EKZN] [hereinafter ABA AML
Guidance]; see also AM. BAR. ASS’N, ADOPTED BY THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION
116 ADOPTING THE VOLUNTARY GOOD PRACTICES GUIDANCE FOR LAWYERS TO DETECT AND
COMBAT
MONEY
LAUNDERING
AND
TERRORIST
FINANCING
(2010),
,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2010_am_116.authcheckdam
.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZSV-YHG9] [hereinafter ABA RESOLUTION 116] (August 2010 ABA
adoption of the endorsement of the ABA AML Guidance); Laurel Terry, Summary &
Supplement to the Voluntary Good Practices Guidance, http://tinyurl.com/VGPG-ABA
[https://perma.cc/G5XB-YU6F] (two-page summary of the red flags found in the ABA
Voluntary Good Practices Guidance document).
234. See supra notes 4, 32, 73 and accompanying text (discussing the IBA/ABA/CCBE
Guide).
235. AM. BAR ASS’N, FORMAL OPINION 463: CLIENT DUE DILIGENCE, MONEY
LAUNDERING,
AND
TERRORIST
FINANCING
(2013),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/form
al_opinion_463.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/C93X-9V99] [hereinafter ABA FORMAL
OPINION 463].
236. CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, RESOLUTION 7: IN SUPPORT OF THE VOLUNTARY
GOOD PRACTICES GUIDANCE FOR LAWYERS TO DETECT AND COMBAT MONEY LAUNDERING
AND
TERRORIST
FINANCING
(2014),
http://ccj.ncsc.org/~/media/microsites/files/ccj/resolutions/07232014-support-of-voluntarygood-practices-for-lawyers.ashx [https://perma.cc/9KJU-63CB].
237. See Terry, supra note 26.
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States received a technical compliance rating of “noncompliant” for
both Recommendations 22 and 23 in its December 2016 FATF Mutual
Evaluation Report. 238 The FATF Mutual Evaluation Report started out
by noting that the US anti-money-laundering framework was “welldeveloped and robust.” 239 The Report acknowledged that US lawyers
are subject to ethical and licensing requirements that differ from those
of other DNFBPs and that this mitigated some of the risks. 240 The
Report also acknowledged US lawyers’ increased awareness of AML
issues, 241 although it observed that this awareness was less than
systematic. 242 But the Report nevertheless found that comprehensive
AML regulation did not apply to US DNFBPs, including lawyers, and
that “the vulnerability of these minimally covered DNFBP sectors is
significant, considering the many examples identified by the national
risk assessment process.” 243 The Report specifically highlighted the
fact that the US had not implemented for the legal profession
Recommendation 23, which includes a suspicious transaction reporting
(“STR”) obligation. 244 There was no discussion in this Report of the

238. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text (reporting the compliance results for
the United States and other countries).
239. See United States MER, supra note 109, at 3.
240. Id. at 120, ¶ 280 (“[E]thical obligations placed on lawyers and accountants[] mitigate
some of these risks.”).
241. Id. at 9, ¶ 22:
Of late, there appears to be greater appreciation of ML/TF vulnerabilities and
implementation of preventive measures by casinos; and some professional guidance
exists for other sectors (in particular, lawyers) on AML/CFT issues. However,
DNFBPs other than casinos and dealers in precious metals and stones have limited
preventive measures applied leaving vulnerabilities particularly in respect of the highend real estate sector and those sectors involved in the formation of legal persons.
242. Id. at 10, ¶ 22 (“Lawyers . . . [and other DNFBPs] are not subject to comprehensive
AML/CFT requirements, and are not systematically applying basic or enhanced due diligence
processes and other preventive measures, as needed; and this is further exacerbated by the
deficiencies in the Beneficial Ownership requirements.”).
243. Id.
244 . See, e.g., id. at 22, ¶ 42(b) (“Technical compliance of DNFBPs not subject to
comprehensive AML/CFT measures: A number of DNFBPs that do perform activities listed in
Recommendations 22 and 23 (real estate agents, trust and company service providers, lawyers,
and accountants) are not subject to comprehensive AML/CFT measures.”); id. at 10, ¶ 24:
[O]ther DNFBPs are subject to less supervision as they are not subject to
comprehensive AML/CFT preventive measures. This is mitigated somewhat for

682

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:2

Interpretive Note to Recommendation 23 or the FATF RBA Guidance
for Legal Professions. 245 While one might argue that the relevant
“Priority Action” item left room for interpretation, 246 the
recommendation found in the body of the Mutual Evaluation Report is
more direct. 247 It states that “on the basis of a specific vulnerability
analysis, appropriate AML/CFT obligations particularly relating to
CDD and SAR filing, should be imposed on lawyers, accountants, and
trust and company service providers as a matter of priority.” 248
Although the information that US legal profession representatives
provided to their government and to the FATF on-site assessment team
may not have changed the technical compliance ratings the United
States received, the documentation US legal representatives provided
may have influenced the tone in the US Mutual Evaluation Report.249
For example, although Canada has an explicit legal profession due
diligence rule and an annual reporting obligation, and the United States
does not, Canada’s Mutual Evaluation Report arguably uses a more
hostile tone towards lawyers than the tone in the US Mutual Evaluation
Report. 250 Moreover, Canada’s Mutual Evaluation Report does not cite
the extensive efforts by its regulators to combat lawyer involvement in
money laundering. The omission of information about Canada’s AML
system in its Mutual Evaluation Report may be due to the fact that the
Federation was not invited to submit any documentation before the
FATF on-site assessment team visit.
In sum, these three case studies illustrate differing levels of
engagement among governments and legal profession representatives
regarding the FATF Mutual Evaluation process. The level of
engagement a profession has may be significant because FATF Mutual
Evaluation Reports appear to rely heavily on each country’s risk
assessment report and on the information that country submits before
lawyers and accountants who have strong professional entry and continuing ethical
requirements, though these do not adequately address ML/TF vulnerabilities or
require reporting of suspicious activity to authorities.
245. See generally id.
246. See generally id.
247. See United States MER, supra note 109, at 118.
248. See id.
249. US Mutual Evaluation Report, supra note 109.
250. Compare supra notes 200-05 (Canada MER) and accompanying text, with supra
notes 238-48 and accompanying text (United States MER).
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the FATF on-site visit. 251 Thus, in the future, legal profession
representatives may find it useful to consider these and other case
studies and the ten suggestions contained in the Appendix to this
Article. 252
V. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF AML SCANDALS AND
COMPETING NARRATIVES ON LAWYER AML REGULATION
This Part of the Article focuses on the United States and Peru,
which are the Authors’ home countries. This Part discusses the antimoney laundering regulatory structure in each country, the role of
FATF, and highlights scandals in each country that already have
influenced or may in the future influence discussions of lawyer AML
regulation. This Part concludes by identifying two competing
narratives about lawyer AML issues in anticipation of Part VI, which

251 . See generally FATF MER REPORTS, supra note 109. The reports also include
information the FATF assessment team obtains during the on-site visit. Id.
252. Some countries have access to case studies beyond the three described in this Article.
For example, the Authors are aware that the CCBE has facilitated discussions on this topic
among European legal profession representatives and that different EU Member States have had
differing levels of engagement with their governments. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Peter
McNamee, Senior Legal Advisor, CCBE, by Laurel Terry (Nov. 29, 2017). Legal profession
groups that want to reach out to other countries can use the resources of the Bar Issues
Commission of the International Bar Association and the International Conference of Legal
Regulators (“ICLR”). The ICLR is a relatively new, and entirely free, organization whose goal
is to provide an international forum where those who regulate legal services can meet one
another and exchange ideas and resources. For additional information about the ICLR, see INT’L
CONFERENCE OF LEGAL REGULATORS, https://iclr.net/ [https://perma.cc/8CKJ-CXGV]. The
ICLR held its fifth-ever conference in September 2017 in Singapore. See Int’l Conf. Legal
Regulators
2017,
INT’L
CONFERENCE
OF
LEGAL
REGULATORS
https://iclr.net/conference/international-conference-of-legal-regulators-2017/
[https://perma.cc/8VJG-VC5Z]. One of the sessions was entitled “Anti-money laundering and
Counter-Financing of Terrorism” and it “explore[d] the role which regulators can and should
take in better educating the legal profession about its obligations, the steps that regulators can
take in combating money-laundering and terrorist financing, and issues of client confidentiality
and legal professional privilege.” Int’l Conf. Legal Regulators, Singapore 2017 Programme:
Legal Regulation in a Borderless World: Building Networks, THE LAW SOCIETY (Oct. 5, 2017),
http://www.lawsociety.org.sg/conference/ICLR2017/pdf/Programme%20Outline(02102017).p
df [https://perma.cc/YXE4-ZF9H]. See also Laurel S. Terry, Creating an International Network
of Lawyer Regulators: The 2012 International Conference of Legal Regulators, 82(2) THE BAR
EXAMINER 18 (June 2013) (short article about the creation of the ICLR).

684

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:2

offers suggestions on how to improve the FATF Mutual Evaluation
process.
A. United States
US lawyers are subject to a number of different federal criminal
laws that prohibit money laundering activities by lawyers and others.
These criminal laws include the 1970 Bank Secrecy Act, the 2001
Patriot Act, the Intelligence Reform & Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004, and the Money Laundering Control Act. 253 For example, the
Money Laundering Control Act makes it illegal to knowingly “(i)
conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership,
or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or (ii) to
avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal
law.” 254 “Structuring” cash payments to avoid the reporting
requirements is also a crime. 255
In addition to these criminal laws, US lawyers are required to
abide by lawyer regulatory provisions as a condition of receiving a law
license. 256 These regulatory provisions include the rules of professional
conduct from the state(s) in which the lawyer is licensed or is
practicing. 257 The rules of professional conduct are enacted by the
highest court in each state and are based on the ABA Model Rules of

253. See U.S. Dept. of Treasury, History of Anti-Money Laundering Laws, Fin. Crimes
Enf’t Network, https://www.fincen.gov/history-anti-money-laundering-laws [https://perma.cc/
7XB9-8VJC].
254. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)–(ii) (2013). The Internal Revenue Code governs the
receipt of more than US$10,000 in cash and authorizes the existing reporting requirements. See,
e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 5331 (2011) (reports relating to coins and currency received in nonfinancial
trade or business).
255. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C § 5324 (2004) (prohibiting structuring transactions to evade
reporting requirement); 26 U.S.C. § 6050I(f)(1) (1996) (prohibiting structuring transactions to
evade reporting requirements). Thus, it would be a crime for a lawyer to deposit US$9,500 and
thereafter deposit US$600 in order to avoid the IRS US$10,000 reporting requirement.
256. See infra note 258 and accompanying text.
257. See, e.g., Policy Implementation Committee, Variations of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 8.5: Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law, ABA CTR. FOR PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY
(Sept.
29,
2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_8_5.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QKU2-S3K4] (state implementation of Rule 8.5(a) regarding disciplinary
authority).
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Professional Conduct. 258 Thus, for ease of reference, this Article will
use the ABA Model Rules as a proxy to describe lawyer regulation in
US jurisdictions.
The ABA Model Rules contain at least three different rules that
are relevant to lawyer AML obligations. ABA Model Rule 1.2(d)
provides that “a lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a
client, in conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent . . . .”259
ABA Model Rule 1.1 establishes a duty of competence. 260 It defines
competence to include knowledge of the relevant facts. 261 ABA Model
Rule 1.16(a) creates a mandatory duty on the part of the lawyer to reject
certain clients. 262 The rule states that “a lawyer shall not represent a
client . . . if: (1) the representation will result in violation of the rules
of professional conduct or other law[.]” 263 In addition to creating a
mandatory duty to reject certain client matters, ABA Model Rule
1.16(a)(1) creates a mandatory duty to withdraw if the lawyer’s
continued representation of the client “will result in a violation of . . .

258 . See, e.g., Laurel S. Terry et al., Adopting Regulatory Objectives for the Legal
Profession, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2719-22 (2012) (describing the regulatory system for
US lawyers). As of 2018, California’s rules are also based on the ABA Model Rules and thus
all fifty US states use the ABA Model Rules. See generally ST. B. CALIF., Current Rules of
Professional Conduct, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Attorneys/Conduct-Discipline/Rules/Rulesof-Professional-Conduct/Current-Rules [https://perma.cc/E8W8-ZVRL] (webpage shows that
California’s new rules, which took effect Nov. 1, 2018, use the ABA Model Rules format).
259. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 34, at r. 1.2(d).
260. Id. at r. 1.1 (stating that “[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.”). Id.
261. Id. at r. 1.1, cmt. [5] (“Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry
into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and
procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners. It also includes adequate
preparation.”). Id.
262. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 34, at r. 1.16(a).
263. Id. at r. 1.16(a)(1). For a UK article that cited the potential benefits of a regulatory
approach in addition to criminal law provisions, see Middleton & Levi, supra note 28, at 663:
For us, the notion that if crime is committed, the response should be either criminal
justice or nothing seems absurd: the licensing and inspection regime for professionals
may be expected to have a preventative effect on the scale of criminality, even if ex
post facto professional sanctions do not deter completely, and especially if
professional inspections and sanctions are much more likely than criminal conviction
to happen.
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other law.” 264 As noted previously, the United States has criminal laws
that prohibit lawyers from engaging in money laundering or assisting
money laundering activities. 265
When read together, Rules 1.1, 1.2(d), and 1.16(a) arguably
impose a “due diligence” obligation on lawyers. 266 Moreover, the “duty
to reject” provisions in US lawyer regulation arguably go further than
FATF Recommendations 22 and 23 because Rule 1.16(a)(1) puts
responsibility on the lawyer to stop interacting with the
criminal/client. 267 The FATF Recommendations, in contrast, transfer
that responsibility from the lawyer to a supervisory body. Transferring
responsibility to a supervisory body might work adequately in
jurisdictions in which the AML supervisor is well-resourced. It is also
possible, however, that a system that removes the “stop work”
responsibility from the lawyer and transfers it to another entity will
result in more money laundering rather than less money laundering.
As this paragraph explains, in addition to the mandatory duty to
reject and the mandatory duty to withdraw provisions to which US
lawyers are subject, US lawyers have broad discretion to reject or
withdraw from representation in additional circumstances. This
discretion to reject or withdraw from a lawyer-client relationship exists
at both the front [acceptance] end of the relationship and the back
[termination] end of the lawyer-client relationship. 268 With respect to
the front end of the lawyer-client relationship, it is noteworthy that,
except for a very narrow exception regarding court appointments,269
US lawyers do not have a general “duty to accept” any client who

264. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 34, at r. 1.16(a)(1).
265. See supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 259-64, infra note 294 (explaining how these three rules work
together).
267. Compare r. 1.16(a), supra note 264 (imposing a duty to reject the money laundering
client), with FATF Recommendation 23, supra note 87, (imposing a duty to file a suspicious
transaction report).
268. The discretion to withdraw from representation appears in Rule 1.16(b). The
discretion to reject representation can be inferred from the fact that the only rule that requires a
lawyer to accept a case is Rule 6.2 regarding court appointments.
269. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 34, at r. 6.2. See also
Russell Pearce et al., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH, 94
(Interactive Casebooks) (West 2d ed. 2013) (“Because the general rule is that a lawyer is not “a
public utility” who must provide service to every client that requests it, a lawyer has great
freedom in deciding which clients to represent.”).
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wishes to retain that lawyer’s services and is able to pay for the
lawyer’s service. 270 The US situation, which gives a lawyer broad
discretion to reject potential clients, is different than the situation that
one sometimes finds in other countries. 271 With respect to the backend or termination of the lawyer-client relationship, Rule 1.16(b)
makes it clear that US lawyers have tremendous discretion to decide
to part company with the client.272 Under Rule 1.16(b), so long as a
lawyer is not representing a client in litigation, that US lawyer may
withdraw from representation at any time and for any reason provided
that the withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse
effect on the interests of the client. 273 Moreover, even if the withdrawal
would cause material adverse effects on the client’s interests, the US
lawyer has the discretion to withdraw if any of several rather broad
enumerated provisions are satisfied. 274
Both the AML criminal laws and the relevant disciplinary rules
have been enforced against US lawyers. 275 The FATF Legal Profession
Typologies Report, for example, lists a number of lawyers who have

270. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 34, at r. 6.2, with the
remainder of the ABA Model Rules. In some states, lawyers may also be subject to antidiscrimination provisions. See, e.g., Nathanson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts Commission
Against Discrimination, 16 Mass. L. Rptr. 76, 2003 WL 224806881 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2003).
271. Compare the lack of a mandatory duty to accept rule in the ABA Model Rules, supra
note 269, with the “cab rank” rule that applies to barristers in England and Wales and that
specifies that barristers have a duty to accept a mandate unless an exception applies. For a
discussion of the cab rank rule, see Bar Standards Board, Consultation, The Cab Rank Rule:
Standard contractual terms and the list of defaulting solicitors (March 2015),
https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/media/1657974/cab_rank_rule_consultation_final__march_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/5P55-QWH7].
272. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 34, at r. 1.16(b)(1).
273. Id.
274. Id. at r. 1.16(b).
The enumerated reasons include the following that are relevant to this Article:
(2) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer’s services that the lawyer
reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;
(3) the client has used the lawyer’s services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;
(4) the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which
the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement; [or]
(7) other good cause for withdrawal exists.
Id.
275. See infra notes 276 & 279 (citing discipline and criminal cases).
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been convicted of violating these federal AML laws. 276 A 2016 plea
bargain by a San Diego lawyer demonstrates that federal prosecutors
are willing to prosecute lawyers on the basis that the lawyer knew or
should have known that the activity involved illegal money
laundering. 277 The San Diego lawyer in that case agreed to a plea
bargain and was sentenced to a five-year prison term. 278 US lawyers
have also been disciplined for AML-related involvement and have lost
their licenses to practice law. 279
As noted in Section III.B, although the US was rated
noncompliant for Recommendations 22 and 23, it was rated as having
a moderate level of effectiveness for Immediate Outcomes 3 and 4.280
US lawyer organizations. including the ABA and ACTEC, have put
considerable effort into educating lawyers about their AML obligations
and helping them spot money laundering red flags. 281 To date,
however, neither the ABA nor ACTEC has gone on record as
supporting efforts to impose on US lawyers mandatory federal laws
that impose due diligence obligations. 282 The ABA’s policy webpage
related to lawyer AML issues notes the ABA’s opposition to several
specific bills and expresses the ABA’s overall concerns about proposed
federal legislation 283 Some of the ABA’s policy statements have
276. See Terry, supra note 26, at 499 nn.54, 57 (listing in one place the criminal cases
cited throughout the lengthy FATF Typologies Report, supra note 27). The US has been one of
the jurisdictions that has prosecuted the most lawyers. Id. at 499.
277. See Laurel Terry, 5 Year Prison Term for a Lawyer Using his IOLTA Account to
Launder Money, CONTEMPORARY PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BLOG (Sept. 7, 2016),
https://contemporaryprofessionalresponsibility.com/2016/09/07/5-year-prison-term-for-alawyer-using-his-iolta-account-to-launder-money/ [https://perma.cc/2KM3-GKLW].
278. Id.
279. See Terry, supra note 26, at 500 nn.57-58 (listing, inter alia, discipline cases in the
FATF Typologies Report, supra note 27); Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Blair, __ A.3rd
___, 2018 WL 3414216 (Md. Ct. of Appeals, July 13, 2018) (discussing a suspended lawyer
who was permanently disbarred for money laundering activities).
280. See supra notes 238-48 and accompanying text (describing the results of the US
Mutual Evaluation Report).
281. See Terry, supra note 26, at 501-10.
282. The ABA’s 2010 red flags guide uses the word “voluntary” in its title. See ABA AML
Guidance, supra note 233. See also infra note 283.
283. See Policy: Gatekeeper Regulations on Lawyers, AM. BAR ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/priorities_policy/indep
endence_of_the_legal_profession/bank_secrecy_act.html [https://perma.cc/ASP6-7DK5]:
The ABA supports reasonable and necessary domestic and international measures
designed to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. However, the
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included in one document discussion of lawyer regulation principles
and discussion of substantive corporate law beneficial ownership
disclosure rules. 284
The discussions about US lawyer AML obligations have taken
place against the backdrop of AML scandals, several of which were
previously cited in Section II.B, as well as debates about corporate
secrecy laws and the overall robustness of the US’ AML regime. For
example, US law firms did not figure as prominently in the Panama
Papers leak as law firms from some other countries, but their
involvement has been noted. 285 After several high profile news stories
about the use of shell corporations to purchase luxury US real estate,286
the United States imposed “Geographic Targeting Orders” (“GTOs”)
that require disclosure of beneficial ownership information in certain
high-value real estate markets and thus affect lawyers and others who
are assisting clients with certain kinds of real estate transactions. 287
While the full impact of these GTOs is not yet known, a July 2018
headline in the Miami Herald stated: How Dirty Is Miami Real Estate?
Secret Home Deals Dried Up When Feds Started Watching. 288 Because

Association opposes legislation and regulations that would impose burdensome and
intrusive gatekeeper requirements on lawyers, including bills that would subject the
legal profession to key anti-money laundering compliance provisions of the Bank
Secrecy Act. If adopted, these measures would undermine the attorney-client
privilege, the confidential lawyer-client relationship, and traditional state court
regulation of the legal profession, while also imposing excessive new federal
regulations on lawyers engaged in the practice of law.
284. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (citing the ABA webpage that contains
multiple policy statements).
285. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 41; John Cassidy, Panama Papers: Why Aren’t There
More American Names?, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 5, 2016).
286. See, e.g., Story & Saul, supra note 47 and accompanying text.
287. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, Press Release: FinCEN Expands Reach of Real
Estate “Geographic Targeting Orders” Beyond Manhattan and Miami, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T
NETWORK (July 27, 2016), https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-expands-reachreal-estate-geographic-targeting-orders-beyond-manhattan [https://perma.cc/L8A7-T2XD].
288. See How Dirty is Miami Real Estate, supra note 47. This news story included a
summary of a study entitled Anonymous Capital Flows and U.S. Housing Markets written by an
employee of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and a professor at the University of Miami.
It concluded that the transparency order affected markets beyond the high-priced markets where
it was enforced. Id.
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of the manner in which lawyer AML obligations and substantive
corporate disclosure laws related to beneficial ownership have been
intertwined in FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports and public
discussions, 289 the US author of this Article believes that beneficial
ownership real estate scandals such as those in New York and Miami
are likely to create additional pressure in the United States for lawyer
regulation reform. 290
What arguably has gotten the most attention in the United States,
however, is the 60 Minutes/Anonymous Inc. TV program. As noted
earlier, a number of individuals have criticized the behavior of the US
lawyers who were the subjects of the Global Witness “sting” in which
an actor sought legal assistance for a simulated transaction that it
intended to represent a money laundering scheme. 291 Although the
American Bar Association 292 and a prominent US legal ethics expert293

289. See, e.g., supra note 242 and accompanying text (US Mutual Evaluation Report
combined discussions of lawyer AML obligations, lawyer privilege, and beneficial ownership
rules) & note 49 (citing a number of articles that discussed both substantive corporate law
beneficial ownership disclosure rules and lawyer regulation and privilege issues). The US
Author finds it regrettable that lawyer regulation and beneficial ownership issues have become
commingled. In her view, the desirability of substantive corporate law disclosure rules—that is,
beneficial ownership rules—is not a lawyer regulation issue. Discussions that equate these two
issues and that commingle discussion of corporate beneficial ownership rules with lawyer
regulation issues arguably put the traditional role of lawyers at risk.
290. In addition to these real estate scandals discussed supra notes 286-88, US lawyers’
representation of Equatorial Guinea’s president Teodoro Obiang Nguema, has often been the
subject of scathing critique. See, e.g., Michael D. Goldhaber, Little Theodor’s Big Troubles,
AM. LAW. 62. Feb. 1, 2013). US lawyers’ representation of Obiang has been the subject of
Congressional Hearings and other reports. See S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs,
supra note 48; Puppet Masters, supra note 39.
291. See supra note 49 and accompanying text; Michael D. Goldhaber, When A Kleptocrat
Comes Calling, AM. LAW, Mar. 2016, at 18.
292. See ABA President Paulette Brown responds to “60 Minutes” segment, supra note 49
(explaining that the ABA supports the highest ethical standards for lawyers as well as reasonable
efforts to combat money laundering and that “both 60 Minutes and Global Witness confirm
Silkenat acted legally and ethically.”).
293. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 49, at 3:
Silkenat provided the ABA Journal with an opinion by ethics expert Stephen Gillers
of New York University School of Law. ‘A preliminary meeting with a prospective
client,’ he wrote, ‘is ordinarily not the place to voice suspicions about what the
prospective client has said or to accuse the prospective client of dissembling, lying or
violating the law.’ Generally explaining vehicles for home ownership is not unethical,
Gillers said.
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have defended the actions of the former ABA President who was one
of the targets of the sting, the US Author’s anecdotal impression is that
US lawyers are embarrassed by the 60 Minutes/Anonymous Inc. TV
program. The 60 Minutes/Anonymous Inc. TV program arguably has
contributed to greater interest in, and discussion of, the topic of lawyer
involvement in money laundering activities.
Regardless of the reason, there seems to be growing interest in the
United States in creating or making more explicit 294 lawyers’ due
diligence obligations. 295 The ABA “Gatekeeper” Task Force has been
the primary group responsible for initiating discussions about ethics
rule changes. 296 Task Force representatives have spoken with members
and staff of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility and the ABA Standing Committee on Discipline. 297
They have asked these committees to amend the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct in order to add or make more explicit lawyers’
AML due diligence obligations. 298 Although the phrase “due
diligence” is not one that is used in the ABA Model Rules, the idea that

But see Memorandum from John Leubsdorf, Distinguished Professor of Law and Judge
Frederick B. Lacey Distinguished Scholar, Rutgers School of Law & William H. Simon, Arthur
Levitt Professor, Columbia Law School, and Gertrude and William Saunders Professor
Emeritus,
Stanford
Law
School,
to Global
Witness (Jan. 28, 2015),
https://www.globalwitness.org/documents/18209/Opinion_of_John_Leubsdorf_and_William_
Simon.pdf [https://perma.cc/4C6R-UYFH] (“In our opinion, the conduct by the above-named
lawyers shown in these interviews does not comply with the professional responsibilities of
lawyers asked for assistance with potentially unlawful transactions.”).
294. Author Laurel Terry is among those who have argued that if read together, Rules 1.1,
1.2(d), and 1.16(a) create a due diligence obligation. For a discussion of these Rules, see supra
notes 259-64.
295. See Kevin Shepherd, ABA Needs a New Model Legal Ethics Rule, LAW 360 (Apr. 6,
2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/910316/aba-needs-a-new-model-legal-ethics-rule
[https://perma.cc/AKG5-GFFG].
There may also be growing interest in the United
States in “decoupling” US lawyer AML regulation issues from substantive corporate law issues
about disclosure of beneficial owners and the optimal level of corporate transparency. There
arguably are quite strong reasons to support this decoupling, but this issue is beyond the scope
of this Article. See supra note 289.
296. Author Laurel Terry has personal knowledge of this fact.
297. Id. This Committee is now known as the ABA Standing Committee on Regulation.
Id.
298. Id.
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a lawyer may have a duty to make a factual inquiry is a familiar one.299
For example, it is the US Author’s impression that few people would
allow a lawyer to avoid the mandatory conflicts of interest provisions
by simply failing to inquire about the identity of the opposing party. A
New York City Bar ethics opinion recently concluded that when a
lawyer is asked to assist in a transaction that the lawyer suspects may
involve a crime or fraud, a duty of inquiry in some circumstances is
implicit in the Rules. 300
In sum, the US has both a criminal law system and a lawyer
regulatory system that prohibits lawyers from assisting clients or others
in money laundering activities. Moreover, there are ongoing
conversations in the United States about the scope of a lawyer’s ethical
duties, including whether Rule 1.1 or another rule imposes a “due
diligence” obligation on lawyers, and whether the ethical rules should
be amended to supplement or make more explicit existing obligations.
Meanwhile, the US’s AML system for DNFBPs has been rated
“noncompliant” by other FATF Members. Moreover, one of the action
items in the 2016 US Mutual Evaluation Report called on the United
States to apply “appropriate AML/CFT obligations” on lawyers. This
FATF Report and the recent money laundering scandals are likely to
create pressure for change in the US AML-lawyer regulatory situation.
B. Peru
This Section begins with background information about Peru and
its lawyers. In 2016, Peru’s population was approximately 32
million. 301 It has one of the fastest growing economies in Latin

299. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1, cmt. [5] (“Competent handling
of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the
problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent
practitioners.”).
300. NEW YORK CITY BAR, Formal Opinion 2018-4: Duties When an Attorney Is Asked
to Assist in a Suspicious Transaction, https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.nycbar.org/
files/2018415-Assisting_Suspicious_Activity.pdf [https://perma.cc/AQ3F-ARKH].
301. World Bank, Country Profile: Peru, WORLD BANK, http://databank.worldbank.org/
data/views/reports/reportwidget.aspx?Report_Name=CountryProfile&Id=b450fd57&tbar=y&d
d=y&inf=n&zm=n&country=PER [https://perma.cc/M4QG-93WG] [hereinafter World Bank
Data Peru]. During 2016, its inflation rate was 2.9%. Id.
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America. 302 Between 2007 and 2012, it had an average GDP growth of
almost seven percent 303 and in 2016, Peru’s annual GDP growth was
four percent. 304 In addition to growing its economy overall, Peru has
made impressive progress in reducing its poverty rate. 305 The World
Bank describes Peru as an “upper middle income” country. 306
Peru is a member of the World Trade Organization, 307 as well as
a number of other international organizations. 308 Peru is also a party to
more than fifteen bilateral or regional free trade agreements, including
an agreement with the United States. 309 The US-Peru Trade Promotion
Agreement entered into force in 2009. 310 In July 2018, the Office of the
US Trade Representative described trade between the United States
and Peru as follows:

302. THE WORLD BANK IN PERU, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/peru/overview
[https://perma.cc/V7X8-5ZD7] (“Between 2002 and 2013, Peru was one of the fastest-growing
countries in Latin America, with an average GDP growth rate of 6.1 percent annually.”).
303 . Trade Policy Review, Report by the Secretariat, Peru, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
WT/TPR/S/289 ¶¶ 3, 6 (Oct. 9, 2013), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s289_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B7EM-WN4J].
304. World Bank Data Peru, supra note 301.
305. See id. (showing a drop in poverty from 30.8% in 2010 to 20.7% in 2016); World
Bank, Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines, WORLD BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC?locations=PE
[https://perma.cc/G9H6KU5N] (poverty has been reduced from 59% in 2004 to 21% in 2016).
306. World Bank, Peru, WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/country/peru
[https://perma.cc/DS6Q-A5TR] [hereinafter World Bank Peru Data Choices].
307. See Trade Policy Review, supra note 303.
308. See Peru Factsheet U.S. Relations with Peru, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35762.htm [https://perma.cc/8AWH-ULC3] (“Peru and the
United States belong to a number of the same international organizations, including the United
Nations, Organization of American States, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum,
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization.”).
309. See CIA, The World Factbook: Peru, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pe.html
[https://perma.cc/B8A5-55ZC] [hereinafter World Factbook] (“[S]ince 2006, Peru has signed
trade deals with the US, Canada, Singapore, China, Korea, Mexico, Japan, the EU, the European
Free Trade Association, Chile, Thailand, Costa Rica, Panama, Venezuela, Honduras, concluded
negotiations with Guatemala and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and begun trade talks with El
Salvador, India, and Turkey.”).
310. See Final Text, U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement Peru TPA, OFFICE OF U.S.
TRADE
REP.,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa/final-text
[https://perma.cc/8VXA-HARM] [hereinafter US-Peru Trade Agreement].
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U.S. goods and services trade with Peru totaled an estimated $20.5
billion in 2015 (latest data available). Exports were $12.6 billion;
imports were $7.9 billion. The U.S. goods and services trade
surplus with Peru was $4.7 billion in 2015. Peru is currently our
35th largest goods trading partner with $14.3 billion in total (two
way) goods trade during 2016. 311

The US-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement applies to professional
services, including legal services. 312
Peru is a civil law country. 313 It has a divided legal profession that
includes Abogado(a) and notaries. 314 Information in English about
Peru’s legal profession can be found in the 2016 International Bar
Association (“IBA”) Directory of Regulators, 315 the 2014 IBA Global
Legal Services Report, 316 and on the IBA Anti-Money-Laundering

311. Peru, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas/peru
[https://perma.cc/BGM5-3CW9].
312. For a discussion of the treatment of legal services in this agreement, see THE U.S.PERU FREE TRADE AGREEMENT REPORT OF THE INDUSTRY TRADE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
SERVICES
AND
FINANCE
INDUSTRIES
(ITAC
10)
(Feb.
1,
2006
),
https://ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Reports/asset_upload_fi
le209_8983.pdf [https://perma.cc/58HD-BZXR]; Laurel S. Terry, From GATS to APEC: The
Impact of Trade Agreements on Legal Services, 43 AKRON L. REV. 875, 937-38 (2010)
(comparing the legal services portion of the US-Peru TPA to those found in fourteen other US
free trade agreements).
313. See, e.g., World Factbook, supra note 309.
314. Compare INT’L BAR ASS’N, IBA Global Regulation and Trade in Legal Services
Report
2014
(Oct.
2014),
at
Peru,
363-366,
https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=1D3D3E81-472A-40E59D9D-68EB5F71A702 [https://perma.cc/BJ8F-4HMB] [hereinafter IBA Global Legal Services
Report] (discussing the rules applicable to the profession of abogado (male) and abogada
(female) and citing the regulatory body of the Junta de Decanos de los Colegios de abogados del
Peru), with Junta de Decanos de los Colegios de Notarios del Perú,
http://www.juntadedecanos.org.pe/ [https://perma.cc/H57T-5E3S] (website of the regulatory
body of the Peruvian profession of notary).
315. See also Directory of Regulators of the Legal Profession, INT’L BAR ASS’N (2016),
144,
https://www.ibanet.org/Legal_Regulators_Directory.aspxhttps://www.ibanet.org/Legal_Regul
ators_Directory.aspxhttps://www.ibanet.org/Legal_Regulators_Directory.aspx
[https://perma.cc/MRN4-PQ3G] [hereinafter IBA Directory of Regulators].
316. See IBA Global Legal Services Report, supra note 314.

2018]

RELEVANCE OF FATF’S RECOMMENDATIONS

695

Forum webpage, 317 as well as in other sources. 318 The US Library of
Congress hosts a website about Peru that includes links to Peruvian
laws and government websites, as well as a number of addition useful
links. 319
According to the IBA Global Legal Services Report, in order to
be admitted to practice, a lawyer in Peru must meet the following
requirements: “The requirements for admission to practise are a five
year university education, followed by registration with the
[Superintendencia Nacional de Educación Superior Universitaria
(SUNEDU)] and . . . incorporation into a [Regional] Bar Association
of Peru.” 320
Regional bar associations in Peru belong to the Junta De Decanos
De Los Colegios De Abogados Del Perú—this might be translated as
the National Board of Deans of the Bar Associations of Peru. 321 This
317 . See INT’L BAR ASS’N, Peru, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING FORUM (last updated
01/07/2017), https://www.anti-moneylaundering.org/southamerica/Peru.aspx [https://perma.cc/
Z57S-L39Y]. As noted infra notes 356-63 and accompanying text, Peru has adopted new AML
laws that apply to lawyers. These new laws are not yet listed on the IBA website. Id.
318. See, e.g., Ana Cecilia MacLean, Legal Education in Peru: Are We Ready for Integration
and Globalization, 19 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 201, 216201216 (2013) (noting that Peru had
seventy-six law schools, of which nineteen were public universities (25%) and fifty-seven were
private universities (75%)); THE CYRUS R. VANCE CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
INITIATIVES,
Country Report, Peru (2011) http://www.vancecenter.org/vancecenter/
images/stories/vancecenter/country%20report%20-%20peru.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N5XQVWU9]; Latham & Watkins, Pro Bono Practices and Opportunities in Peru, LATHAM &
WATKINS,
489
(Sept.
2015),
https://www.lw.com/admin/Upload/Documents/
Global%20Pro%20Bono%20Survey/pro-bono-in-peru.pdf
[https://perma.cc/23HP-G38E]
(stating that in 2014, Peru had 130,000 Bar-affiliated lawyers, which was approximately one
lawyer for every 234 habitants.”).
319. Guide to Law Online: Peru, U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, (last visited Oct. 5, 2018)
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/guide/nations/peru.php [https://perma.cc/QVY7-FE4E]. See also
Peru, USAID, https://www.usaid.gov/peru [https://perma.cc/34SG-QZSE].
320. IBA GLOBAL LEGAL SERVICES REPORT, supra note 314, at 363. This IBA Report
indicates that although an abogado/a must register with a regional bar association, that lawyer
may practice throughout the country and need not work in the region in which he or she
registered. Id.
The language in brackets was provided by one of this Article’s Authors, who is Peruvian.
It corrects the registration entity listed in the IBA Report and deletes the statement that a lawyer
must register with the Superior Court of Lima. Id. at 363.
321. See COLEGIO DE ABOGATOS DE LIMA, Junta De Decanos De Los Colegios De
Abogados Del Perú , http://www.cal.org.pe/junta_decanos_peru.html [https://perma.cc/CN8Q-
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national organization, which is established by law and represents more
than thirty bar associations, meets periodically. 322
The Junta De Decanos De Los Colegios De Abogados Del Perú
has certain overarching responsibilities related to lawyer regulation.
For example, it adopted Peru’s 2012 legal ethics code 323 and lawyer
disciplinary procedures. 324 A preface to the 2012 ethics code includes
interesting background information, including the fact that it was
modeled after the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 325
Peru’s 2012 ethics code has been well publicized. For example,
the Colegio de Abogados de Lima (Bar Association of Lima) 326 has a

T8LT] [hereinafter National Board webpage] (this page, which is available as a link from an
older webpage of the Colegio de Abogados de Lima (Bar Association of Lima) includes links to
a number of items, including its governing document, the Estatuto De La Junta De Decanos De
Los Colegios De Abogados Del Peru). See also Colegios Profesionales, CONSEJO NACIONAL
DE DECANOS DE LOS COLEGIOS PROFESIONALES DEL PERÚ SIGA EL SIGUIENTE E NLACE
(CDCP), http://cdcp.org.pe/colegios-profesionales/ [https://perma.cc/C89H-6MQ3] (includes
links to members, as well as links to the Peruvian laws that created these organizations).
322 . See, e.g., Junta Nacional de los Colegios de Abogados del Perú, COLEGIO DE
ABOGADOS DE LIMA (July 25, 2018), http://www.cal.org.pe/v1/junta-nacional-de-los-colegiosde-abogados-del-peru/ [https://perma.cc/5WTR-XRQW] (reporting on a July 20, 2018 meeting
of the national board); JUNTA DE DECANOS DE LOS COLEGIOS DE ABOGADOS DEL
PERÚ, http://www.cal.org.pe/junta_decanos_peru.html [https://perma.cc/2AN7-GWGX]
(linking to several meetings).
323. See generally Junta Law No. 001- 2012-JDCAP-P, Código De Ética Del Abogado
[The Code of Ethics for Lawyers], COLEGIO DE ABOGATOS DE LIMA (Apr. 14, 2012),
http://cal.org.pe/archivos_oficiales/2015/etica/codigo_de_etica_del_abogado_051114.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FQE7-E22Z]. Links to this ethics code are available in a number of different
locations. See, e.g., IBA Directory of Regulators: Peru, supra note 315, at 144.
324. Law No. 002-2012-JDCAP-P, Reglamento Del Procedimiento Disciplinario De Los
Órganos De Control Deontologico De Los Colegios De Abogados Del Perú [Disciplinary
Regulations for Peruvian Lawyers], COLEGIO DE ABOGATOS DE LIMA (Apr. 14, 2012),
http://cal.org.pe/archivos_oficiales/2015/etica/reglamento_de_los_procedimiento_disciplinario
_051114.pdf [https://perma.cc/TRX9-93NR].
325 . See Prefacio, RAMA JUDICIAL, 2-3, http://www.ramajudicial.pr/reglas-deconducta/Cap-1a.pdf [https://perma.cc/7U9T-K7YJ]. A link to this preface is included in the
Peru entry in the IBA Directory of Regulators, supra note 315, at 144. The preface explains that
the drafters consulted a number of resources including the ALI’s Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and ethics codes from
Spain and the European Union, among other items. Prefacio, supra, at 1-2. As the Preface
explains, the drafters ultimately decided to use the ABA Model Rules as the model for Peru’s
revised ethics code. Id. at 2-3. This preface identifies the drafters and the difference in approach
in the 2012 ethics code compared to the earlier version. Id. at 1-2.
326 . See, e.g., COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE LIMA, (last visted Oct. 5, 2018),
http://www.cal.org.pe/v1/ [https://perma.cc/6DG4-AWUT]. Peru also has a bar association for
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professional ethics office which has a webpage. 327 This webpage
includes, inter alia, links to the 2012 ethics code, the 2012 disciplinary
enforcement rules, a complaint form for consumers, directions to
consumers about the grounds for a complaint and how to fill out the
form, as well as a list of lawyers who have been disciplined.328 The Bar
Association of Lima’s Ethics webpage also includes links to various
reports and its workplan. 329
Although there is relatively little demographic data about Peru’s
legal profession, 330 Peru has fewer large law firms than the United
States, and the largest firms are smaller. 331 There are also relatively

North Lima and South Lima. Pronouncement of the Board of Deans, COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS
http://www.cal.org.pe/v1/28482-2/ [https://perma.cc/F633-ECUS].
327. See Dirección De Ética Profesional, COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE LIMA,
http://www.cal.org.pe/v1/etica-profesional/ [https://perma.cc/D43H-ZFDT] [hereinafter Lima
Bar Ethics Webpage].
328. See id.
329. Id. The Lima Bar’s older webpage also included a robust ethics page with information
about the implementation plan for the 2012 ethics code. See Ética Profesional, COLEGIO DE
ABOGADOS DE LIMA, http://www.cal.org.pe/etica.html [https://perma.cc/7U98-48CU]
[hereinafter Older Lima Bar Ethics page]. The older Lima Bar Ethics page included a link to a
document that had interesting implementation information: the Plan de Trabajo. COLEGIO DE
ABOGADOS DE LIMA, Plan de Trabajo (2014) http://www.cal.org.pe/pdf/etica/2014/marzo/P-TEtica.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZP2E-RJMC].
330. See, e.g., Los abogados en el Perú, LE LEY (Apr. 1, 2014),
http://laley.pe/not/1215/los-abogados-en-el-peru/ [https://perma.cc/TA93-BNM6] (containing
demographic information); See also Cyrus Vance Peru Report, supra note 318, at 13-14 (citing
a report that in May 2010, there were approximately more than 97,000 lawyers in Peru, also
noting city concentration and law student practice area interests, but noting that there is no direct
data that reflects the geographic concentration of lawyers or distribution of lawyers across
sectors).
331.
Compare
2018
Latin
Lawyer 250,
LATIN LAWYER
(2018),
https://latinlawyer.com/ll250/countries/2257/peru [https://perma.cc/7G6N-Y5D5] (2018 Latin
Lawyer 250 ratings list only four Peruvian firms that have more than one-hundred lawyers), with
Global 100: Most Lawyers, AM. LAW. 42-46 (Oct. 2018) (listing many US law firms with more
than 700 lawyers and no Peruvian firms). A 2013 ABA report noted in that in 2005,
approximately seventy-five percent of lawyers were in private practice and of those,
approximately seventy-five percent practiced as solos or in firms of twenty or fewer lawyers.
See AM. B. ASS’N, Lawyer Demographics [2012], https://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/lawyer_demographics_2013.authcheckda
m.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6MH-5CR2]. It seems logical that most Peruvian lawyers also practice
as solos or in small law firms.
DE LIMA,

698

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:2

few “global” law firms with offices in Peru. 332 For example, the 2014
IBA Global Legal Services Report stated that the “Spanish firm Uría
Menéndez and the legal arms of the large accountancy networks (PwC
legal and Ernst and Young) have for some time been the only foreign
firms with a foothold in Peru. Baker and McKenzie recently tied up
with a local firm.” 333 After the IBA Report was written, a Peruvian law
firm merged with Dentons, which is one of the world’s largest law
firms. 334 Other global law firms now have a presence in Peru. 335 In
2018, Chambers & Partners has offered the following description of the
Peruvian legal market:
The fast-growing Peruvian economy has opened many doors for
both multinational companies wanting to take advantage of the
country’s business reputation, as well as local entities that are
using the current momentum to expand beyond their borders. This
has therefore increased the need for advice of an international
standard and cross-border legal advice in the country. It then
comes as no surprise that Peru has recorded historic M&A
transactional amounts in the last decade especially in 2007
(USD5.3 billion), 2013 (USD6.8 billion) and 2014, a recordbreaking year with over USD11 billion. The mergers and
acquisitions market for 2016 saw a 20% growth when compared
to 2015, with a reported 131 significant transactions.
As a result, international law firms have started to enter Peru over
the past four years, either independently or by incorporating an
existing national firm into their structure. In return, Peruvian
lawyers that have chosen to remain independent have embraced
the need for increasing their regional profile, building a strong

332. See infra notes 333-36 and accompanying text.
333. IBA GLOBAL LEGAL SERVICES REPORT, supra note 314, at 364.
334. Dentons combines with Peru’s Gallo Barrios Pickmann, DENTONS (Oct. 2, 2017),
https://www.dentons.com/en/whats-different-about-dentons/connecting-you-to-talentedlawyers-around-the-globe/news/2017/october/dentons-combines-with-perus-gallo-barriospickmann [https://perma.cc/QHC7-AA9W]; Paula Kulig, Dentons plans combination with
Peruvian law firm, THE LAW. DAILY (May 24, 2017), https://www.thelawyersdaily.ca/family/
articles/3803/dentons-plans-combination-with-peruvian-law-firm
[https://perma.cc/P58NLAM9] (noting the proposed merger with Gallo Barrios Pickmann and the fact that Peru is “one
of the strongest and fastest-growing economies in Latin America”).
335. Compare 2018 Latin Lawyer 250, supra note 331 (recommended firms include CMS
Grau, DLA Piper Pizarro Botto Escobar, and Garrigues (Peru)), with Global 100, supra note 331
(CMS and DLA Piper are among the ten largest firms listed).
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reputation to prove to their current and potential clients that they
are more than capable of handling complex and even cross-border
transactions with the required international standard of quality. 336

When evaluating the AML situation for Peru’s lawyers, one must
take note of the fact that Peru has faced significant corruption issues,337
including the 2018 resignations of its president 338 and the head of its
judiciary. 339 Lawyers, as well as Peru’s president, have been caught up
in the massive “Lava Jato” scandal that prominently featured bribery,
money laundering, and the Brazilian construction firm Odebrecht.340

336. See
Peru
Overview,
CHAMBERS
&
PARTNERS,
https://www.chambersandpartners.com/guide/latin-america/9/171/1 [https://perma.cc/3NT7EUSD].
337. See, e.g., Adriana Peralta, Peru’s Most Wanted Gangster Captured after 4 Months on
the Run, Panampost (Nov. 2014), https://panampost.com/adriana-peralta/2014/11/14/perusmost-wanted-gangster-captured-after-4-months-on-the-run/?cn-reloaded=1
[https://perma.cc/SYU4-3RBN].
See
also
TRANSPARENCY
INT’L,
Peru,
https://www.transparency.org/country/PER [https://perma.cc/B4HN-BV98] (ranking Peru
ninety-sixth out of 180 countries for 2017).
338. Peru’s President Pablo Kuczynski resigned in March 2018 after an impeachment
threat related to a corruption scandal tied to Brazilian construction company Odebrecht. See
Marcelo Rochabrún & Andrea Zarate, ʻWeʼve Had Enoughʼ Says Peruʼs New President, N.Y.
TIMES (March 23, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/23/world/americas/peru-kuczynskivizcarra.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FPeru [https://perma.cc/X8DQ-E7BN private];
Nicholas Casey & Andrea Zarate, Corruption Scandals with Brazilian Roots Cascade Across
Latin America, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2017) (noting the arrest warrant for former president
Toledo and the conviction of former president Alberto K. Fujimori). See also Miller & Chevalier,
Latin
America
Corruption
Survey
(2016),
https://www.millerchevalier.com/sites/default/files/resources/2016-Latin-America-CorruptionSurvey-Full-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/QX3T-RNGJ].
339. See, e.g., Head of Peru’s Judiciary Resigns as Crisis Grips Justice System, REUTERS
(July 19, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-peru-corruption-resignation/head-of-perusjudiciary-resigns-as-crisis-grips-justice-system-idUSKBN1K92OH [https://perma.cc/NB833FW9].
340. See, e.g., Óscar Castilla et. al, La lista negra del Caso Lava Jato, Ojo Publico, (Feb.
5, 2017, updated 02/28/2018), https://lavajato.ojo-publico.com/articulo/lista-negra-casolavajato/ [https://perma.cc/6LN2-4872]; Fabiano Angelico, Brazil: Open Data Just Made
Investigating
Corruption
Easier,
Transparency
Int’l
(May
12,
2017),
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/brazil_open_data_just_made_investigating_corrupt
ion_easier [https://perma.cc/2TYR-HCJ8] (referring to the “Lava Jato” money laundering
scandal and explaining its relationship to Odebrecht). See also Aquino, infra note 341.
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The Panama Papers scandal has also reached Peru. For example, in
2016, Peruvian authorities raided the Lima office of the now-closed
law firm, Mossack Fonseca, whose leaked papers launched the Panama
Papers scandal. 341 The Panama Papers database maintained by the
International Consortium of Journalists lists a number of firms with
Peruvian connections. 342 Recently, the Lava Jato Commission of the
Peruvian Congress agreed to waive the tax secrecy of fifty of the main
Peruvian large law firms hired by the Brazilian construction company
Odebrecht. 343 While these developments are discouraging to read
about, one of the authors of this article believes that from a legal ethics
perspective, the Lava Jato/Odebrecht scandal may be—and needs to
be—to Peru what Watergate was to the United States—the catalyst that
leads to legal ethics becoming more prominent. 344
Peru has taken a number of steps to fight corruption and money
laundering. For example, in July 2018, Peru became a party to the
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”)
Anti-Bribery Convention and the Multilateral Convention on Mutual

341. See Marco Aquino, Peru Raids Local Mossack Fonseca Office, Seizes Documents
(April 11, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-panama-tax-peru/peru-raids-localmossack-fonseca-office-seizes-documents-idUSKCN0X82MD
[https://perma.cc/S7F7DWQ4].
342 . See ICIJ Database, supra note 44. At Search Results for Peru,
https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/search?utf8=%E2%9C%93&q=peru&e=&commit=Search
[https://perma.cc/CGC7-BB2F]. As the “consent” box that one must agree to before accessing
this database prominently notes, being listed in the database does not mean that the person or
firm has done anything illegal or improper.
343. See Levantarán secreto tributario de 60 estudios de abogados por contratos con
Odebrecht, LA REPÚBLICA (July 28, 2018), https://larepublica.pe/politica/1284591-lava-jatosecreto-bancario-60-estudios-abogados-contratos-odebrecht [https://perma.cc/N9J3-QB9L].
344. As many US lawyers know, the involvement of lawyers in the Watergate scandal that
led President Nixon to resign was one of the main reasons why the American Bar Association
changed the legal education accreditation requirements to include a legal ethics education
requirement. See, e.g., Mark Curriden, The Lawyers of Watergate: How a “Third-Rate
Burglary” Provoked New Standards for Lawyer Ethics, 98 A.B.A. J. 36 (2012). For a Peruvian
article that cites this Watergate article and makes this analogy, see José Carlos Llerena Robles,
De los Petroaudios a Odebrecht ¿estamos en el caso de un Watergate peruano en la enseñanza
del derecho?, CAFELEGAL (Feb. 6, 2017), https://cafelegal.lamula.pe/2017/02/06/de-lospetroaudios-a-odebrecht-estamos-en-el-caso-de-un-watergate-peruano-en-la-ensenanza-delderecho/jcllerena84/ [https://perma.cc/5BHR-R69Q] (discussing current and past scandals and
whether they might prompt reforms).
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Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. 345 Most significantly for
purposes of this Article, Peru is a member of GAFILAT, which is one
of the FATF-Style Regional Bodies described earlier. 346 GAFILAT
was established in 2000 and consists of sixteen countries from South,
Central, and North America. 347 GAFILAT uses training measures and
mutual evaluations to support its members in the “implementation of
the 40 Recommendations and the creation of a regional prevention
system against money laundering.” 348
Peru’s most recent completed mutual evaluation is its 3rd Round
Mutual Evaluation Report, which is dated July 2008. 349 According to
a summary of that report, Peru was deemed compliant with ten
recommendations, largely compliant with fourteen recommendations,
345. See OECD, Newsroom: Peru to join two major OECD Conventions: Anti-Bribery
Convention and multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matter,
http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/peru-to-join-two-major-oecd-conventions-anti-briberyconvention-and-multilateral-convention-on-mutual-administrative-assistance-in-taxmatters.htm [https://perma.cc/UBT2-RQMA] (Peru became the forty-fourth party to the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention on July 27, 2018 and acceded to the Multilateral Convention on
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, effective September 1, 2018).
Peru has ratified the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (“CICC”) in 1997 and
the United Nations Convention against Corruption (“UNCAC”) in 2004. See, e.g., PERU PODER
JUDICIAL, Lucha contra la Corrupción, https://www.pj.gob.pe/wps/wcm/connect/
cooperacion/s_corte_suprema_utilitarios/as_inicio/as_normas_internacionales/as_lucha_contra
_corrupcion [https://perma.cc/U2W7-VVQZ].
346. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text for information about the FATF-Style
Regional Bodies. See infra note 347 regarding Peru’s membership.
347. See, e.g., GAFILAT, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatfgafi.org/countries/#GAFILAT [https://perma.cc/FG3P-YJWG] (shows that Peru is a
member of GAFILAT, which former was known as GAFISUD). It can be difficult to find an
English version of the GAFILAT webpages. Compare GAFILAT: Home,
http://www.gafilat.org/index.php/en/
[https://perma.cc/S4M6-2M4D],
with
http://gafilat.org.iplan-unix-03.toservers.com/content/quienes/&lang=en
[https://perma.cc/A5UJ-HAAN].
348. See FATF GAFILAT, supra note 347.
349. See 2008 Peru Mutual Evaluation, supra note 7. Unlike some of the FATF 4th Round
reports for Spanish-speaking countries, Peru’s 2008 Mutual Evaluation Report is available only
in Spanish. Compare 2008 Peru Mutual Evaluation Report, supra note 7 (available only in
Spanish), with Mexico MER, supra note 109 (available in English and Spanish); Nicaragua
MER, supra note 109 (available in English and Spanish). Peru received several progress reports
after its third mutual evaluation report. See, e.g., III Informe de Avance de la Evaluación Mutua
de Perú, Informe de la Secretaría Ejecutiva (These reports are not listed on the FATF Peru page
and currently are password protected on the GAFILAT website).
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and partially compliant or non-compliant with four of the six core
recommendations. 350 At the time of Peru’s 3rd Round Mutual
Evaluation Report, Peru’s lawyers were not subject to Peru’s antimoney laundering regime. 351
Peru’s 4th Round Mutual Evaluation Report has not been issued,
but the FATF Plenary discussion of this Report currently is scheduled
for December 2018. 352 Peru has a webpage with extensive materials
related to its 2017-18 Mutual Evaluation, although most are exclusively
in Spanish. 353 This government webpage includes documents related
to Peru’s national threat assessment and action plan. 354 A July 2018
IMF report contains an English summary of Peru’s national threat
assessment. 355

350. See Know Your Country, Peru, https://www.knowyourcountry.com/peru1111
[https://perma.cc/4KAW-DRYB].
351. See 2008 Peru Mutual Evaluation Report, supra note 7, at 67. Accord IBA AML
Forum, Peru, supra note 317, at 1 (“There’s no regulation regarding money laundering guidance
for lawyers.”).
352. See FATF Global Assessment Calendar, supra note 102, at Peru, http://www.fatfgafi.org/calendar/assessmentcalendar/?hf=10&b=0&r=%2Bf%2Ffatf_country_en%2Fperu&s=
asc(document_lastmodifieddate)&table=1 [https://perma.cc/GW4Y-TC4P].
353. See SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCA, SEGUROS Y AFP, Guías para el proceso de
Evaluación Mutua, http://www.sbs.gob.pe/prevencion-de-lavado-activos/Sistema-de-LuchaContra-el-LA-FT/Evaluacion-Mutua-Peru-2017-2018/Guias-para-el-proceso-de-EvaluacionMutua [https://perma.cc/N424-L6QJ].
354. SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCA, SEGUROS Y AFP, Plan Nacional contra el Lavado
de Activos (LA) y el Financiamiento del Terrorismo (FT) 2018-2021,
http://www.sbs.gob.pe/prevencion-de-lavado-activos/Sistema-de-Lucha-Contra-el-LAFT/Plan-Nacional-contra-el-Lavado-de-Activos-y-el-Financiamiento-del-Terrorismo-20182021 [https://perma.cc/XFM5-PGLY].
355 . See INT’L MONETARY FUND, Peru, Financial Sector Stability Assessment, IMF
Country
Report
No.
18/238
(July 2018),
https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/
Publications/CR/2018/cr18238-PeruFSSA.ashx [https://perma.cc/T7CD-K6T7]. This IMF
report stated, inter alia, that “drug trafficking, corruption, and environmental crimes were
identified as key threats, while the informal economy’s size and the inadequate controls over
movement of cash were listed as major vulnerabilities. The acquisition of real estate was recently
noted as a significant ML typology.” Id. at 28. See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I Drug and Chemical Control 272-73
(March 2014), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/222881.pdf [https://perma.cc/
TXM3-4GS8] (“The Government of Peru has demonstrated increasingly strong political will to
address drug production and trafficking in Peru, both through funding a significant share of
eradication operations for the first time and through its successful operations in the VRAEM to
bring down high-ranking members of Shining Path.”). See also supra note 353 (SBS Mutual
Evaluation webpage).
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When Peru’s 4th Round Mutual Evaluation Report is published,
the legal profession portion will look very different than Peru’s prior
Mutual Evaluation Report. As this paragraph explains, this is because
Peru has now added lawyers to the groups who are subject to Peru’s
AML laws. 356 In November 2016, the Peruvian government enacted a
new law known as Legislative Decree No. 1249. 357 Legislative Decree
1249 includes attorneys among the professionals who are obliged to
report suspicious transaction under Peruvian anti-money laundering
rules. 358 Legislative Decree 1249 provides that an attorney who is in
solo practice or in a law firm, who, on a habitual basis and on behalf a
third party or on his own, is required to report the following activities:
a) Purchase and sale of real estate;
b) Management of money, securities, accounts of the
financial system or other assets;
c) Organization of contributions for the incorporation,
operation or administration of legal entities;
d) Incorporation, management, or reorganization of legal
entities or other legal structures; and
e) Purchase and sale of shares or social participations of
legal persons. 359

356. Compare infra notes 357-62 and accompanying text (discussing Decree 1249), with
IBA Anti-money Laundering Forum webpage for Peru, supra note 317 (“ARE LAWYERS
COVERED BY ANTIMONEY LAUNDERING LEGISLATION? Anti[-]money laundering
legislation does not cover lawyers specifically. Nevertheless, Notaries are obligated to inform
any suspicious
Operation to the UIF Perú. In general they are supervised by the Council of Notaries.”).
357. See Decreto Legislativo N° 1249 que dicta medidas para fortalecer la prevención,
detección y sanción del lavado de activos y el terrorismo, [Legislative Decree 1249],
http://www.leyes.congreso.gob.pe/Documentos/2016_2021/Decretos/Legislativos/01249.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4PLU-4KZH]. This law is available as a link from the webpage of Peru’s AML
supervisor. See SUPERINTENDENTA DE BANCA, SEGUROS Y AFP
Normas de aplicación general en materia de LAFT, http://www.sbs.gob.pe/prevencion-delavado-activos/normas-de-aplicacion-general-en-materia-de-laft
[https://perma.cc/L2W4LS3H].
358. See Legislative Decree 1249, supra note 357.
359. Id.
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Legislative Decree 1249 establishes that the information
mentioned above and reported to the AML Peruvian Authority shall not
be protected by attorney-client privilege. 360 In March 2018, the
Peruvian Banking Regulator, Superintendencia de Banca, Seguros y
AFP, issued Resolution 789-2018. 361 This twenty-four page Resolution
provides additional detail about the regulation contained in Decree
1249. 362 Resolution 789-2018 includes information about topics such
as the content of the Transactions Registers that attorneys must keep as
part of a prevention system, the requirement that attorneys report, and
the sanctions applicable to the breach of AML duties by lawyers. 363
According to this Article’s Peruvian Author, the Peruvian legal
community has not yet started to have an open and deep debate about
the consequences of Resolution 789 and Decree 1249. There are not
yet clear parameters about what kind of information an attorney shall
report to the Peruvian AML Authority without breaching the attorneyclient privilege that is regulated by Peruvian Political Constitution364
and the Peruvian Code of Legal Ethics. 365 In the Peruvian Author’s
view, this is a challenge that the Peruvian legal community needs to
tackle in the short term in order to have clearer knowledge about
360. Legislative Decree 1249, supra note 357, at art. 3.29.
361. See República del Perú, Resolución SBS Nº 789-2018, Norma para la prevención del
lavado de activos y del fi nanciamiento del terrorismo aplicable a los sujetos obligados bajo
supervisión de la UIFPerú, en materia de prevención del lavado de activos y del financiamiento
del terrorismo, EL PERUANO http://epdoc2.elperuano.pe/EpPo/DescargaIN.asp?Referencias=
MTYyMjE0NV8xMjAxODAzMDM= [https://perma.cc/TK3M-AQ2G] [hereinafter Resolution
789-2018].
362. Id.
363. Id. This law excludes law firms as legal entities obliged to report. Id.
364. See República del Perú, Constitución de 1993 incluyendo reformas hasta 2005,
POLITICAL DATABASE OF THE AMERICAS, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Peru/
per93reforms05.html [https://perma.cc/8F2G-RN2P]. One of the Author’s translation is as
follows:
Article 2 of Peruvian Political Constitution
Every person has the right:
(...)
18. To keep his political, philosophical, religious or any other type of conviction
private, as well as to keep professional secrets.
365. See Peruvian Code of Legal Ethics, supra note 323, at art. 30. Article 30 might be
translated as follows: “Attorney client privilege is the duty of reserve that the lawyer has to
protect and maintain in the strictest confidentiality the facts and information referred to a client
or potential client who knows on the occasion of the professional relationship.” (translation by
one of the Authors).
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attorneys’ new regulatory duties. However, because of the deep and
wide presence of illegal activities related to drug trafficking in Peru,
the Peruvian AML Authority does not have enough resources and
political support to deal with all the issues related to money laundering
activities. 366 Because of this, the activities that are prioritized in the
struggle against money laundering are things such as the construction
sector, real estate companies, and entertainment, rather than legal
services. 367
Peru’s 2012 legal ethics code will be an important part of the legal
profession’s AML discussions and an important tool in Peru’s fight
against money laundering and corruption. Before 2012, Peru had been
using an ethics code based on the 1908 ABA Canons of Ethics. 368 As
the Preface to Peru’s new 2012 ethics code recognizes, the 1908 ABA
Canons do not provide a useful basis for lawyer discipline. 369 Peru now
has a set of ethics rules—as opposed to aspirational principles—that
can provide a basis for regulating and disciplining Peru’s lawyers who
assist clients in money laundering activities. 370
In 2016, Legislative Decree 1249 established a national register
of disciplined lawyers. 371 The names of disciplined lawyers from
around the country and the sanctions they received are prominently
listed on a Peruvian Government webpage managed by the Peruvian
Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. 372 As noted earlier, the Lima

366. See, e.g., supra notes 337-43 and accompanying text (describing widespread
corruption scandals); National Action Plan, supra notes 354-55 (showing that lawyers are not a
primary target of Peru’s AML efforts).
367. See generally National Action Plan, supra notes 354-55 (setting forth Peru’s AML
priorities).
368. See Prefacio to the 2012 Peru Ethics Code, supra note 325, at 2 (“Como se sabe, los
Cánones de Ética Profesional de 1935 fueron una traducción directa al castellano de los Cánones
de 1908 aprobados por la A.B.A.”).
369. Id. at 3-4.
370. See Prefacio, supra note 325 (describing Peru’s new 2012 ethics code and noting that
the prior ethics code was modeled on the 1908 ABA Canons of Ethics).
371. See supra note 357. Disciplined lawyers also are listed on the webpages of regional
bar associations such as the Bar Association of Lima. See supra note 329 and accompanying
text.
372. See Registro Nacional De Abogados Sancionados Por Mala Práctica Profesional,
https://rnas.minjus.gob.pe/rnas/ [https://perma.cc/4XPH-Y8Q5], which is linked from Gov’t of
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Bar Association’s ethics webpage includes a link to the lawyers that it
has disciplined. 373
Peru and its legal profession have taken a number of additional
steps to fight lawyer involvement in money laundering. For example,
in 2018, Peru created a register of lawyers involved in corruption. 374 In
June 2018, the Lima Bar Association held a conference on anti-money
laundering. 375 In July 2018, the Junta De Decanos De Los Colegios De
Abogados Del Perú held a press conference in which it called for a
quick investigation against the judges and members of the National
Council of the Magistracy (“CNM”) involved in cases of corruption.376
Some of these recent steps may have been triggered or accelerated by
lawyer involvement in the Lava Jato/Odebrecht and Panama Papers
scandals. 377 But as the US experience with Watergate demonstrates,
sometimes a scandal can prompt useful and radical reforms in order to
really change the structural roots that create trouble and to recover the
population’s confidence in institutions. 378 In Peru, the FATF
Recommendations may provide support for those who want additional
tools to identify and resist lawyer involvement in corruption and money
laundering.

Peru, Defensa, Seguridad y Justicia, https://www.gob.pe/categorias/15-defensa-seguridad-yjusticia [https://perma.cc/6PZE-623W].
373. See Lima Bar Association Ethics Webpage, supra note 327.
374 . See COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE LIMA, Se Creará El Registro De Abogados
Implicados En Actos De Corrupción (Jan. 25, 2018),
http://www.cal.org.pe/v1/se-creara-el-registro-de-abogados-implicados-en-actos-decorrupcion/ [https://perma.cc/WP7M-AFSS].
375. COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE LIMA, Lavado de Activos (May 31, 2018),
http://www.cal.org.pe/v1/conferencia-lavado-de-activos/ [https://perma.cc/D3LB-Q6MG].
376 . See Conferencia de Prensa: Colegios de Abogados del Perú piden una rápida
investigación y una drástica sanción. See COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE LIMA (July 11, 2018),
http://www.cal.org.pe/v1/conferencia-de-prensa-colegios-de-abogados-del-peru-piden-unarapida-investigacion-y-una-drastica-sancion/ [https://perma.cc/8MY9-CKS2 ] (“Junta de
Decanos de los Colegios de Abogados del Perú pidió una rápida investigación y una drástica
sanción contra los jueces y miembros del Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura (CNM)
involucrados en casos de corrupción y tráfico de influencias.”).
377. See, e.g. supra notes 338-40 and accompanying text for articles about these
developments.
378. See supra note 344.
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C. The Use of Competing Narratives to Discuss Lawyer AML Issues:
“Lawyers as Sieves” Versus “Lawyers as Atlas”
This Article asserts that when one reads about lawyer involvement
in money laundering and lawyer AML regulation issues, one
encounters quite different starting premises and perspectives. This
disconnect between the perspectives is dramatic and evocative of the
movie Rashomon, in which the same event is told from very different
perspectives.
It is a thesis of this Article that one of the two competing
narratives one encounters is a narrative that this Article has labeled the
“lawyer as sieve” narrative. 379 In the lawyer as sieve narrative, lawyers
who assist criminal money launderers are not an occasional aberration,
but are the “sieve” through which criminal proceeds regularly flow.
Lawyers are seen as either the equivalent of other “gatekeeper”
DNFBPs such as casinos or precious metal dealers or as something
even worse because of lawyers’ willingness to help criminals launder
money. If one consciously or unconsciously accepts this narrative, then
there is little or no need to weigh the costs and benefits of AML lawyer
regulation or the effect of such regulation on lawyer-client privilege or
the rule of law because strict lawyer AML regulation is obviously
necessary.
The lawyer as sieve narrative frequently appears in media reports.
Section II.B cites a number of examples that use this perspective.380
The following statement by Michael Goldhaber may be one of the most
memorable examples of this perspective: “Unfortunately, if a
kleptocrat seeks a more respectable middleman, American lawyers
seem only too happy to comply.” 381 The international organization
Global Witness which sponsored the “sting” operation that was shown
on the TV show 60 Minutes has used language that evokes the lawyer
as sieve narrative. 382

379. See infra notes 404-09 and accompanying text.
380. See, e.g., supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
381. Michael D. Goldhaber, The Global Lawyer: The Money Laundering Mills of Panama
and You, AM. LAW. DAILY (April 4, 2016).
382. See Global Witness, supra note 49.
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The lawyer as sieve narrative also appears in FATF Mutual
Evaluation Reports and in other intergovernmental documents. For
example, the Serbia Mutual Evaluation Report’s description of
professional secrecy as a “negative cultural approach” arguably reflects
this perspective. 383 The Authors submit that the lawyer as sieve
narrative might also explain the hostility towards the legal profession
that appears in Canada’s Mutual Evaluation Report. 384 That Report
cavalierly dismissed a lengthy and thoughtful Canadian Supreme Court
case that had tried to balance the government’s interest in fighting
money laundering and the constitutional rights associated with lawyer
privilege, describing the case as an “impediment” to Canada’s AML
system. 385 The World Bank’s Puppet Masters Report, which was cited
in Section II.B, also seems to use this perspective. 386
One characteristic of the lawyer as sieve narrative the Authors
have identified is the tendency to apply or recommend stringent AML
provisions for lawyers with limited or no discussion about lawyers’
roles in the legal system or the potential impact on administration of
justice or the rule of law. 387 Those who espouse an extreme version of
this narrative typically want lawyers regulated in a manner identical to
other DNFBPs and do not explore whether there might be reasons to
regulate lawyers differently than other potential money-laundering
conduits. 388

383. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (describing Serbia’s MER).
384. See supra notes 200-05 and accompanying text for a discussion of Canada’s Mutual
Evaluation Report.
385. See, e.g., Canada MER, supra note 109, ¶ 27: (“[AML/CFT] requirements were
found to breach the constitutional right to attorney-client privilege by the Supreme Court of
Canada on 13 February 2015. In light of these professionals’ key gatekeeper role . . . this
constitutes a serious impediment to Canada’s efforts to fight ML.”). Id. The Canadian Supreme
Court decision, which is more than fifty pages long, struck down parts of the government’s AML
regulations directed towards lawyers, but refused to adopt the more profession-friendly
reasoning of the Court of Appeals. Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies
of Canada, 2015 SCC 7.
386. See, e.g., Puppet Masters, supra note 39, at 94-97 (this discussion of the way in which
the attorney-client privilege impedes AML enforcement contained little to no discussion of what
might be lost by changing lawyers’ regulatory structure).
387. See, e.g., id.; Canada MER, supra note 109.
388 . It is worth noting, however, that the lawyer as sieve narrative is sometimes
intertwined with criticisms of substantive corporate law rules, such as those found in Delaware,
Wyoming, and elsewhere, that do not require disclosure of the corporation’s “beneficial
owners.” These kinds of “shell” corporations make it easier to hide the proceeds of crime. See,
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Although the lawyer as sieve narrative is prevalent in AML
discussions, it is not the only narrative that has been used to discuss
AML lawyer regulation discussions. This Article asserts that there is a
competing narrative, which this Article refers to as the “lawyer as
Atlas” narrative. In Greek mythology, Atlas held up the sky on his
shoulders. 389 The narrative that this Article has labeled the lawyer as
Atlas narrative focuses on the role of lawyers in upholding the rule of
law and ensuring a robust administration of justice system.
A number of international documents recognize lawyers’ unique
role and provide support for the lawyer as Atlas perspective. For
example, the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers
includes the following clause: “Whereas adequate protection of the
human rights and fundamental freedoms to which all persons are
entitled, be they economic, social and cultural, or civil and political,
requires that all persons have effective access to legal services provided
by an independent legal profession.” 390
The United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers
further provides that “[g]overnments shall recognize and respect that
all communications and consultations between lawyers and their clients
within their professional relationship are confidential.” 391 Additional

e.g., Costa Rica MER, supra note 109, ¶¶ 450-51; Zimbabwe MER, supra note 109, at 97-98,
102-03; Hungary MER, supra note 109, at 38 n.19; United States MER, supra note 109, ¶ 22;
Goldhaber, supra note 381 (“The even bigger embarrassment is the ABA’s obstruction of
commonsense reform such as the Incorporation Transparency Act . . . .”). As explained supra
notes 289, 295, there may be advantages to “decoupling” AML lawyer regulation issues, on the
one hand, and beneficial ownership corporate transparency laws on the other hand, but that issue
is beyond the scope of this Article.
389. See Edith Hamilton, MYTHOLOGY: TIMELESS TALES OF GODS AND HEROES 25
(Warner 1969); see also Lynne S. Wilcox, Who Holds Up the World?, 4(2) Preventing Chronic
Dis.
A20
(Apr.
2007),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1893119/
[https://perma.cc/TA27-5PTX] (“In Greek mythology, for example, Atlas was forced to support
the earth after fighting unsuccessfully against Zeus, the leader of the Olympian gods. . . .
Fortunately, countries throughout the world today are approaching their responsibility to support
their citizens’ health more willingly than Atlas approached his task.”).
390. Eighth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 27
August–7 September 1990, Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, UN Doc
A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1
(1990),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/
RoleOfLawyers.aspx [https://perma.cc/4EQW-S9EL] [hereinafter UN Basic Principles].
391. Id. ¶ 22.
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statements about the role of lawyers in upholding the rule of law are
found in the Council of Europe’s Recommendation about the Legal
Profession, 392 European Parliament resolutions, 393 IBA resolutions,
such as the International Bar Association Resolution on the Regulation

392. Council of Europe Recommendation Rec (2000) 21 of 25 October 2000 on the
freedom
of
exercise
of
the
profession
of
lawyer,
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=
09000016804d0fc8 [https://perma.cc/6PBY-Y93N]. The “whereas” clauses include the
following:
Underlining the fundamental role that lawyers and professional associations of
lawyers also play in ensuring the protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms;
Desiring to promote the freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer in order to
strengthen the Rule of Law, in which lawyers take part, in particular in the role of
defending individual freedoms;
Conscious of the need for a fair system of administration of justice which guarantees
the independence of lawyers in the discharge of their professional duties without any
improper restriction, influence, inducement, pressure, threats or interference, direct
or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason;
Aware of the desirability of ensuring a proper exercise of lawyers’ responsibilities
and, in particular, of the need for lawyers to receive sufficient training and to find a
proper balance between their duties towards the courts and those towards their clients.
Id. at 1.
393. European Parliament resolution on the legal professions and the general interest in
the functioning of legal systems, P6TA (2006)0108 (March 23, 2006),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P6-TA2006-0108+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN [https://perma.cc/BW7Y-8N5L]. This resolution included
the following paragraphs relevant to the role of lawyers in establishing and maintaining the rule
of law:
1. Recognises fully the crucial role played by the legal professions in a democratic
society to guarantee respect for fundamental rights, the rule of law and security in the
application of the law, both when lawyers represent and defend clients in court and
when they are giving their clients legal advice; . . .
3. Notes the high qualifications required for access to the legal professions, the need
to protect those qualifications that characterise the legal professions, in the interests
of European citizens, and the need to establish a specific relationship based on trust
between members of the legal professions and their clients;
4. Reaffirms the importance of rules which are necessary to ensure the independence,
competence, integrity and responsibility of members of the legal professions so as to
guarantee the quality of their services, to the benefit of their clients and society in
general, and in order to safeguard the public interest[.]
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of the Legal Profession, 394 statements by the CCBE, 395 rule of law
initiatives, 396 the IBA/ABA/CCBE Typologies document previously
394. See, e.g., International Bar Association, Resolution on the Regulation of the Legal
Profession (adopted at the IBA Council Meeting Vienna, 1998), https://www.ibanet.org/
Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=4094F728-9035-4C6C-8AB6-DE645546D26C
[https://perma.cc/L6AX-KJYN] [hereinafter IBA Core Values Resolution]. The “whereas”
quotes include the following:
HAVING due regard to the overriding public interest that the legal profession should
fulfil a special function in serving society which distinguishes it from other service
providers in that it has
c) a role in facilitating the administration of, and guaranteeing access to, justice;
d) a duty to the courts;
e) a duty to uphold the rule of law;
f) a duty to keep client matters confidential;
g) a duty to avoid conflicts of interest;
h) a duty to uphold specific ethical and professional standards;
i) a duty to provide clients with the highest and most beneficial quality of advice,
representation and legal services;
j) a duty, in the public interest, of securing its independence, professionally,
politically and economically, from any influence affecting its service; and
HAVING due regard to the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers adopted by the
Eighth United Nations Congress meeting in Havana on 7 September 1990; . . .
Id.
395. CCBE, Position of the Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Union
(CCBE) on the requirements on a lawyer to report suspicions of money laundering and on the
European Commission Proposal for a Third EU Directive on Money Laundering Regulations
(Nov. 2004), ¶¶ 19-20, https://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/speciality_distribution/public/
documents/ANTI_MONEY_LAUNDERING/AML_Position_papers/EN_AML_20041104_C
CBE_position_on_the_requirements_on_a_lawyer_to_report_suspicions_of_money_launderin
g_and_on_the_European_Commission_Proposal_for_a_Third_EU_Directive_on.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2PRQ-BX3T]:
19. . . . The CCBE cannot stress enough that requirements on a lawyer to report
suspicions regarding the activities of clients based upon information disclosed by
clients in strictest confidence is a violation of a fundamental right.
20. The CCBE requests that the Commission, Council and the Parliament bear in mind
that a lawyer is a member of a regulated profession, is part of the process which
ensures the rule of law, and has the duty to apply the law and have it applied. The
CCBE emphasises that when lawyers actually provide legal advice on money
laundering, they are party to an offence and should not benefit from any exemption.
396. See, e.g., ABA RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, Legal Profession Reform Index Factors,
https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/rule_of_law/publications/assessments/lpri/lpri_factors.
html [https://perma.cc/G8HV-2X8W] (“Factor 4. Lawyer-Client Confidentiality The state
recognizes and respects the confidentiality of professional communications and consultations
between lawyers and their clients.”). See also ABA ROLI Annual Report 2016-17,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/roli/misc/aba-roli-annual-report-
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cited, 397 and the FATF RBA Guidance for Legal Professions cited
earlier. 398
The lawyer as Atlas narrative emphasizes the fact that there is a
global consensus that a lawyer’s duty of confidentiality, or professional
secrecy or privilege, is one of the core values and key attributes of the
legal profession and often cites one or more of the documents listed
above. 399 The lawyer as Atlas narrative recognizes that lawyers should
not be permitted to assist their clients in illegal activities, 400 but it
highlights the lack of empirical data about intentional or unwitting
lawyer involvement in illegal money laundering activities.
In the same way that examples of the lawyer as sieve narrative
sometimes omit references to concerns involving the lawyers’ role in
upholding the rule of law and administration of justice, examples of the
lawyer as Atlas narrative sometimes omit or minimize discussion of the
money laundering concerns that have given rise to the competing
perspective. Consider, for example, the report accompanying ABA
Resolution 104, which was the first of the ABA’s three resolutions on

2016-2017.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/TAV2-JWLY] (“An independent, fair and
efficient justice system requires clear and transparent laws, skilled and ethical professionals, and
effective and accountable institutions.”).
397. See supra note 4 (IBA/ABA/CCBE Typologies document).
398. See FATF RBA Guidance for Legal Professionals, supra note 69.
399. See, e.g., UN Basic Principles, supra note 390, ¶ 22; IBA Resolution, supra note 394,
at (f); Council of Europe Recommendation, supra note 392, at Principle 1, ¶ 6. Because of space
limitations, this footnote does not cite the many other examples available including the Charter
of Core Principles of the European Legal Profession and the 2005 Statement of Core Principles
of the Legal Profession signed by the presidents of more than 100 legal profession organizations.
While countries differ from one another with respect to the exact terminology they use and the
exact parameters of these doctrines, the UN Basic Principles, the IBA Core Values Resolution,
and the other documents cited supra demonstrate the deeply-embedded and global nature of
legal profession values such as confidentiality, loyalty, and independence. These documents also
highlight lawyers’ important role in ensuring a robust rule of law culture.
400 . See, e.g., CCBE, European Parliament Committee of Inquiry into Money
Laundering, Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion (PANA) Committee of inquiry questions to the
Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE), 1, 4 (Jan. 24, 2017),
https://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/speciality_distribution/public/documents/ANTI_MONEY_LA
UNDERING/AML_Position_papers/EN_AML_20170124_Responses_of_inquiry_questions_t
o_the_CCBE_from_EP_Committee_of_Inquiry_into_Money_Laundering__Tax_Avoidance_a
nd_Tax_Evasion__PANA_.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VXT-DS73] (“Professional secrecy/legal
professional privilege do not apply if a lawyer takes part in illegal actions of the client. This is
the case in every EU Member State.”).
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this topic. 401 The opening paragraph of the Resolution mentions the
need for “reasonable and balanced initiatives designed to detect and
prevent domestic and international money laundering and terrorist
financing,” 402 but the accompanying report arguably does not convey
the scope of the money laundering problem or explain why criminals
need to seek out others, such as lawyers, to help them achieve the
“layering” and “integration” stages of money laundering. 403 In other
words, it omits the type of discussion found in Section II.A of this
Article that explains why AML laws exist and the role that lawyers
might play in addressing a serious societal issue by decreasing money
laundering activities.
Outside of the FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports, it is common to
find both the lawyer as sieve and lawyer as Atlas narratives, although
rarely in the same document. 404 For example, popular press articles
often use the lawyer as sieve perspective. 405 Bar association
documents, on the other hand, often use the lawyer as Atlas
perspective. 406 Inside the four corners of the FATF Mutual Evaluation
Reports, however, the lawyer as sieve narrative seems dominant, with
little acknowledgment of the issues raised by the lawyer as Atlas
narrative. Some Mutual Evaluation Reports, such as the previously
cited Serbia report, 407 are explicitly hostile to the issues that underlie
the lawyer as Atlas narrative. 408 Other FATF Mutual Evaluation

401. Compare Section II.A, supra (discussing the extent of the problem and the stages of
money laundering), with ABA Resolution 104, infra note 402. See also supra notes 295, 388,
which cite the commingling of lawyer regulation AML issues, on the one hand, and substantive
corporate law and beneficial ownership issues, on the other hand, but note that this issue is
beyond the scope of this Article.
402 . AM. BAR. ASS’N, ADOPTED BY THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 104
(2003),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2003_my_104.
authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8PE-M54D].
403. Id. at 3-16.
404. See infra notes 405-06 and accompanying text.
405. See, e.g., supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
406. See generally ABA Gatekeeper Advocacy webpage, supra note 208; CCBE AntiMoney
Laundering
Committee,
https://www.ccbe.eu/actions/committees-workinggroups/?idC=791&Committee=Anti-Money-Laundering [https://perma.cc/2FEJ-4BKS].
407. See Serbia MER, supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
408. See generally supra notes 139-70 and accompanying text.
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Reports implicitly demonstrate their hostility to the lawyer as Atlas
issues by their failure to respond meaningfully to the privilege
arguments raised by the legal profession during the FATF mutual
evaluation process. 409 As noted previously, none of the fifty FATF
Mutual Evaluation Reports discussed in this Article provides a nuanced
discussion of the difficult issues involved and the valid points that have
given rise to both the lawyer as sieve and lawyer as Atlas
perspectives. 410 Part VI, infra, argues that the polarized nature of the
lawyer AML discussions has been counterproductive and offers
suggestions about how the FATF Mutual Evaluation process could
more effectively harness the energy of the legal profession and reduce
lawyer involvement in illegal money laundering activities.
VI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ABOUT HOW TO
STRUCTURE FATF MUTUAL EVALUATIONS TO REDUCE
LAWYER FACILITATION OF ILLEGAL MONEY LAUNDERING
Reading the legal profession sections of FATF Mutual Evaluation
Reports can be quite depressing. On the one hand, the FATF Mutual
Evaluation Reports express frustration with the legal profession’s
failure to adopt or implement the FATF Recommendations in the same
manner as other DNFBPs. 411 Legal profession representatives, on the
other hand, seem frustrated by the lack of acknowledgement in the
Mutual Evaluation process of the role that lawyers play in establishing
a vibrant rule of law culture and the ways in which FATF’s approach
undermines the fundamental nature of the lawyer-client relationship
and widely-accepted values within the legal profession. 412 In short,
both sides seem frustrated with the current situation.
This Article submits that there is a better way forward than the
approach that has been used in FATF’s ongoing Mutual Evaluations.
Lawyers can be and should be powerful tools in the fight against
criminal money laundering. But instead of the current
counterproductive approach that diverts energy by trying to fit a square
peg (lawyers) into a round hole (FATF’s existing DNFBP rules and
mutual evaluation process), society arguably would be much better off

409.
410.
411.
412.

See generally supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 139-71 and accompanying text.
Id.
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if the FATF Mutual Evaluation process could recognize and harness
the differences that exist between lawyers on the one hand and
DNFBPs such as casinos, precious metal dealers, and real estate
brokers, on the other hand. It is fully consistent with lawyers’
professional values to ask them to be robust gatekeepers at the front
end of the lawyer-client relationship and to avoid assisting criminals in
their money laundering efforts. 413 By focusing on the “front end” of the
lawyer-client relationship and by bringing together AML and legal
profession experts, FATF could harness a tremendous amount of
energy and arguably would make greater progress in reducing lawyer
facilitation of illegal money laundering.
Consider, for example, what might happen if FATF and its
stakeholders could agree on the following three goals: 414
•
•
•

Reducing the overall amount of money laundering;
Reducing lawyer facilitation of money laundering; and
Having a vibrant rule of law system.

Asking stakeholders to endorse these three goals or regulatory
objectives and to address them in the legal profession portion of a
FATF Mutual Evaluation could have a significant impact on AML
conversations. Those who articulate an extreme version of the lawyer
as Atlas narrative could be reminded of the need to acknowledge the
global consensus that money laundering is a serious societal problem
that needs to be addressed, the fact that criminal money launderers are
likely to seek out lawyers for assistance during the layering and
integration stages of money laundering, 415 and the need to have a
robust lawyer AML regulatory and education system in order to
achieve the agreed-upon goal of minimizing lawyer involvement in,
and facilitation of, criminal money laundering Those who articulate an
413. See supra notes 260-66, 400 and accompanying text (citing the CCBE’s response to
the EU Pana Committee and traditional legal profession documents and US legal ethics rules).
414. See, e.g., Laurel S. Terry et al., Adopting Regulatory Objectives for the Legal
Profession, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685 (2012) (arguing in support of explicit regulatory
objectives).
415. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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extreme version of the lawyer as sieve narrative could be reminded of
the importance of having a robust rule of law system not only because
it is healthy for a society, but because a robust rule of law culture can
help a jurisdiction reduce money laundering. 416 These individuals
could also be reminded of the important role that lawyers play in
ensuring a robust rule of law culture and the fact that loyalty and
confidentiality are recognized as universal lawyer values that are core
to lawyers’ self-identity, even if countries differ in the exact manner in
which they implement these values. 417
The Authors submit that using the three goals listed above as the
framework for the legal profession portion of a Mutual Evaluation not
only could lead to changed conversations, but it likely would lead to
improved outcomes and a reduction in lawyer involvement in money
laundering. These goals retain the concept of “lawyer as gatekeeper”
and include as a critical goal the reduction of lawyer facilitation of
money laundering. But instead of treating lawyers in a manner that is
identical to all other DNFBPs but inconsistent with traditional lawyer
values, a principles-based approach based on the three goals listed
above could take advantage of, and leverage, the strengths, expertise,
and values of the legal profession in the fight against money
laundering.
What might a principles-based FATF Mutual Evaluation of the
legal profession look like? Consider how much progress might be
made if the legal professions in FATF jurisdictions were asked to
address the following four questions during the FATF Mutual
Evaluation process. First, the legal profession portion of a FATF
Mutual Evaluation might begin by asking the country in question to
confirm that it has a regulatory system that makes it clear that money
laundering is illegal and that lawyers are aware of these criminal laws.
Having clear, well-publicized, and well-understood AML laws is a

416. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (citing UN statements regarding the harm
caused by money laundering).
417. See supra note 399 and accompanying text (citing documents that set forth these
values). Ignoring these traditional values can lead to an AML approach that treats lawyers
identically to other DNFBPs but changes the fundamental nature of lawful lawyer-client
relationships. This change could have negative consequences for the rule of law. If clients view
their lawyers as arms of the state who have a very low threshold for reporting potential
misconduct, clients may be less willing to raise concerns with their lawyers and lawyers may
have less opportunity to dissuade their non-criminal clients from improper activity. It could also
contribute to societal distruct of the legal system.
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critical prerequisite to reducing lawyer facilitation of money
laundering. The Authors believe that in each of their countries, there
is room for improvement in educating lawyers about the underlying
AML criminal laws. Lawyers may not currently understand that
actions that may be perfectly legal in one context, such as setting up a
corporation, will be illegal if the client’s motive is to conceal the illegal
proceeds of criminal activities. Thus, the first set of questions that a
FATF Mutual Evaluation might focus on is whether the country has
adopted anti-money laundering criminal laws and whether the lawyers
in that country understand what conduct constitutes criminal money
laundering activity.
Second, the legal profession portion of a FATF Mutual Evaluation
might ask the country in question to confirm that it has a regulatory
system in place that makes it clear that lawyers are prohibited from
assisting their clients in illegal money laundering activities. Many
countries already include such provisions in their lawyer regulatory
systems. 418 As numerous legal profession documents, including some
cited earlier in this Article, have made clear, assisting a client in illegal
conduct is not a core value of the legal profession. 419 The CCBE made
this point to a Panama Papers committee when it observed that
“Professional secrecy/legal professional privilege do not apply if a
lawyer takes part in illegal actions of the client. This is the case in every
EU Member State.” 420 Thus, even if a country has not yet adopted
explicit laws on this point, the legal profession should not object to
adopting ethical rules or other regulatory provisions that make it clear
that a lawyer may not assist a client with his or her illegal money
laundering.
Third, if a country has the appropriate AML criminal laws and
lawyer regulatory system in place, this portion of the FATF Mutual
Evaluation could focus on how the country implements its regulatory
system that prohibits lawyers from facilitating money laundering. It
418. See, e.g., supra notes 259-74 and accompanying text (discussing ABA Model Rules
1.1, 1.2(d), and 1.16(a)).
419. See supra notes 390-98 and accompanying text (citing documents about the legal
profession).
420. See supra note 400 and accompanying text (citing the CCBE’s statement to the EU
PANA Committee). This is also true in the United States. See supra notes 275-79 and
accompanying text (discussing US criminal and lawyer discipline provisions).
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might begin by asking whether the jurisdiction is doing all it could to
ensure that its lawyers understand why criminals who launder money
are likely to seek the assistance of lawyers. This section of the Mutual
Evaluation might continue by asking the jurisdiction what steps it has
taken to educate its lawyers so that they recognize money laundering
situations and recognize when they have been asked to assist a client
with the client’s criminal money laundering. As noted in the prior
paragraph, lawyers would be forbidden by both criminal law and the
lawyer regulatory system from assisting criminals in their money
laundering efforts and this stage of the Mutual Evaluation process
would focus on education efforts that would teach lawyers to recognize
when clients were seeking such services.
The fourth section of the legal profession portion of a FATF
Mutual Evaluation could focus on enforcement of the lawyer regulatory
system. This section would ask whether and how the jurisdiction
enforces its regulatory provisions that prohibit lawyer facilitation of
money laundering and whether there is room for improvement in the
enforcement system. During this stage of the Mutual Evaluation,
countries could be asked to explain whether their lawyer regulatory
enforcement actions are publicized since publication can serve both
education and deterrent functions.
In responding to these four sets of questions, a FATF country
might find it helpful to consult the questions found in Outcomes 3 and
4 of the Effectiveness Assessment in the FATF Mutual Evaluation
Methodology document. 421 A country might also find it helpful to
examine practices and examples from other countries. 422 It seems
likely that if this type of Mutual Evaluation approach were used, FATF
or legal profession representatives might decide that it would be helpful
to have a legal profession-specific master document that listed
examples from around the world of lawyer regulatory provisions,
implementation efforts, and enforcement mechanisms. Thus, even if a
country was not using a particular AML tool at the time of its Mutual
Evaluation, it could use the Mutual Evaluation process as an
opportunity to educate itself about what other jurisdictions were doing

421. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 220-25 and accompanying text (the Appendices listing various US
initiatives and efforts).
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and obtain feedback about the strengths and weaknesses of its own
approach. 423
As a corollary to this latter point, FATF might want to consider
whether and how it might facilitate in-depth peer-to-peer evaluations
by legal profession representatives.
Lawyers from different
jurisdictions are accustomed to talking to each other, exchanging ideas
with one another, and learning from one another. 424 It is beyond the
scope of this Article to document the contexts in which multijurisdictional legal profession conversations have occurred, but these
kinds of conversations are common and influential in the legal
profession 425 If FATF combined these kinds of peer-to-peer
conversations with its existing AML expertise, it would be harnessing
423. For information about how US lawyer regulation use peer review, see Email from
Ellyn Rosen, ABA Center for Professional Responsibility Regulation and Global Initiatives
Counsel and Counsel to the Professional Regulation Committee, to Laurel Terry (Nov. 11,
2018). This email discussed the domestic US impact of peer review:
The ABA Standing Committee on Professional Regulation (formerly Discipline) has,
since 1980, provided to state supreme courts a lawyer and judicial discipline system
consultation service. At the invitation of a state supreme court, the Committee
conducts a comprehensive study of the jurisdiction’s disciplinary system that includes
a multi-day onsite visit. At the conclusion of its review, the Committee submits to
the court, on a confidential basis, a report that highlights the system’s strengths and
makes recommendations for improvements using ABA policies as guidelines, as well
as noting, where appropriate, practices in other jurisdictions that have proven
successful. A consultation report is submitted to the court on a confidential basis, and
it is left to the court to determine whether and when to make it public. More
frequently courts have decided to do so. The Committee has conducted over 65
consultations, and adoption of its recommendations have resulted in the adoption of
changes that have improved the effectiveness, efficiency, fairness, transparency, and
resourcing the system.
Id. See also Laurel S. Terry, Preserving the Rule of Law in the 21st Century: The Importance
of Infrastructure and the Need to Create a Global Lawyer Regulatory Umbrella Organization,
2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 735 (discussing, inter alia, the power of regulatory networks, model
standards, and peer review).
424. See, e.g., Laurel S. Terry, The Impact of Global Developments on U.S. Legal Ethics
During the Past Thirty Years, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 365, 381-85 (2017); Laurel S.
Terry, Creating an International Network of Lawyer Regulators: The 2012 International
Conference of Legal Regulators, 82(2) BAR EXAMINER 18, 18-19 (June 2013); Laurel S. Terry
& Carole Silver, Transnational Legal Practice [2014], 49 ABA/SIL (n.s.) 413 (2015)
(discussing TLP-Nets that interact in the legal services and legal services regulation space).
425. See supra note 424 (cited sources provide numerous examples of conversations
among legal professionals).
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tremendous knowledge, skill, experience, expertise, energy,
cooperation, and engagement. Legal professions could learn from one
another regulatory design options, implementation and education tools
that have proven effective, and enforcement systems and options. The
focus would be on the front-end of the lawyer-client relationship and
making sure that lawyers know that it is improper for them to assist
clients in money laundering activities and teaching lawyers to
recognize when potential clients are seeking the lawyer’s services for
this purpose. Peers might not always agree with all of the methods or
choices that others have made, but a peer review system could provide
a mirror through which legal profession representatives could reflect
on the strengths and weaknesses of their own system and introduce
them to new ideas.
Despite the education and information-sharing that would take
place through a peer-evaluation process, it is highly likely that there
will continue to be a few “bad apple” individual lawyers who will
choose to become criminals and who will knowingly help their clients
illegally launder money. 426 But if these “bad apple” lawyers are not
deterred by the existing criminal law sanctions, it is unlikely that they
will be deterred by a lawyer regulatory system, even a well-designed
and well-implemented system. Thus, if a primary goal is to reduce, if
not completely eliminate, lawyer facilitation of illegal money
laundering, surely it is better to enlist the full support of lawyer
regulators and law-abiding members of the legal profession and focus
on educating those lawyers who would not knowingly and willingly
become criminal money launderers.
To implement this approach, jurisdictions should work to ensure
that they have in place laws that criminalize money laundering, that
lawyers know what those criminal laws say, that there are lawyer
regulatory provisions that prohibit lawyers from assisting criminal
money laundering clients, that lawyers are educated so that they
recognize when they are being asked to assist in money laundering, and
that there are enforcement mechanisms for lawyers who ignore these
obligations. FATF Mutual Evaluations that helped jurisdictions
achieve these steps arguably would be much more effective in reducing

426. In the future, there will likely be disagreements about how aberrational it is for
lawyers to knowingly assist criminals in their efforts to launder money. The Authors hope,
however, that we can agree that not all lawyers would knowingly and willingly assist those who
are engaged in money laundering.
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lawyer facilitation of money laundering than the Mutual Evaluation
approach currently used and would be more likely to affect permanent
change. Treating lawyers as gatekeepers who have a duty not to assist
criminal money laundering activity leverages lawyers’ identity as
“professionals” and is fully consistent with the traditional values that
gave rise to the lawyer as Atlas narrative. 427
FATF Members have accurately recognized that lawyers can be
powerful tools in the important fight against criminal money
laundering, but they arguably have not yet harnessed the full power of
the legal profession in this fight. One of the reasons why this has not
occurred is that the legal profession views FATF’s one-size-fits-allDNFPBs approach as fundamentally at odds with lawyers’ historic and
globally-accepted values. 428 This Article recommends that, in the
future, the legal profession portions of FATF Mutual Evaluations
should focus on the three goals listed previously and should help
countries develop a culture in which their lawyers internalize AML
sensitivity in the same way that lawyers have internalized conflicts of

427. See supra notes 259-74, 400 and accompanying text (citing ABA Model Rules that
prohibit lawyers from assisting clients in illegal activities and the CCBE’s statement to the EU
PANA Committee making a similar point).
428. See, e.g., Helgesson & Morth, supra note 45, at 234-37, 244 (their interviews with
Swedish lawyers highlighted the clash between professional norms and FATF obligations). In
the Authors’ view, this study illustrates the benefits that might come from an education-heavy
approach that seeks to have lawyers better understand ML risks and internalize their responses,
rather than perform a “check off the box” exercise or expect many suspicious transaction reports.
The article concluded:
A remaining question is thus whether it would be possible for lawyers to better help
prevent crime among their clients, and contribute to the quest for security in society,
with recourse to other types of regulatory tools. To that end, further research could
focus on the political willingness to give lawyers possibilities to combine activities
of ‘true’ pro-active crime prevention with their strong professional norm of client
confidentiality. So far, the FATF recommendations and EU directives do not appear
to make enough of a distinction between the banking sector and the non-banking
sector. Here, our case suggests that the reluctance among lawyers to become engaged
in ‘true’ pro-active crime prevention, and not only in being compliant enough in order
to avoid punishment and sanctions, is dependent on if and how the FATF can listen
more closely to how the front-line workers perceive and handle the regulations on
AML/CTF in practice.
Id. at 241. See also Middleton & Levi, supra note 28, at 656-57 (examples cited arguably
illustrate the benefit that might come from additional education).
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interest sensitivity. This type of approach truly could result in lawyers
being the type of gatekeepers who would help stop the flow of illegal
money laundering.
In closing, it is worth noting that the treatment of lawyers in the
FATF Mutual Evaluations—and the aftermath—is an issue that all
legal services regulation stakeholders and AML stakeholders should
care about. As Part I of this Article explains, money laundering is a
serious societal problem with widespread negative consequences. 429
Because of the three-step process of money laundering, 430 criminals are
likely to seek out the services of lawyers. 431 While improvements have
been made, AML scandals in the United States, in Peru, and elsewhere
show that there is room for improvement in the way in which lawyers
are handling their gatekeeping role. 432 Moreover, AML regulation of
lawyers implicates a number of much broader issues, including issues
related to the type of lawyer regulation that promotes or impedes a
robust rule of law system. Thus, it is in the interests of those who care
about AML issues and those who care about lawyer regulation to
consider the current and future design of FATF’s Mutual Evaluations
and the best way to advance the goal of reducing lawyer facilitation of
illegal money laundering activities.

429. See supra notes 2-21 and accompanying text.
430. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
431. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
432. See, e.g., supra notes 266, 295 and accompanying text (discussing the US author’s
views about needed improvements), supra notes 365-66, 378 and accompanying text (discussing
the Peruvian Author’s views about needed improvements).
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APPENDIX I
Checklist of Ten Issues for Legal Profession Representatives
Whose FATF Mutual Evaluations Have Not Yet Occurred
This Appendix summarizes information discussed elsewhere in
this Article. It is based in large part on the advice from the three “case
study” jurisdictions and offers a checklist of issues for jurisdictions that
have not yet undergone their FATF 4th Round Mutual Evaluation.
1. Confirm Timing: The FATF webpage contains a searchable
calendar that indicates the timetable for each country’s Mutual
Evaluation Report. 433 The FATF Procedures document explains the
steps and timetable. Legal profession representatives should recognize
the significant lead time involved and become familiar with the
deadlines for the national risk assessment and the documents submitted
before the on-site assessment visit. 434
2. Identify Relevant Government Authorities: Jurisdictions
differ with respect to the government body that takes the lead in
interacting with FATF. 435 If the legal profession representatives are
able to locate the relevant government entity and establish a
relationship with the government representatives in advance of the
mutual evaluation, that should be helpful. 436 Government
representatives might welcome this kind of relationship because the
legal profession representatives have knowledge that will make the

433. See FATF Global Assessment Calendar, supra note 102 and accompanying text.
434. See FATF 4th Round Methodology, supra note 95 (discussing the FATF 4th Round
Methodology document, its Timeline appendix, and the fact that tasks that are performed two,
four, and six months before the FATF on-site visit).
435. If legal profession representatives are not sure whom they should reach out to, one
source that can provide a starting point is the International Bar Association’s Anti-MoneyLaundering Forum webpage. This webpage has listings for many countries in the world and
these listings identify the relevant government bodies Anti-Money-Laundering Forum, INT’L B.
ASS’N, https://www.anti-moneylaundering.org/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/7YAN-YT9P].
436 . Cf. 2017 Canada Risk Assessment, supra notes 196-97, which assigned a high
vulnerability rating to Canada’s legal profession and did not note professional regulation
initiatives. At the time the Canadian government issued its threat assessment report, it had
recently lost in the Supreme Court a fourteen-year legal fight with lawyer regulators regarding
the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act and regulations
pertaining to the legal profession.
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government representatives’ jobs easier in completing the necessary
paperwork.
3. Recognize the Importance of the National Risk Assessment:
A country’s national risk assessment plays a key role in the FATF
Mutual Evaluation. Some of these risk assessments have been prepared
with little input from the legal profession in their countries. In order to
maximize their chance of input, legal profession representatives should
familiarize themselves with any prior risk assessments performed by
their country and consider whether and how they can participate in the
country’s forthcoming risk assessment. 437 Because countries have been
criticized for “stale” or weak threat assessments, governments should
welcome the participation of the legal profession. 438 The participation,
however, must be meaningful. FATF Reports have expressed criticism
of countries that painted too optimistic a picture of the risks posed by
legal professionals. 439

437. There are three different reasons why legal professions might want to consider, in
advance of the mutual evaluation, how they could contribute to the national risk assessment.
First, legal professions that have ignored requests to participate have been criticized in their
country’s FATF mutual evaluation Report. See supra note 150 (noting that Serbia’s MER
criticized the legal profession for not responding to a questionnaire that solicited information for
the National Threat Assessment). Second, legal professions might want to participate in the
development of the risk assessment, rather than simply critiquing it later as unfounded, because
the FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports give great deference to these national reports. See, e.g.,
FATF 4th Round Methodology, supra note 95, ¶ 7 (“Assessors should use the country’s own
assessment(s) of its risks as an initial basis for understanding the risks, but should not uncritically
accept a country’s risk assessment as correct, and need not follow all its conclusions.”); id. at 8,
¶ 15 (“Assessors are not expected to conduct an independent risk assessment of their own when
assessing Recommendation1 and Immediate Outcome 1, but on the other hand should not
necessarily accept a country’s risk assessment as correct. In reviewing the country’s risk
assessment, assessors should consider the rigour of the processes and procedures employed; and
the internal consistency of the assessment. . . .”) A third reason to participate and help shape the
findings is because FATF reports have been critical of legal professions that are unfamiliar with
or disagree with the findings contained in their country’s national risk assessments. See, e.g.,
supra note 153 (citing Andorra MER); Portugal MER, supra note 109, ¶ 300) (“[The regulator]
could not provide an analysis of the conclusions of the [National Risk Assessment] that directly
targeted their specific sector(s), nor clarify the source(s) of data.”).
438. See, e.g., Australia MER, supra note 109, ¶ 2.8 (“The [National Threat Assessment’s]
conclusions reasonably reflect most of Australia’s main risks (which likely still prevail), but the
NTA is now three years old and assessors are not confident that it is current for all risks,
including where subsequent assessments have superseded it in some areas . . .”).
439. See, e.g., supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
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4. Look Outside the Country for Ideas About Risk
Assessment: One of the recurring themes about lawyer AML issues is
how little empirical data is available. Given the lack of data that legal
profession representatives are likely to encounter, they may want to
look outside their own country for ideas to consider in a risk
assessment.
5. Become Familiar with FATF’s Mutual Evaluation
Template Documents: It is important for legal profession
representatives to realize that their own country likely will submit
information to the FATF on-site assessment team using the FATF
template found in the FATF 4th Round Methodology document. 440
FATF’s 4th Round Mutual Evaluation Report is also likely to follow
the structure in the template. Legal profession representatives would be
wise to familiarize themselves with these documents and strive to
collect the requested data. They will also need to learn how to present
the information they consider relevant using the terminology and
framework that the FATF assessors consider relevant.
6. Document and Communicate Profession-Based AML
Requirements: Legal profession representatives should understand
that the assessment team, and perhaps the profession’s own
government representatives, may not fully understand the nature and
scope of professional regulation unless they are educated on that point.
Moreover, the FATF assessment team is likely to assume that if a
lawyer is not subject to the same AML regulations as all other
DNFBPs, then the lawyer’s AML obligations are deficient. Legal
profession representatives need to be familiar not only with their own
regulations, but with the AML regulations applicable to other kinds of
DNFBPs so that they can explain where there is overlap and why
aspects of the national AML scheme applicable to other DNFBPs may
be duplicative and thus unnecessary for lawyers. 441

440. See FATF 4th Round Methodology, supra note 95.
441. See, e.g., Nicoll Email, supra note 174 (recommending additional education about
the relationship of FATF to professional regulations). There may also be additional regulations
with the forum, including regulatory requirements that overlay obligations for example of
identification, verification in real estate transactions, foreign investment, company, trust
formation, charities, and not for profit organizations that mimic or duplicate some or most of the
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7. Develop, Document, and Communicate Professional
Regulation Implementation Data: Legal profession representatives
should be prepared to present documentation to support the
jurisdiction’s lawyer AML education efforts and regulatory
enforcement, including education efforts and criminal and disciplinary
cases. 442 The legal profession in one country, for example, was
criticized for not providing the FATF on-site team with its educational
materials. 443 Legal profession representatives might want to use a
forthcoming visit as an opportunity to educate or reeducate the
jurisdiction’s lawyers using existing or new tools. For example, the
Ghana Bar, which is a member of the IBA, was criticized for not
circulating the IBA/ABA/CCBE Typologies Guide. 444
8. Identify Appropriate Legal Profession Representatives to
Speak with the FATF On-Site Team: According to the FATF
Procedures document, two months before the FATF assessment team’s
on-site visit, the country must provide the assessment team with the
program for its visit, which will include the private sector bodies the
team will meet with. Legal profession representatives should work with
government authorities to ensure that the appropriate legal profession
representatives are invited to meet the FATF on-site team. 445 They
should also make sure that the individuals tasked to meet with FATF
representatives have all of the information that would be helpful.

AML/CTF regulatory requirements). Id. Many such regulatory obligations arise pursuant to state
based legislative schemes. Id.
442. See, e.g., supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text (noting FATF interest in some
of the information the US legal profession collected).
443. See Iceland MER, supra note 109, ¶ 315 (observing, in an arguably critical manner,
that the Iceland Bar Association had not provided the FATF on-site assessors with a copy of the
guidance it provided to its members).
444. See Ghana MER, supra note 148 (citing Ghana’s Mutual Evaluation Report).
445. See Wilson Email, supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text (reporting on
discussions within Canada about whether the legal profession representatives should be from
British Columbia or from the Federation, which had broader representation). If government
representatives do not reach out to the legal profession representatives, legal profession
representatives may want to take the initiative because countries have been criticized for their
failure to have legal profession representatives meet with the on-site assessment team. See supra
notes 153-54 and accompanying text (noting countries whose legal profession had been
criticized because it had not met with the FATF on-site inspectors or the representatives were
unfamiliar with the country’s risk assessment).
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9. Consider Reaching Out for Advice to Legal Professions that
Have Already Undergone Their Mutual Evaluations: Legal
profession representatives who are planning for their country’s mutual
evaluation may find it useful to consult with individuals from other
countries who have already gone through the process. 446 Countries that
have done so have found it useful. 447 Among other points, legal
profession representatives may want to speak with one another to learn
how they can most effectively remind the FATF on-site assessors (and
perhaps their own government) of the points made in the FATF
Interpretive Note to Recommendation 23. 448
10. Consider Cost-Benefit Arguments and Data: FATF has
been criticized for not adequately taking into the account the costs
imposed by its Recommendations. The costs may be tangible, such as
the financial cost of administering an AML system. 449 However, the
costs may also be intangible, such as a loss of confidence in the rule of
law that might result under certain circumstances if lawyers are
required to act as agents of the government and report suspicious
transactions. Additional costs might include the loss of opportunities in
which a lawyer persuaded a client to avoid money laundering activities.
While this undoubtedly would not work for all clients, there might be
some clients for which it would work. If legal profession

446. See supra note 252 (recommending that countries that are looking for a venue in
which to meet each other and have these kinds of conversations might consider using the
webpage and resources of the International Conference of Legal Regulators (“ICLR”) and the
IBA Bar Issues Commission).
447. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text (describing Case Study #3 and USAustralian information-sharing).
448. See supra notes 91, 159-60 and accompanying text (describing the Interpretive Note
to Recommendation 23 and the lack of discussion about this Note in the reports).
449. The Law Society of England and Wales is one of the few groups that has collected
empirical data about the costs and benefits of lawyer AML efforts. See Law Soc., The costs and
benefits of anti-money laundering compliance for solicitors: Response by the Law Society of
England and Wales to the call for evidence in the Review of the Money Laundering Regulations
2007 (Dec. 2009), http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/risk-compliance/anti-moneylaundering/documents/law-society-response-to-the-hm-treasury-money-laundering-review2009/ [https://perma.cc/8VZP-4NQW] (noting that solicitors filed a number of SARs, but few
required government follow-up action; also includes cost information). See also Terry, FATF
Introduction, supra note 89, at 29-32 (summarizing the data the Law Society presented to its
government).
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representatives want to offer cost-benefit arguments, they should
consider how best to develop and frame those points.

